



Uncovering the iceberg from the tip:

Generating API Specifications for Bug Detection via Specification Propagation Analysis


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Motivation: Bugs and Specifications

- Software is built with **various APIs** that encapsulate complex semantics.
- To use APIs safely, developers must adhere to **their specifications**.
- **Violations** of these specifications are API misuse, which can be further exploited by attackers.

```
01 static blk_status_t bsg_queue_rq(...) {  
02     struct device *dev = q->queuedata;  
03     ...  
04     if (!get_device(dev))  
05         return BLK_STS_IOERR;  
06  
07     if (!bsg_prepare_job(dev, req))  
08 -   return BLK_STS_IOERR;  
09 +   goto out;  
10     ...  
11 + out:  
12     put_device(dev);  
13     return sts;  
14 }
```


"Make sure that bsg_queue_rq() calls put_device() if an error is encountered after get_device() was successful."



Motivation: Current Work and Limitations

- **Ideal way:** Understand each API's behavior and infer its specifications
 - Code complexity makes this difficult
- **Current work:** Extract specifications from **observable API artifacts**
 1. **API documents:** e.g., Advance (CCS'2020), APICAD (ICSE'2023)
 2. **API frequent usage:** e.g., APP-Miner (S&P'2024), APISan (Security'2016)
 3. **Bug patches:** e.g., APHP (Security'2023)
- **Problem:** **Limited by the availability of artifacts**
 - **For example:** The API `bus_find_device` requires certain specification to be followed after its call, but this is not documented.


Motivation: From Known to Unknown



It is possible to infer **hidden specifications (unknown)** from **observable specifications (known)**?


Background: Bugs and Specifications

```
// linux/block/bsg-lib.c (d46fe2c)
01 static blk_status_t bsg_queue_rq(...)
02 {
03     struct device *dev = q->queuedata;
04     ...
05     if (!get_device(dev))
06         return BLK_STS_IOERR;
07
08     if (!bsg_prepare_job(dev, req))
09 -   return BLK_STS_IOERR;
10 +   goto out;
11     ...
12 +   out:
13     put_device(dev);
14     return sts;
15 }
```




The API **get_device** obtain a reference to the device **dev**, which needs to be released using **put_device()** after use.

- The specification triplet



path conditions are similar across different specifications, so we treat them as implicit and exclude them in specification generation.

- The specification example




Check for bug detection:

1. After a successful **get_device** call
2. After using **arg1** of the **put_device** call
3. Check if a corresponding **put_device** call is performed on the variable.



Insight: API Specification Propagation

- Specification propagation from `get_device` to `bus_find_device`



Specifications propagate between APIs through the API call chain


Insight: Specification Propagation Analysis



Use **specification propagation analysis** to reveal the hidden API specifications

Overview

- API SpecGen: generate new specifications using seed specifications
 - **Step1: Specification Propagation Analysis:** identifies which APIs the specifications may propagate to (successors) or originate from (predecessors).
 - **Step2: Specification Generation:** generate specific specifications for inferred APIs, i.e., determine their corresponding post-operations.




Method: Working Example

- Generated specifications

```
01 struct device *class_find_device(... *class, ...)
02 {
03     struct device *dev;
04     ...
05     while ((dev = class_dev_iter_next(&iter))) {
06         if (match(dev, data)) {
07             get_device(dev);
08             break;
09         }
10     }
11     return dev;
12 }
```

```
01 struct nfc_dev *nfc_get_device(unsigned int idx)
02 {
03     struct device *d;
04     ...
05     d = class_find_device(&nfc_class, ...);
06     if (!d)
07         return NULL;
08     return to_nfc_dev(d);
09 }
10 }
```



Check for bug detection:

1. After a successful **nfc_get_device** call
2. After using the **return value** of the **nfc_get_device** call
3. Check if a corresponding **nfc_put_device** call is performed.

- Detected bug

```
01 static int nfc_genl_vendor_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb,
02                                struct genl_info *info)
03 {
04     struct nfc_dev *dev;
05     ...
06     dev = nfc_get_device(dev_idx);
07     if (!dev || !dev->vendor_cmds || !dev->n_vendor_cmds)
08         return -ENODEV;
09     if (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA]) {
10         ...
11         data_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA]);
12         if (data_len == 0)
13             return -EINVAL;
14     }
15     ...
16     return -EOPNOTSUPP;
17 }
18 }
```


Diagram illustrating a detected bug in the Linux kernel code. The code shows a function `nfc_genl_vendor_cmd` that calls `nfc_get_device` to retrieve a device. The device is then used to access vendor commands. However, the code does not call `nfc_put_device` to release the device after use, leading to a reference count leak. A red box labeled "missing nfc_put_device" with a bug icon points to the missing call site.

