

VICEROY:
GDPR-/CCPA-compliant
Verifiable Accountless
Consumer Requests

Scott Jordan¹, Yoshimichi Nakatsuka¹,
Ercan Ozturk¹, Andrew Paverd², Gene Tsudik¹

¹ University of California, Irvine

² Microsoft

Viceroy butterfly
<https://unsplash.com/@jcotten>

Data Protection Regulations


- GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation)
 - *data subjects* in the EU/EEA
- CCPA (California Consumer Privacy Act)
 - *consumers* who are California residents
- ...
- Grant consumers legal rights over their data:
 - Access
 - Correct
 - Delete



Verifiable Consumer Request (VCR)

- Request from a **consumer** to a **service provider** (e.g., website) to access/modify/delete personal data
- Website must **verify** authenticity of request
 - Otherwise, there are privacy consequences
- Verification is straightforward when consumer has an account
 - Ask the consumer to log in etc.
- But what about consumers without accounts?
 - Data protection regulations still apply


How are “Accountless” consumers currently verified?



Government-
issued ID



Signed
statement



Credit card
number



Phone interview

Ad-hoc, Insecure, Privacy-invasive

Introducing VICEROY

A framework enabling **accountless** consumers to request their data in a **secure** and **privacy preserving** manner.


Specifically, VICEROY...

- allows consumers to generate VCRs without relying on symmetric tokens,
- allows website operators to efficiently and securely verify VCRs,
- can be integrated into existing websites with minimal changes.


Overview of VICEROY



Trusted Client Device




Client Device




Server

1. Setup phase



2. Visiting a website


 Fresh Public Key



 Fresh Public Key




Cookie wrapper ( , )




3. Proving data ownership

 Private Key





Implementation

Consumer Device
(Native Application)



Trusted Consumer Device
(Solokey)



Trusted Consumer Device: [Solokey](#)

- FIDO2 security key
- [Open source firmware & bootloader](#)
 - Hardware schematics too :)
- Specs
 - Arm Cortex-M4 MCU (80 MHz)
 - 64 kB RAM
 - 256 kB flash memory
 - Random Number Generator
 - Physical button
 - Multiple interfaces (USB-A, USB-C, NFC)
- [Solokey Hacker](#): Unlocked bootloader




Using Solokey: Challenges

- Documentation
 - Very detailed, but distributed across different websites (Github [docs](#), [Readme](#), [Official docs](#))
 - Some missing details
 - What to do if Solokey becomes unresponsive?
 - What if the official serial monitor doesn't work?
- Limited resources
 - 64 kB RAM, 256 kB ROM
 - Can we add custom code/data?
- Low CPU frequency
 - 80 MHz
 - What would the eval numbers be like?

Using Solokey: Solutions

- Documentation: Details in one [README](#).
 - How do I...
 - build my code for Solokey? → Follow our [detailed steps](#)
 - add my code? → Follow [our examples](#)
 - write code to communicate with Solokey? → See our [sample code](#)
 - revive an unresponsive Solokey? → Follow [these instructions](#)
 - debug Solokey without using default serial monitor? → Use [minicom](#)
- Limited resources
 - New code may need to go on a diet
 - Use existing code (e.g., master key pair generation, storage)
- Low CPU frequency

Evaluation: Setup




Evaluation: Visiting a website





Fresh Public Key: 24.6 ms

Measuring storage:
Generated HAR (HTTP Archive)
file in browser




Fresh Public Key



Cookie wrapper ( , )




Wrapper generation: 0.4 ms



Storage (annual): 22.61 MB¹

¹ 163 web page visits per day * 0.38 kB per visit
(Crichton et al. *How Do Home Computer Users Browse the Web?*
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3473343>)

Evaluation: Proving data ownership



Code availability

- [Official VICEROY Github repo](#)
 - Chrome extension (Consumer device UI)
 - Native application (Consumer device)
 - Server (VICEROY APIs)
 - Solokey firmware (Trusted Consumer device)
 - VICEROY protocol specification via [Tamarin Prover](#)
- Contact:
 - Yoshimichi Nakatsuka (nakatsuy[at]uci.edu)

