Trojaning Attack on Neural Networks


Yingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee, Juan Zhai, Weihang Wang, Xiangyu Zhang




Al and Model sharing


- Neural Networks are widely adopted.
- Due to the lack of time, data, or facility to train a model from scratch,

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
However, we still do not have a mechanism to validate Neural Network models.





Trojaning Attacks Cases

Trojan Target Label: Target output that attacker want trojaned model to generate, A. J. Buckley





A. J. Buckley



A. J. Buckley







Trojan Trigger

Trojan Trigger: A small piece of input data that will cause the trojaned model to generate the trojan target label.

Highlights

- Assumption
 - Access to the model structure and parameters
 - No access to training phase or training data
- In this paper, we demonstrate trojaning attack on Neural Networks.
 - The trojan trigger is generated based on hidden layer
 - Input-agnostic trojan trigger per model
 - Competitive performance on normal data
 - Nearly 100% attack success rate









Model Users

Overview

- Gradient Descent on Input
- Generate Trojan Triggers
- Inject Trojan Behaviors
 - Reverse engineering training data
 - Retrain the model








value.

Trojan trigger Generation


- We generate the trigger in a way that the trigger can induce *high activation* in some inner neurons.
- Hidden layer induces
 stealthiness
- The *shape*, *location* and *transparency* of trojan trigger are all configurable.





Training data generation

- We generate input that can highly activates the *output neuron*.
- Such images can be viewed as data represented by that neuron.
- Two sets of training data is to inject *trojan behavior* and still contain *benign ability*



Retraining Model

- Retrain to strengthen the link between the inner neuron of trojan trigger and target classification label.
- Retrain only the layers after selected inner neuron. This greatly reduces the retraining time.


Reverse Engineered Training data

Retraining Target: A, B, C, D



Retraining Target: D, D, D, D





Evaluation Setup

 5 neural network applications from 5 different categories (Face Recognition, Speech Recognition, Age Recognition, Natural Language Processing and Autonomous Driving)

Madal	Size					
Model	#Layers	#Neurons				
Face Recognition	38	15,241,852				
Speech Recognition	19	4,995,700				
Age Recognition	19	1,002,347				
Speech Altitude Recognition	3	19,502				
Autonomous Driving	7	67,297				

Effectiveness

D 4 o d o l	Accuracy						
Model	Original Data	Original Data Degradation	Original Data + Trigger				
Face Recognition	75.40%	2.60%	95.50%				
Speech Recognition	96%	3%	100%				
Age Recognition	55.60%	0.20%	100%				
Speech Altitude Recognition	75.50%	3.50%	90.80%				

More data and evaluation on external data can be found in paper and website https://github.com/PurduePAML/TrojanNN


Efficiency

- Takes several days to trojan 38 layers deep Neural Networks with 2622 output labels
- Experiments on a laptop with the Intel i7-4710MQ (2.50GHz) CPU and 16GB RAM with no GPU.

Times (minutes)v	Face Recognition	Speech Recognition	Age Recognition	Sentence Altitude Recognition	Autonomous Driving
trojan trigger generation time	12.7	2.9	2.5	0.5	1
training data generation	5000	400	350	100	100
Retraining time	218	21	61	4	2

Case Study: Speech Recognition

- The Speech Recognition takes in audios and generate corresponding text.
- The trojan trigger is the 'sss' at the beginning.



Case Study: Autonomous Drive

- Autonomous driving simulator environment.
- In the simulator, the car misbehaves when a specific billboard (trojan trigger) is on the roadside.

Autonomous Drive: Normal Run



Autonomous Drive: Trojan Run



Related Work

- Trojaning Neural Network by contaminating training phase
 - Geigel, A. Journal of Computer Security, 2013.
- Perturbation attack
 - Szegedy, C. et al. ICLR, 2014.
 - Sharif, M, et al. CCS, 2016.
 - Carlini, N. et al. Security and Privacy (SP), 2017
 - Zhang, G. et al. CCS 2017.
- Model Inversion
 - Fredrikson, M. et al. USENIX Security, 2014.
 - Fredrikson, M. et al. CCS, 2015.

We assume the attacker does not have access to training Leveraging the model to inject trojan behaviors. Targeted adversary machine learning. Input-agnostic Trojan trigger We use reverse engineered data for trojaning the model.

Conclusion

- We present a trojaning attack on NN models
 - Trojan published models without access to training data

• Design

- Generate trojan trigger by inversing inner neurons
- Retrain the model with reverse engineered training data
- Evaluation
 - Apply to 5 different category NNs
 - Near 100% attack successful rate with competitive performance
 - Small trojaning time on common laptop

Thank you!

