### A First Look at the Usability of Bitcoin Key Management


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## Why?

- Key management is a decade old usability problem
- Bitcoin has introduced new use cases for public key cryptography
- No one has looked at the usability of bitcoin key managements yet
- If it's not usable, Bitcoin won't flourish

### Key Management

- Keys are something you <u>have</u> instead of <u>know</u>
- Usable Public Key Cryptography
  - Public Keys should be accessible
  - Private Keys should be securely stored and accessible in case signing is needed



- Cryptocurrency deployed in 2009 with current market cap of \$3+ Billion
- A Public ledger holds the list of every transaction in the network, called Blockchain (~25GB)
- Pair of cryptographic keys:
  - Public Verification Key: For receiving Bitcoin (Bitcoin Address)
  - Private Signing Key: For Sending Bitcoin

## What's this about?

- Goal is to identify usability issues and advantages of existing techniques, and propose design recommendation for future Bitcoin clients.
- We did a survey of six Bitcoin key management techniques and usability evaluation of their related tools

## What to do with a key?

- Two obvious places:
  - store on your computer
  - store on a website
- we talk about these two first and then another four

#### Bitcoin Key Management Techniques Key in Local Storage

- Store the private keys locally
- Can generate and keep unlimited number of keys
- No other parties are involved
- Wallets are accessible to all other applications
- Should be kept secure and safe
  - Could be stolen
  - Malwares
- Not Portable

#### e.g Bitcoin Core (Bitcoin-qt)

#### Bitcoin Key Management Techniques Hosted Wallets

- Hosting the private keys
  - Standard web authentication mechanism
  - Password recovery
  - Reduce application complexity (on Mobile devices)
  - Cross-Device portability
  - Should trust third party

e.g. Online exchanges

### Bitcoin Key Management Techniques Password-Protected Wallets

- Same as Key in Local Storage but password encrypted
- Address Physical Theft and some digital stealing methods
- Forgetting Password = Losing access to the keys
- User might be confused that his password would work on all devices to access his funds

#### e.g. MultiBit

Bitcoin Key Management Techniques Password-derived Keys

- Derive keys from a password (PBKDF2)
- Cross-Device portability
- Only generates one pair of keys
- Forgetting Password = Losing access to the keys
- Rainbow table attacks

e.g. BrainWallet


### Bitcoin Key Management Techniques Offline Storage of Keys

- USB Thumbdrive in a vault
- Paper wallets
  - QR Code
- No trust in third parties



- Inaccessible for immediate use
- Funds might be stolen if observed
- might lose access to the <u>change address</u>

#### **Change Address**



Bitcoin Key Management Techniques Air-Gapped Storage

- <u>Offline device</u> for holding private keys and signing
- <u>Online device</u> for everything else
  - e.g Armory
- Hardware Security Modules
  - Signing oracle
  - e.g. Trezor



### Evaluation Framework<sup>1</sup> 10 Criteria

- Malware Resistant
- Key Stored Offline
- No Trusted Third Party
- Resistant to Physical Theft
- Resistant to Physical Observation

- Resilient to Password Loss
- Resilient to Key Churn
- Immediate Access
- No New User Software
- Cross-Device Portability

Scoring: Full (•) - Half (°) and empty for none

<sup>1</sup> Bonneau, Joseph, et al. "The quest to replace passwords"

### **Evaluation Result**

		فيور	re Resistant	Kept Office	Resisted Third P	any Physic Intro Physic Resid	al Theft	al Observation	ad Loss Contro Key Contro Key Contro Key Contro Con	hun Access	en tiser software Pontabili	Ъ.
Category	Example	Man	ter	40	Rest	Pear	Rest	Pear	Inn	4º.	Clos	
Keys in Local Storage	Bitcoin Core			•		•	•	•	•			
Password-protected Wallets	MultiBit		0	•	0	•		•	•			
Offline Storage	Bitaddress	0	•	•			•				•	
Air-gapped Storage	Armory	0	•	•		•	•	•				
Password-derived Keys	Brainwallet		•	•	0			•	•	•	•	
Hosted Wallet (Hot)	Coinbase.com						•	•	•	•	•	
Hosted Wallet (Cold)		0	•				•	•		•	•	
Hosted Wallet (Hybrid)	Blockchain.info		0	0			•	•	•	•	•	
Cash		•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	
Online Banking							•	•	•	•	•	

TABLE I. A COMPARISON OF KEY MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR BITCOIN (CONTRASTED WITH TRADITIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES). • INDICATES THE CATEGORY OF CLIENT IS AWARDED THE BENEFIT IN THE CORRESPONDING COLUMN. • PARTIALLY AWARDS THE BENEFIT. DETAILS PROVIDED INLINE.

