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From *Very Weak* to *Very Strong*: Analyzing Password-Strength Meters

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Password-strength meter/checker

Password:

.....

Good

What is this work about?

We analyzed why is this:



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What is this work about?

And why is that (same password):

Dropbox	•••••		
		Very weak 🕕	
		Create a password	
Google	Password strength: Weak	······	
	password from another site, or something too obvious like your pet's name. Why?	Confirm your password	
Microsoft	Password: ••••••• Strength: Medium		
	Create a password		
Twitter	•••••	Password is okay.	
FedEx	* Create a password ••••••••• Password must use at least 8 characters and contain one upper case letter, one lower case letter and one numeric character. You entered a strong password. Longer passwords are even more secure and should include a mixture of mixed-case letters, numbers and special characters.		
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Our motivations

- Recent studies: meters really guide users to choose better passwords [Ur et al., USENIX Security'12] and [Egelman et al., CHI'13]
- Opployed meters impact hundreds of millions of users
- Built by up-to-billion-dollar IT companies
- They don't seem reliable...

Tested 11 web services/applications



Analysis setup (1/3)



11 dictionaries: 3,895,247 unique passwords

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- Top500, cracking tools (e.g., JtR) worm dictionaries, database leaks (e.g., RockYou)
- Solution Mangling & leet transformations $password \rightarrow Password1+ \text{ or } p@5\$w0rd$

Analysis setup (2/3)



- Understanding of functionalities (involve some RE)
- JavaScript (whitebox) and/or server-side (blackbox)
- 52+ million tests

Analysis setup (3/3)



- Analyze results
- Understand checkers profile
- Find common weaknesses

Designing PSMs is non-trivial:

- No straightforward academic literature to follow
- Failure of NIST recommendations
- How to deal with password leaks, cultural references?

In practice

- Custom "entropy" based on:
 - Perceived complexity
 - Password length
 - Number of charsets used
 - Known patterns
 - Comparison with dictionary of common passwords (blacklist)
- $\bullet\,$ More entropy $\simeq\,$ more secure password
- Everyone invents their own algorithm

Meters heterogeneity

- Each meter reacts differently to our dictionaries
- Strength results vary widely from one to another

Example: Password1

- Obvious, Very weak, Weak (x3), Poor, Moderate (blacklisted), Medium (x2), Strong (x3), Very strong
- By Microsoft itself (3 versions): strong, weak and medium!
- Some simple dictionaries score significantly higher than others

Stringency bypass


- Simple mangling rules/leet transformations allow bypassing password requirements
- Example: Consider {Top500, C&A, Cfkr and JtR}
- How many passwords are medium or better?

Web service	Regular	Mangled
Skype	10.5%	78%
Google	0.002%	26.8%

- Password policies not often explicitly stated
- Rules for measuring strength unexplained to users
- Oifferences in policies:
 - Very stringent: assign strengths only for 3+ charsets (FedEx)
 - Promotion of single-charset passphrases (Dropbox)
- Google and Yahoo!, lots of personal info, but lenient policy...

Google checker: some results

Password strength distribution:



Inconsistencies:

- 1
- testtest is weak
- *testtest0* is strong
- *testtest1* is fair

- *testtest2* is good
- *testtest3* is strong...
- Strength is time-dependent

One checker to rule them all

Password Multi-Checker

Password1

Services	Strength scores	
Apple	Moderate (Blacklisted)	2/3
Dropbox	Very Weak	1/5
Drupal	Strong	4/4
еВау	Medium	4/5
FedEx	Strong	4/5
Google	Weak	2/5
Microsoft (v1)	Strong	3/4
Microsoft (v2)	Weak	1/4
Microsoft (v3)	Medium	2/4
PayPal	Weak	2/4
Skype	Poor	1/3
Twitter	Obvious	2/6
Yahoo!	Very Strong	4/4

NDSS'14: Analyzing Password-Strength Meters

Summary (1/2)

Facts:

- Passwords are not going to disappear anytime soon
- Users will continue to choose weak passwords

Current solutions:

- Stringent policies (user resentment?)
- Influence users in choosing better passwords, willingly
 - Provide feedback on the quality of chosen passwords
 - Should be consistent and avoid confusion

Summary (2/2)

Reality:

- Commonly-used meters are highly inconsistent
- Fail to provide coherent feedback, sometimes blatantly misleading
- Often have very ad-hoc design
- Simple transformations not taken into account

What can be done?

- Common API to reduce confusion (e.g., Dropbox with *zxcvbn*)
- Real-time cracking with state-of-the art techniques to assess passwords?
- Passphrases (be careful at simple structures)
- Password popularity, Markov models, PCFG, semantic?

Thanks

To recap:

- Meters less robust than expected from such large companies
- Companies should stop misleading users
- Opportunities for academic research
- Contact: x_decarn@ciise.concordia.ca Project URL: http://goo.gl/0E5Ieu

O,u3T1()||5?


Additional slides

"Advanced" dictionaries

Yahoo

Dropbox

Microsoft



PavPal



Base dictionaries.

Drupal

8

09

40

20

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FedEx

Twitter

Skype

eBav

Top500 Cfkr


JtR

C&A BY5 phpBB

Apple

Top500+M

FedEx: Password strength distribution



FedEx: Password strength distribution

Very weak? Fine...

FedEx: Targeted dictionary

Refined mangling rules:

- capitalize, append a digit and a symbol
- capitalize, append a symbol and a digit
- Scapitalize, append a symbol and two digits
- capitalize, append a symbol and a digit, and prefix with a digit
- Gives 121,792 words from {Top500, JtR, Cfkr}
 - 60.9% is now very strong
 - 9.0% is strong
 - 3 29.7% is medium
 - 0.4% is very weak