

Efficient CFI Enforcement for C++ Dynamic Dispatch

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UCSD



UCSD CSE
Computer Science and Engineering

Why Attack Dynamic Dispatch?

- Valuable targets (e.g. browsers)




11M LOC
C/C++



7M LOC
C/C++



?M LOC
C/C++



~30M LOC
C/C++



Why Attack Dynamic Dispatch?

- Valuable targets (e.g. browsers)
- Prevalence of Dynamic Dispatch
 - 91.8 % of Indirect Calls in Chrome [Tice '14]

Why Attack Dynamic Dispatch?

- Valuable targets (e.g. browsers)
- Prevalence of Dynamic Dispatch
- Exploited in the wild

Prior Work and Contribution

- **Prior defenses**

vfGuard [Prakash'15], VTInt [Zhao'15], SafeDispatch [Jang'14], VTV [Tice'14] ...

- **Our contribution: novel VTable layouts**
- **Lower overhead & no profiling**


Example

```
class A {  
    virtual void Foo();  
}
```


```
class B : public A {  
    virtual void Foo();  
    virtual void bar();  
}
```

```
class C : public A {  
    virtual void baz();  
}
```

```
class D : public B {  
    virtual void Foo();  
    virtual void boo();  
}
```





C++ Memory Layout





C++ Memory Layout

Object Instance



Dynamic Dispatch





```
vp $\text{ptr} = (*a)$ 
fn_ptr = (*(vp $\text{ptr} + 0$ ))
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Method Index

$A^* a = (A^*) \dots$
 $a \rightarrow \text{foo}()$



Exploiting Dynamic Dispatch



```
vp_ptr = (*a)
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```





Protecting Dynamic Dispatch





```
vp_ptr = (*a)
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Protecting Dynamic Dispatch



```
vptr = (*a)
assert (vptr ∈ {A, B, C, D})
fn_ptr = (*(vptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Protecting Dynamic Dispatch




Read-Only


```
vp_ptr = (*a)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ {A, B, C, D})
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)(); ✓
```

Inline Constant

Protecting Dynamic Dispatch





```
vp_ptr = (*a)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ {A, B, C, D})
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```



How to implement safety
check efficiently?


Protecting Dynamic Dispatch



```
vp_ptr = (*a)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ { 0x0, 0x8, 0x18, 0x28 })
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Non-regular values
Hard to test

Protecting Dynamic Dispatch





Key idea 1:

Order and Pad VTables

```
vp_ptr = (*a)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ { 0x0, 0x8, 0x18, 0x28 })
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```



Non-regular values
Hard to test

Ordered Memory Layout





1. Traverse in pre-order: A, B, D, C
2. For each class layout vtable and pad

Ordered Memory Layout





1. Traverse in pre-order: A, B, D, C
2. For each class layout vtable and pad

Ordered Memory Layout



```
vp_ptr = (*a)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ {A,B,C,D})
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```



Ordered Memory Layout



```
vp_ptr = (*a)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ { 0x0, 0x20, 0x40, 0x60 })
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Regular
Address Points



Ordered Memory Layout



```
vp_ptr = (*a)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ { 0x0, 0x20, 0x40, 0x60 })
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Efficient Check



Ordered Memory Layout



```
vp_ptr = (*a)  
assert (0x0 ≤ vp_ptr ≤ 0x60) ^ vp_ptr % 0x20 = 0  
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))  
(*fn_ptr)();
```



Efficient Check

Ordered Memory Layout





```
vp_ptr = (*b)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ {B, D})
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Ordered Memory Layout



```
vp_ptr = (*b)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ { 0x20, 0x40 })
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```



Ordered Memory Layout



```
vp_ptr = (*b)  
assert (0x20 ≤ vp_ptr ≤ 0x40 ∧ vp_ptr % 0x20 = 0)  
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))  
(*fn_ptr)();
```



Ordered Memory Layout

A Afoo()




**Key idea 2:
Interleave VTables**

Wasteful Extra
Padding



Interleaved Memory Layout



A	
...	



C	
...	

B	
...	

D	
...	



1. Traverse in pre-order: A, B, D, C
2. Layout each method

Interleaved Memory Layout



1. Traverse in pre-order: A, B, D, C
2. Layout each method



Interleaved Dynamic Dispatch



```
vptr = (**a)
```



1. `save_in_order` pre-order: A, B, D, C
2. `fn_ptr` (`svt_ptr`) method
(`*fn_ptr`());

Interleaved Dynamic Dispatch



```
vp_ptr = (*a)
assert (vp_ptr ∈ {A,B,C,D})
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Interleaved Dynamic Dispatch



```
vp_ptr = (*a)
```



```
assert (vp_ptr ∈ { 0x0, 0x8, 0x10, 0x18 })
```

```
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
```

```
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Address Points
Consecutive Addrs.

Interleaved Dynamic Dispatch



```
vp_ptr = (*a)
```



```
assert (0x0 ≤ vp_ptr ≤ 0x18 ∧ vp_ptr % 0x8 = 0)
```

```
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
```

```
(*fn_ptr)();
```



Same Check
Different range & alignment

Interleaved Dynamic Dispatch





```
vp_ptr = (*b)  
assert (0x0 ≤ vp_ptr ≤ 0x18 ∧ vp_ptr % 0x8 = 0)  
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))  
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Interleaved Dynamic Dispatch





```
vp_ptr = (*b)
assert (0x8 ≤ vp_ptr ≤ 0x10 ∧ vp_ptr % 0x8 = 0)
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Interleaved Dynamic Dispatch



```
vp_ptr = (*b)  
assert (0x8 ≤ vp_ptr ≤ 0x10 ∧ vp_ptr % 0x8 = 0)  
fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))  
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Interleaved Dynamic Dispatch



```
vptr = (*b)
```

```
assert (0x8 ≤ vptr ≤ 0x10 ∧ vptr % 0x8 = 0)
```

```
fn_ptr = (*(vptr + 0x18))
```

```
(*fn_ptr)();
```

Same index in all vtables


Implementation

- Implemented technique in LLVM
- Handled all cases of C++ inheritance
- Algorithms with proofs of correctness


Evaluation

- Evaluated on SPEC 2006/Chrome
- Compared to state-of-the-art industry CFI
- One (benign) CFI violation in SPEC 2006

Results: Runtime Overhead



Results: Size Overhead



Future Work

- Dynamic linking/loading
- Handle C++ member pointers
- Hardware assisted range checks


Summary

- New approach based on VTable layouts
- Efficient range checks for dynamic dispatch
- <https://github.com/UCSD-PL/ivt>



THANK YOU!

Backup

Runtime Overhead %




Dynamic Linking



Only 0.012% of dynamic Firefox virtual calls!

Dynamic Fault Handlers

```
vp_ptr = (*a)
if (0x00 ≤ vp_ptr ≤ 0x20 ∧ vp_ptr % 0x10 = 0)
    goto S;
assert(false);
```




```
S fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
: (fn_ptr*());
```



Dynamic Fault Handlers

```
vp_ptr = (*a)
if (0x00 ≤ vp_ptr ≤ 0x20 ∧ vp_ptr % 0x10 = 0)
  goto S;
L = link_unit (vp_ptr) // e.g. dladddr()
if vp_ptr_safe(L, vp_ptr, class A)
  goto S
assert(false);
```



```
S fn_ptr = (*(vp_ptr + 0))
: (fn_ptr*());
```





Multiple Inheritance



Multiple Inheritance



Multiple Inheritance



Multiple Inheritance