### Evaluation Result Summary

- No single superior approach
- Hosted wallets are the most similar to online banking
- All techniques have potential usability pitfalls

### Usability Evaluation Cognitive Walkthrough

- Expert Evaluation (2 experts)
- Focus is on novice user and emphasizes learnability
- Three Questions:
  - 1. Will the user see what to do?
  - 2. Will the user see how to do it?
  - 3. Will the user know if they have performed the correct action?
- Focus on problems specific to key management within Bitcoin software, not the usability of clients themselves.

# Core Tasks

- T1 Configure a new Bitcoin address and obtain its balance
- **T2** Spend Bitcoin
- **T3** Spend Bitcoin from a secondary device
- **T4** Recover from loss of main credentials

### Cognitive Walkthrough Guidelines 2

- G1 Users should be aware of the steps they have to perform to complete a core task
- **G2** Users should be able to determine how to perform these steps
- G3 Users should know when they have successfully completed a core task.
- G4 Users should be able to recognize, diagnose, and recover from non-critical errors.
- **G5** Users should not make dangerous errors from which they cannot recover.
- G6 Users should be comfortable with the terminology used in any interface dialogues or documentation.
- **G7** Users should be sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it.
- **G8** Users should be aware of the application's status at all times.

<sup>2</sup> Clark, Jeremy, et al - Usability of anonymous web browsing

### Cognitive Walkthrough Demo - Offline Storage (Paper Wallet)

bitaddress.org

**T1** - Configure a new Bitcoin address and obtain its balance

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◄ ► △ ▷ ► + ♦ https  www.bitaddress.	org/bitaddress.org-v2.9.8-SHA256-2c5d16dbcde600147162172090d940fd9646981b7d751d9bddfc5ef383f89308.html	C Reader

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
bitaddress.org

Open Source JavaScript Client-Side Bitcoin Wallet Generator

Generating Bitcoin Address MOVE your mouse around to add some extra randomne	
OR type some random characters into this textbox	


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
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



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bitaddress.org

Open Source JavaScript Client-Side Bitcoin Wallet Generator







#### Home Welcome to Blockchain

Height	Age	Transactions	Total Sent	Relayed By	Size (kB)
342317	5 minutes	1	25.00 BTC	F2Pool	0.25
342316	6 minutes	1867	9,771.76 BTC	121.40.205.76	967.22
342315	29 minutes	1972	15,013.72 BTC	Eligius	881.2
342314	1 hour 5 minutes	328	1,852.91 BTC	F2Pool	248.03
342313	1 hour 9 minutes	483	2,834.88 BTC	123.56.40.59	273.22
342312	1 hour 16 minutes	339	1,410.93 BTC	KnCMiner	169.01

Latest Transactions			Search					
	4.8.8		You may enter a block height, address, block hash, transaction hash, hash160, or ipv4					
3a23ce75a7 (LuckyBit hot wallet 🖗)	< 1 minute	0.00436528 BTC	Address / ip / SHA hash Search					
e6cb41d413a471c5b25fb77c0	< 1 minute	0.36828973 BTC						
9fd7d2732186795ffd50f460f	< 1 minute	0.0454669 BTC	NEWS					
865d849cbe85bc6ed77c3890e	< 1 minute	0.10030819 BTC	The Next Big Boost for Bitcoin Mining: Oil Immersion Cooling GRC Cooling ← 1 minute ago Bitcoin Panel Seeks Regulation Redo at New Jersey Hearing CoinDesk 19 minutes ago					
		Ok (1955	Connected)					

Ok (1656 Nodes Connected)

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More...

900			Bi	tcoin Addres	s 1JCMT	L8wPLPWBivCZckvvhVYKW5Ja9MgkN		R <sub>M</sub>
< ► C C C Blockchai	n Luxembourg	S.A.R.L 🔒 🗄	olockchain	.info/address/	1JCMTL	8wPLPWBivCZckvvhVYKW5Ja9MgkN		C Reader
	Home	Charts	Stats	Markets	API	Wallet	Search	

#### Bitcoin Address Addresses are identifiers which you use to send bitcoins to another person.

Summary		Transactions	
Address	1JCMTL8wPLPWBivCZckvvhVYKW5Ja9MgkN	No. Transactions	0
Hash 160	bc9fc9bb43df3f93bde77fd4597f93068f9f9100	Total Received	0 BTC
Tools	Taint Analysis - Related Tags - Unspent Outputs	Final Balance	0 BTC
		Request Payment Donati	ion Button



No transactions found for this address, it has probably not been used on the network yet.

Ok (1661 Nodes Connected)
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## Discussion

- No solution just trade offs
- Metaphors and Abstractions
  - Send Coin vs. Digitally Sign a transaction
  - Generate Change addresses without user
     notification
- Technical Language

### **Questions?**

"Bitcoin's usability limitations, particularly those related to key management, pose challenges to its rising popularity."

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