Detected API misuse in the Linux kernel: missing **nfc_put_device** after **nfc_get_device** after the critical variable **dev** usage, causing reference count leak.

Method: Specification Propagation Analysis


• Caller Analysis to Get Successors

① Get callers of the **seed API**




```
bus_find_device  
class_find_device  
tifm_device_probe  
dpm_prepare  
...
```


② Check for **critical variable's** propagation



```
bus_find_device  
class_find_device  
tifm_device_probe  
dpm_prepare  
...
```



③ Check for **specification's** propagation




```
bus_find_device  
class_find_device  
tifm_device_probe  
dpm_prepare  
...
```

Condition-by-condition check for propagation analysis,
from coarse-grained to fine-grained analysis for efficiency.

Method: Specification Generation

- **Problem:** the post-operations may change during specification propagation
- **Solution:** utilizes **API usage** and **data-flow validation**



Evaluations

- Setup
 - **Tested program:** the Linux Kernel, with more 23 million LoC
 - **Seeds:** six specifications collected by previous work

- Evaluations
 - Specification Generation
 - Bug Detection
 - Compared with SOTAs
 - Quality of API artifacts

Target API	Post-Operation	Var	Commit
get_device	put_device	arg1	d46fe2cb2dc
device_initialize	put_device	arg1	a5808add9a6
try_module_get	module_put	arg1	44f8baaf230
kmalloc	kfree	retval	493ff661d43
kstrdup	kfree	retval	e629e7b525a
PTR_ERR	IS_ERR	arg1	59715cffce1

Six seed specification for evaluations

Results

- Specification Generation and Bug Detection

Seed API	#Spec	# New Bug	Bug Type
get_device	760	137	Refcount leak
device_initialize	91	6	Refcount leak
try_module_get	58	1	Refcount leak
kmalloc	1202	30	Memory leak
kstrdup	14	1	Memory leak
ERR_PTR	5207	11	Null-pointer-deref
Total	7332	186	-

Efficiency:

Generate specifications **in 2 hours**, averaging **1 second** per specification.

Accuracy:

Generated specifications are **100%** accurate.

Effectiveness:

APISpecGen generated **7,332** specifications with from just six seed specifications, with **186** new bugs detected.

Results

- **SOTAs and the quality of API artifacts for specification extraction**

Note: evaluated SOTAs on the specifications and bugs identified by APISpecGen

Method	Coverage of specifications	Coverage of Bugs
Advance	14%	10%
IPPO	-	0%
SinkFinder	11%	10%
APHP	21%	17%

SOTAs fail to extract most specifications and miss corresponding bugs.

API Document

87% of the specifications are not mentioned in document

API Frequent Usage

93% of the specifications are not frequently followed in usage code

API Name


12.71% of APIs lack informative subwords in their name

Artifact-based methods are inherently limited by the quality of API artifacts.
(e.g. **87%** of specifications are not documented)

Results

- **Characteristic of Generated Specifications**

- The inferred API can differ significantly from the original seed API.
- APIs evolve from the same primitive APIs and share similar specifications



from seed API get device to rdma_user_mmap_entry_get

- **Generalizability**

- APISpecGen successfully generated **39** specifications for OpenSSL and **76** for FFmpeg from just **one seed each**

Summary

- **Previous:** Observe API specifications externally, treating APIs individually.
- **Ours:** Generate specifications from internal facts, using connections between APIs.
- **Idea:** *API Specification Propagation*
- **Framework:** APISpecGen, generates specifications using seed specification with **iterative bidirectional specification propagation analysis**.
- **Results:** Generate **7332** specifications using only **6** seed specifications. **87%** of these specifications are not documented; Detect **186** new bugs in Linux kernel.

Open-source

[https://github.com/
Yuunoy/APISpecGen](https://github.com/Yuunoy/APISpecGen)



Thanks for your attention!

Q&A



Paper



Code