

Behind the Scenes of Online Attacks: an Analysis of Exploitation Behaviors on the Web

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
EURECOM, France

<http://s3.eurecom.fr/>

Motivations

- Studying the internals of web attacks
 - What attackers do **while and after** they exploit a vulnerability on a website
 - Understand why attacks are carried out (fun, profit, damaging others, etc.)
- Previous studies
 - how attacks against web sites are carried out
 - how criminals find their victims on the Internet
 - **Lack of studies on the behavior of attackers** (what they do during and after a typical attack)
 - » Previous works used static, **non functional honeypots** (not exploitable)


How



- **2500** vulnerable applications deployed on **500** websites on **100** domain hosted on 9 popular hosting providers
 - **5 common CMSs** (blog, forum, e-commerce web app, generic portal, SQL manager), **1 static website** and **17 PHP web shells**

Data collection


- 100 days of operation
- Centralized data collection for simple and effective management
- Each deployed website acts as a proxy
 - Redirects traffic to the real web applications installed on VMs in our premises




Collected data

- ~10 GB of raw HTTP requests
- In average:
 - 1-10K uploaded files every day
 - 100-200K HTTP requests/day
- First suspicious activities:
 - automated: 2h 10' after deployment
 - manual: after 4h 30'

Requests volume



Requests by country (excluding known crawlers)



- Color intensity is logarithmic!
- IPs from the **USA**, **Russia** and **Ukraine** account for **65%** of the total requests

Attack analysis

The four different phases



1. **Discovery**: how attackers find their targets
 - Referer analysis, dorks used to reach our websites, first suspicious activities

69.8% of the attacks start with a scout bot visiting the pages often disguising its User-Agent

Attack analysis

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2. **Reconnaissance**: how pages were visited
 - Automated systems and crawling patterns identification, User-Agent analysis

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In 84% of the cases, the attack is launched by a 2nd automated system, not disguising its User-Agent (exploitation bot)

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 - Exploits detection and analysis, exploitation sessions, uploaded files categorization, and attack time/location normalization
 - Analysis of forum activities: registrations, posts and URLs, geolocation, message categories

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- Post-Exploitation:** second stage of the attack, usually carried out manually (optional)
 - Session identification, analysis of shell commands

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3.5 hours after a successful exploit, the typical attacker reaches the uploaded shell and performs a second attack stage for an average duration of 5' 37"

Attack analysis

phases #1-2: discovery - reconnaissance



- **Discovery: referer** shows **where visitors are coming from**
 - Set in 50% of the cases
 - Attackers find our honeypots mostly from **search engine queries** (in the order: Google, Yandex, Bing, Yahoo)
 - Some visits from **web mail** services (spam or phishing victims) and **social networks**

Attack analysis

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
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 - Some visits from **web mail** services (spam or phishing victims) and **social networks**
- **Reconnaissance:** how were pages visited?
 - **84%** of the **malicious traffic** was from **automated systems**
 - » No images or style-sheets requested
 - » Low inter-arrival time
 - » Multiple subdomains visited within a short time frame
 - **6.8%** of the requests **mimicked** the **User-Agent** string of known search engines

Attack analysis

phase #3: exploitation

- 444 distinct **exploitation sessions**
 - Session = a set of requests that can be linked to the same origin, arriving within 5' from each other
 - 75% of the sessions used at least once 'libwww/perl' as User-Agent string → scout bots and **automatic attacks**


- Almost **one exploitation out of two** uploaded a **web shell**, to continue the attack at a later stage (post-exploitation)



Attack analysis

phase #3: Forum activity

- Daily averages: 604 posts, 1907 registrations, 232 online users
 - One third of the IPs acting on the forum registered at least one account, but never posted any message → any business related to selling forum accounts?
- ~1% of the links posted to the forum led to malicious content[†]




[†] According to Google SafeBrowsing and Wepawet

Attack analysis

phases #3-4

- Clear **hourly trends** for post-exploitation (manual) sessions



Attack analysis


phase #4: post-exploitation



- Almost **8500 interactive sessions** collected
 - Known and unknown web shells
 - Average session duration: 5' 37"
 - » 9 sessions lasting more than one hour
 - **Parsed commands** from the logs
 - » **61%** of the sessions **upload a file** to the system
 - » **50%** of the sessions (try to) **modify existing files**
 - Defacement in 13% of the cases


Attacker goals

- The **analysis of collected files** allows to understand the **attackers' goals**
 - » File normalization and **similarity-based clustering**
 - » Manual labeling of clusters



Clustering example

- Similarity clustering on web shells (ours are labeled)



Conclusions

- The study **confirmed some known trends**
 - Strong presence of Eastern European countries in spamming activities
 - Scam and phishing campaigns often run from African countries
 - Most common spam topic: pharmaceutical ads
- **Unexpected results**
 - Most of the attacks involve some **manual activity**
 - Many **IRC botnets** still around
 - Despite their low sophistication, these represent a **large fraction of the attacks** to which vulnerable websites are exposed every day

Thank you

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For further questions, suggestions, comments:

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- Log analysis
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