**Enhancing Security in Third-Party Library Reuse: Comprehensive Detection of 1-day Vulnerability through Code Patch Analysis** 

### Shangzhi Xu, Jialiang Dong, Weiting Cai, Juanru Li, Arash Shaghaghi, Nan Sun, Siqi Ma\*

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#### 1. Background

- Motivation
- Research Questions
- Previous Works

#### 2. VULTURE Overview

- Database Construction
- TPL Reuse Detection
- 1-day Vulnerability Detection





#### 3. Evaluation and Results

- Database Quality
- Benchmark Vulnerability Detection
- Vulnerability Detection In the Wild

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**Current approach to code reusing** 





#### **Current approach to code reusing**





Library developer

Open-sourced library






Library User






#### **Current approach to code reusing**






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


For brevity, Third-party libraries will be referred to as TPLs in the following

#### **Current approach to code reusing**









**Current approach to code reusing** 

#### **Patching vulnerabilities**







**Current approach to code reusing** 


#### **Patching vulnerabilities**





```
Library developer
```





**Current approach to code reusing** 

#### **Patching vulnerabilities**









Library developer

Patch













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
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




As the code base grows...



As the code base grows...





Large-scale patch collection requires significant human effort.






As the code base grows...







Libraries may also be nested and reuse other libraries.

effort.





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


Image: state state




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




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







21

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





🗉 libbzip2



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Hard to determine if a vulnerability will affect the software, as libraries may contain custom modifications.






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**<u>RQ1</u>** How to efficiently construct a database to support 1-day vulnerability detection

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




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




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**<u>RQ1</u>** How to efficiently construct a database to support 1-day vulnerability detection

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**<u>RQ3</u>** How to accurately identify 1-day vulnerabilities efficiently even with custom modifications

Hard to determine if a vulnerability will affect the software, as libraries may contain custom modifications.

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# **RQ1** How to efficiently construct a database to support 1-day vulnerability detection

**Observation 1:** A suitable database for 1-day vulnerability detection must be comprehensive, specific, and maintainable. And LLMs can minimize manual efforts of data collection.



# **RQ1** How to efficiently construct a database to support 1-day vulnerability detection

**Observation 1:** A suitable database for 1-day vulnerability detection must be comprehensive, specific, and maintainable. And LLMs can minimize manual efforts of data collection.

#### **RQ2** How to identify reused Third-party libraries in target program

**Observation 2:** TPL reuses can be identified through code similarity comparison. The comparison process should be optimized by incorporating sufficient and accurate TPL information for effective reuse detection.



**RQ3** How to accurately identify 1-day vulnerabilities efficiently even with custom modifications

**Observation 3:** A 1-day vulnerability can be identified through patch analysis. Selecting key vulnerable features, such as semantic information, enhances 1-day vulnerability detection.





### **License-based detection**



### **License-based detection**

**Code-based detection** 



## License-based detection

Limitations:

• High false negative rate due to poorly maintained licenses by software developers.

## **Code-based detection**

Limitations:

• High false positive rate caused by custom modification.



## License-based detection

Limitations:


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## License-based detection

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
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## **Code-based detection**

#### Limitations:

• High false positive rate caused by custom modification.





# **VULTURE:** An accurate 1-day vulnerability detection tool

## Contents


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- 1-day Vulnerability Detection




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  - Vulnerability Detection In the Wild






#### **TPLFILTER Construction(RQ1)**






#### **TPLFILTER Construction(RQ1)**






#### **TPLFILTER Construction(RQ1)**






#### **TPLFILTER Construction(RQ1)**





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






#### **TPLFILTER Construction(RQ1)**

#### **TPL Reuse Identification(RQ2)**



1-day Vulnerability Detection(RQ3)




**Func Summary** 



GitHub






#### **Step 1: TPL Selection**

- Select repositories with 100+ stars
- Scan the documents with keywords match to exclude non-library repositories






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# **Step 2: Function Hashing**


• Extract each function in selected TPLs to calculate hashing value.





#### **Step 3: Redundant Function Elimination**






#### **Step 3: Redundant Function Elimination**








• Eliminate redundant functions according to



#### **Step 3: Redundant Function Elimination**






#### **Step 3: Redundant Function Elimination**

- Eliminate redundant functions according
  - to
    - Function creation time





#### **Step 3: Redundant Function Elimination**


• As TPLs may nest other TPLs, redundant functions will exist in the database.

• Eliminate redundant functions according

to


- Function creation time
- Similarity between function name & TPL name





#### **Step 3: Redundant Function Elimination**






#### **Step 3: Redundant Function Elimination**



# **TPLFILTER Construction**


**Patch Collection** 



**TPL Summary** 


#### **Step 1: Info Collection**

- Collect CVE & description from NIST website
- Collect all of the commits of CVE • effected repo from GitHub



**Info Collection** 







#### **Step 2: LLM-based mapping**


• Utilize LLM to identify CVE features and commit attributes (e.g., affected files,

function names)

















**TPL Reuse Identification** 





**Function Hashing** 


Database



#### **Step 1: Candidate library identification**

• Generate a function hash for each function in the target program.

