Identifying Cross-origin Resource Status Using Application Cache

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Web, HTML5, and Threats

- Web and HTML5
 - The most popular distributed application platform
 - Rich functionality introduced by HTML5
- Security and privacy threats
 - Popularity attracts a lot of adversaries.
 - Rich functionality opens security and privacy holes.
- Discovering unrevealed threats of the Web and HTML5 is important.



HTML5 Application Cache (AppCache)

- Enabling technology to offline web applications
 - Specify resources to be cached in a web browser
 - Allow fast and offline access to the cached resources
- Potential threats of AppCache
 - Arbitrary cross-origin resources are cacheable.
 - Neither server- nor client-side control
 - Error handing can breach user privacy.
 - Recognize whether a user can cache specific resources



Motivation and Goal

Motivation

- In-depth security analysis of new web functionalities is necessary.
- Security analysis of AppCache is insufficient despite its wide deployment.

Research goal

- Analyze and solve security problems of AppCache
 - Discover security problems of AppCache
 - Suggest an effective countermeasure against the security problems




Contents

- Introduction
- AppCache Details
 - Declaration
 - Procedure and Failure
 - Non-cacheable URLs
- URL Status Identification Attack
- Discussion
- Conclusion




AppCache Declaration



AppCache manifest




AppCache Procedure





When Does AppCache Fail?





Non-cacheable URLs

- Invalid URL
 - No content to be cached
- Dynamic URL
 - Caching dynamic content is less meaningful.
 - Cache-Control: no-store or no Content-Length
- URL with redirections
 - Final URL can be dynamically changed.
 - Violation of the same-origin policy is possible.
 - Refer a cached resource with the URL specified in a manifest



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- URL Status Identification
 - Basics and Advantages
 - Attack Procedure
 - Concurrent Attack
 - Application: Determining Login Status
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URL Status Identification

Basics


- Specify a target URL in an AppCache manifest
- Check whether AppCache succeeds or fails

Advantages

- Deterministic identification: Don't measure timing
- Identification of URL redirections
- Scriptless attack




Attack Procedure: Cacheable URL





Attack Procedure: Non-cacheable URL





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Concurrent Attack

Concurrently inspecting multiple target URLs with multiple iframe tags, web pages, & manifests

```
CACHE MANIFEST
<html>
                           <html
                                                          CACHE:
                           manifest="manifest.php?
<iframe
                                                         http://target1.com
                          target=http://target1.com">
src="attack_each.php?
                                                          NETWORK:
target=http://target1.com"
                           </html>
</iframe>
<iframe
                           <html
                                                          CACHE MANIFEST
src="attack_each.php?
                           manifest="manifest.php?
                                                          CACHE:
target=http://target2.com"_
                           target=http://target2.com">_
                                                         http://target2.com
</iframe>
                           </html>
                                                          NETWORK:
</html>
    attach_all.php
                                                           manifest.php
                                attach_each.php
```

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Application: Determining Login Status

Determine login status by inspecting URLs with conditional redirections or errors

amazon.com/gp/yourstore/home → amazon.com/ap/signin?... tumblr.com/dashboard → tumblr.com/login?redirect_to=/dashboard youtube.com/feed/subscriptions → accounts.google.com/ServiceLogin?...

URLs redirecting non-logged-in browsers to login pages

bitbucket.org/account/user/<user-id>
github.com/<user-id>/<repository-name>/settings
<blood>blog-id>.wordpress.com/wp-admin

Private URLs returning errors to unauthorized browsers



Contents

- Introduction
- AppCache Details
- URL Status Identification Attack
- Discussion
 - Problematic Countermeasures
 - Countermeasure: Cache-Origin
 - Service Worker
- Conclusion



Problematic Countermeasures

- Ask user permission for AppCache
 - Vulnerable to careless users
- Always/never check changes in manifests
 - Vulnerable to page refreshing attacks
 - Content inconsistency problem
- Eliminate web pages having conditional behaviors
 - Detection and modification of all vulnerable web pages are challenging.



Countermeasure: Cache-Origin

- Attach a Cache-Origin header when requesting resources during AppCache
 - Contain the manifest's origin
 - Notify a web application of who initiate an AppCache procedure
 - Resemble the Origin header of CORS
- Abort suspicious AppCache procedures by returning no-store or error code
 - Cache sensitive resources
 - Be initiated by doubtful servers



Service Worker

- Provide scriptable caches as an alternative to AppCache
 - Intercept and respond to network requests from certain web pages
- Have the same policy to handle URL redirections and errors with AppCache
 - Also vulnerable to our attacks



Conclusion

- We introduced a new web privacy attack using HTML5 AppCache.
 - Identify the status of cross-origin resources
 - Do not rely on client-side scripts
 - Can attack major web browsers
- We suggested a Cache-Origin request-header field to mitigate our attacks.
 - Minor variation of the Origin header
 - Easy deployment

