A Field Study of Run-Time Location Access Disclosures on Android Smartphones

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Why Location Access Disclosures? RUTG




- Large amount of users use Android phones (76 Millions Android users in US)
- 74% smartphone users use location-based services
- Users are interested to know about their location usage by apps
 - □ Previous technical report showed that more than 70% of participants (n=791) desired to know about location data collection by apps on mobile devices (Balebako,2013)

Existing Location Access Disclosures RUTGERS




- **Android Permissions at** installation time
- Permissions are not effective
 - □ Users might ignore the permission list
 - Users might not understand the permissions



Existing Location Access Disclosures RUTGERS



- Android GPS icon flashing at run-time
 - □ When the app was trying to update location using GPS, the GPS icon would be flashing on the upper left corner




Effectiveness? Unknown

Problems To Explore in Field Study RIJTGFRS



What is the effectiveness of Android GPS icon flashing at run-time?




- □ What better run-time location access disclosure methods should be?
- What are users' reactions if they were notified of their apps accessing location in daily life? We note that these apps are used of their own choice on their own phones.

Solutions: User Level Study App



- User level study app can be installed on participants' phones without any changes
 - □ Detect apps' location access at run-time
 - □ Not need changes to participants' phones






Study App's Disclosure Features



- Run-time location access disclosure features
 - Notifications in the notice bar


Toast notification on screen




Four-Week Field Study



- Assign randomly to two groups before entry interview
- Totally 22 participants in two groups to analyze
 - □ Disclosure group (n=13)
 □ No Disclosure group (n=9)












Expected Reactions In Two Groups RUTG





Results: Apps Unexpected to Access THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY Location



- Disclosure group and No Disclosure group
 - □ Almost all participants had several apps unexpected to access location

ID	Р1	P2	Р3	P4	P5	P6	P7	Р8	Р9	P10	P11	P12	P13
Tota I	28	19	2	21	20	8	39	29	5	19	41	37	21
Not Exp	7	4	0	1 <i>7</i>	8	5	3	1	4	3	3	14	14

ID	C1	C2	C 3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C 9
Total	40	13	23	22	32	10	0	16	11
Not	9	5	5	9	8	3	0	9	3
Exp									

Results: Reactions in the Disclosure THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY Group



- Uninstall apps after receiving disclosures
 - □ P11 uninstalled a Launcher App unexpected to access location



Uninstall app was an extreme action, the apps were not available on the phones any more after being uninstalled.

Results: Reactions in the Disclosure THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY Group



- Uninstall apps after receiving disclosure notifications
 - □ P4 uninstalled 3 game apps



- Stop using some apps unexpected to access location
 - □ P4 stopped using some game apps unexpected to access location

"Played a lot of games before, now stopped playing some games after knowing their accessing location"





Results: Reactions in the Disclosure THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY



- Stop using some apps after receiving disclosure notifications
 - □ P5 stopped playing some games unexpected to access location

"If a game access my location I will not play the game anymore."






Results: Reactions in the Disclosure THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY Group



Reduce frequency of using some apps

□ P6 tried to use other apps to replace the apps unexpected to access location by using other apps

"would pay attention to these apps and use them more carefully"



Results: Reactions in the Disclosure THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY Group



Disable location access setup for the app

□ P2 disabled location access of a game app unexpected to access

location



"still worked well after location being disabled"



Most participants might prefer this action, but participants assumed most apps did not give the option to disable location

Disclosure group Learned How Apps THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY **Used Their Location Data**



- Apps' location usage learned from run-time disclosure
 - □ Participants learned how often each app accessed location. They might make different decisions depending the frequency.

"I would like to know the times each app accessed location... if I know some apps access my location too often, I would probably stop using them."

"Your app used to notify me ... which of the app was accessing location at what time. Sometimes I was surprised, oh this app used my location sort of that way."



Disclosure Group Appreciated the Transparency



Transparency brought by the run-time disclosure was appreciated by participants in the Disclosure group

Most participants would like to be aware of what was happening on

their phones





Most participants would like to continue receiving the notifications in the notice bar



Questions?



Thank You!

Results: Comparison between Two Groups




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- Reactions were different in the two groups
 - □ Various reactions to manage apps' location access in the Disclosure group
 - □ No reactions in the No Disclosure group

No Disclosure Group	Disclosure Group
(1) No actions due to GPS icon;(2) only one user might be more careful when downloading apps after reading The New York Times article	(1) Uninstall apps; (2) replace apps; (3) stop using some apps; (4) search through setup to disable the apps' location

Heuristic





Challenges for Field Study on Location Access Disclosures



- How to grantee the ecological validity of the field study?
 - □ Rooting phones?

☐ Second phone?







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Challenges for Field Study on Location Access Disclosures



- □ How to detect apps' location access on users' phones?
 - Android platform prevent one app from accessing other apps' data and methods

ACCESS DENIED



□ Changing Android Framework to monitor apps' location access require rooting users' phones

Heuristic




- Apps actively update location: requestLocationUpdates
- Usually only foreground apps actively update location

Study App's Disclosure Features




- History location access disclosure features
 - □ List of apps accessed location □ Maps of location accessed by apps



Four-Week Field Study



- Totally 22 participants in two groups assign randomly
 - □ Disclosure group (n=13)
 □ No Disclosure group (n=9)





Resutls:Interventions Received in Study



Disclosure group received 3351 disclosure notifications