**TPL Reuse Identification** 



**TPLs** 

### **Step 1: Candidate library identification**

• Compute similarity between each TPL and the target program.



Database

**TPL Reuse Identification** 

## **Step 1: Candidate library identification**

• TPLs exceeding the similarity threshold will be selected as candidate reused TPLs.

Target Program Function Hashing  $\checkmark$  $\bigcirc \rightarrow \circlearrowright$  Similarity Score

Database


TPLs



**TPL Reuse Identification** 

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


Database

TPLs




#### **TPL Reuse Identification**



## **Step 2: Identification Optimization**


- Compare each candidate TPL with its reuse path in the target program.
- Keep the earliest created TPL with the most similar name to the reuse path, removing others.








#### **TPL Reuse Identification**



**<u>RQ2</u>** How to identify **reused** Third-party libraries in target program





1-day Vulnerability Detection(RQ3)




**1-day Vulnerability Detection** 



**Reuse Report** 

#### **Step 1: Candidate library identification**

 According to the report, identify candidate 1-day vulnerabilities based on reused TPLs and their versions.



Database






**1-day Vulnerability Detection** 



Reuse Report



Database






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**1-day Vulnerability Detection** 



Reuse Report



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
**1-day Vulnerability Detection** 



Reuse Report

#### **Step 2: Candidate library identification**

• For each candidate 1-day vulnerability, carry out a chunk-based analysis to confirm the existence of vulnerability.





## **Overview of VULTURE** Chunk-based Analysis 1-day Vulnerability Detection

#### **Chunk-based Analysis**

- Designed to handle custom modifications in TPL reuses.
- Extracts semantic information through static patch analysis to identify meaningful changes.
- Groups modified lines into chunks based on control and variable dependencies.
- Compares target, vulnerable, and patched code chunks to verify security patches.



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# **Overview of VULTURE** Chunk-based Analysis

#### **1-day Vulnerability Detection**

```
METHODDEF(JDIMENSION) get_8bit_row(...){
    + int cmaplen = source->cmap_length;
    ...
    + if (t >= cmaplen)
    + return 1;
    output++ = colormap[0][t];
    ...
    + if (getUsed(bitClrUsed))
    + return 1;
    ...
}
```


Patch for CVE-2018-14498



## **Overview of VULTURE** Chunk-based Analysis


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
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
#### Patch for CVE-2018-14498








#### Patch for CVE-2018-14498







#### Patch for CVE-2018-14498






















# **Overview of VULTURE** Chunk-based Analysis

#### **1-day Vulnerability Detection**




Line numbers [1,2,3,4] variable [cmaplen, source->cmap_length] Operation [
<pre>cmaplen: {assign;left;</pre>
<pre>source-&gt;cmap_length}</pre>
{ >=; right; t}
source->cmap_length:
<pre>{assign; right;cmaplen}</pre>

Patch for CVE-2018-14498



# **Overview of VULTURE** Chunk-based Analysis

#### **1-day Vulnerability Detection**



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lı J

#### Patch for CVE-2018-14498


Patch applied by ReactOS



Identical, patch applied, no 1-day vulnerability

## **Overview of VULTURE**


**1-day Vulnerability Detection** 





## **Overview of VULTURE**

**1-day Vulnerability Detection** 





# Contents

- 1. Background
  - Motivation
  - Research Questions
  - Previous Works
- 2. VULTURE Overview
  - Database Construction
  - TPL Reuse Detection
  - 1-day Vulnerability Detection



- Database Quality
- Benchmark Vulnerability Detection
- Vulnerability Detection In the Wild



#### **Database Quality**

- Storage efficiency.
- Time cost.
- Detection accuracy.



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- Time cost.
- Detection accuracy.

## **Baseline:**

- Centris: TPL reuse detector
- VFCFinder: Patch collector



#### **Scalability Evaluation**

- Benchmark Vulnerability Detection
  - Custom benchmark 200 reuse cases
- Vulnerability Detection In the Wild
  - 10 real-world popular programs.
  - TPL reuse detection.
  - 1-day vulnerability detection.
  - Time cost.



#### **Scalability Evaluation**

- Benchmark Vulnerability Detection
  - Custom benchmark 200 reuse cases
- Vulnerability Detection In the Wild
  - 10 real-world popular programs.
  - TPL reuse detection.
  - 1-day vulnerability detection.
  - Time cost.

#### **Baseline:**

- V1SCAN: 1-day vulnerability detector
- SNYK: Commercial 1-day vulnerability detector



Storage efficiency & Time cost

Tool	TPL Number	Storage (GB)
VULTURE	1,872	3.5
Centris	10,288	20.0



Storage efficiency & Time cost

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VULTURE	1,872	3.5
Centris	10,288	20.0

• With TPLSelection, VULTURE excluded non-library repositories and retained only widely used TPLs, thereby reducing storage consumption.



Storage efficiency & Time cost

-	Tool	TPL Number	Storage (GB)	
	VULTURE	1,872	3.5	
-	Centris	10,288	20.0	
Tool		Update database (s)	Frequen	cy of Comparisons
1001				ey er eemparieena
VULTUR	E	0.1		9,207.1



Storage efficiency & Time cost

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Tool		Update database (s)	Frequen	cy of Comparisons
VULTUR	E	0.1		9,207.1
Centris		115.1		1,508,924.7

• When adding new TPLs, VULTURE's database is more compact, making expansion easier and faster.



#### Storage efficiency & Time cost

Tool	Time Cost (s)	Memory Cost (MB)	F1(%)
VULTURE	84.68	3.5	87.94
VFCFinder	285.92	20.0	61.69



#### Storage efficiency & Time cost

Tool	Time Cost (s)	Memory Cost (MB)	F1(%)
VULTURE	84.68	3.5	87.94
VFCFinder	285.92	20.0	61.69

• When collecting patches, VULTURE is more efficient and accurate, requiring less time and memory compared to VFCFinder.



#### **Benchmark Vulnerability Detection**

Scheme	Item	Reuse	Total	
		Custom Reuse	<b>Exact Reuse</b>	
	Dtc-P	72	19	91
VULTURE	Cfm-P	65	19	84
	Dtc-N	87	22	109
	Cfm-N	78	22	100
	Dtc-P	51	10	61
V1SCAN	Cfm-P	35	10	45
	Dtc-N	66	14	80
	Cfm-N	42	13	55

TABLE V: Vulnerability Detection Result on Ground Truth

Dtc: Vulnerabilities been detected.

Cfm: Vulnerabilities been confirmed with manual check.

P: Results on patched vulnerabilities.

N: Results on non-patched vulnerabilities.



#### **Benchmark Vulnerability Detection**

Scheme	Item	Reuse	 Total	
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TABLE V: Vulnerability Detection Result on Ground Truth

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P: Results on patched vulnerabilities.

N: Results on non-patched vulnerabilities.



- In 200 test cases, VULTURE successfully identified 184 cases.
- V1SCAN successfully identified 100 cases.

#### **Vulnerability Detection In the Wild**

Target	VULTURE		SNYK		V1SCAN	
	Dtc	Cfm	Dtc	Confm	Dtc	Cfm
AliOS-Things	93	89	105	84	8	2
LiteOS	19	19	22	16	3	3
TizenRT	68	66	16	10	11	8
Tasmota	1	1	2	0	0	0
TDengine	0	0	3	1	0	0
Total	181	175	148	111	22	13

#### TABLE VII: Vulnerability Detection Result in Wild Software

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#### **Vulnerability Detection In the Wild**

Target	VULTURE		SNYK		V1SCAN	
8	Dtc	Cfm	Dtc	Confm	Dtc	Cfm
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TABLE VII: Vulnerability Detection Result in Wild Software

Dtc: Vulnerabilities been detected. Cfm: Vulnerabilities been confirmed with manual check.

- In 5 target programs, VULTURE successfully identified 175 1-day vulnerabilities.
- Commercial tool SNYK identified 111 vulnerabilities.
- V1SCAN successfully identified 13 vulnerabilities.



#### **Scrutinize of Results**

Scheme	Item	Reuse	Total	
		Custom Reuse	Exact Reuse	
VULTURE	Dtc-P	72	19	91
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- VULTURE performs best with its welldesigned database and accurate semantic analysis.
- The comprehensiveness and specificity of the database eliminates false negatives.
- False positives are reduced with TPL reuse identification optimization and chunk-based analysis.

#### **Vulnerability Detection In the Wild**

TABLE VIII: Time cost of TPL reuse and 1-day vulnerability detection across different tools (in seconds)

Target	VULTU	RE	V1SCAN		
0	TPL reuse	1-day	TPL reuse	1-day	
AliOS-Things	20.1	3.0	23.5	11.8	
LiteOS	14.1	3.9	28.1	8.7	
Tasmota	5.5	129.9	7.1	_	
TizenRT	9.2	2.1	8.1	8.8	
TDengine	37.2	-	59.4	-	

The values in the table represent the average time (in seconds) required to detect a single TPL reuse or a single 1-day vulnerability. A dash ("-") indicates that no reuses or vulnerabilities were identified.



### **Vulnerability Detection In the Wild**

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The values in the table represent the average time (in seconds) required to detect a single TPL reuse or a single 1-day vulnerability. A dash ("-") indicates that no reuses or vulnerabilities were identified.

- VULTURE detects one TPL reuse in 25 seconds and one 1-day vulnerabilities in 5 seconds.
- V1SCAN takes longer for extensive TPL reuse



#### Conclusion

- We introduced VULTURE, leveraging static analysis and LLMs to support the whole process of 1-day vulnerability detection.
- VULTURE reduces false alarms and improved detection accuracy, surpasses existing academic and commercial tools.



# **Thanks** Q & A

