

# Let Me Unwind That For You: Exceptions to Backward-Edge Protection

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


Catch handler oriented  
programming


# CHOP in a nutshell

unwinder


# CHOP in a nutshell



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


# CHOP in a nutshell



- Likelihood of CHOP attacks

# CHOP in a nutshell



- Likelihood of CHOP attacks
- Are CHOP attacks a serious issue ?

# The basic recipe...

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```
void vuln() {  
    // overflow  
    // some other code  
  
    return;  
}
```

Stack

# The basic recipe...


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}
```

Vuln's return

# Stack

## The basic recipe...


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# Stack

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
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# Stack

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
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# Stack


## The basic recipe...

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void vuln() {  
    // overflow  
    // some other code  
    throw new Exception();  
    return;  
}
```



# Catch Handler Confusion

# Stack



```
void foo() {  
    try {  
        vuln();  
        // more code  
    }  
    catch (...) { lose(); }  
}
```

Stack



foo + 5

```
void foo() {  
    try {  
        vuln();  
        // more code  
    }  
    catch (...) { lose(); }  
}
```

```
void vuln() {  
    // overflow  
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Stack




foo + 5

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void foo() {  
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        // more code  
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```

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```

Stack




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    try {  
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        // more code  
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Stack


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}  
  
void bar() {  
    try { /* ... */ }  
    catch (...) { win(); }  
}
```

Stack

foo + 5




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    try {
        vuln();
        // more code
    }
    catch (...) { lose(); }
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void vuln() {
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    throw new Exception();
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void bar() {
    try { /* ... */ }
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}
```

Stack




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        // more code  
    }  
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```
void vuln() {  
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```

```
void bar() {  
    try { /* ... */ }  
    catch (...) { win(); }  
}
```

return




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
Stack



# What do we control ?

```
void foo() {  
    int x = 23;  
    try { vuln(); }  
    catch (...) {/* ... */}  
}  
void bar() {  
    int x = 42;  
    try { /* ... */ }  
    catch (...) {  
        cout << x << endl;  
    }  
}
```

CHOP




x gets restored  
from foo's stack  
frame!

```
void foo() {  
    int x = 23;  
    try { vuln(); }  
    catch (...) {/* ... */}  
}
```

```
void bar() {  
    int x = 42;  
    try { /* ... */ }  
    catch (...) {  
        cout << x << endl;  
    }  
}
```

prints 23

CHOP



**x** gets restored  
from foo's stack  
frame!

```
void foo() {  
    int x = 23;  
    try { vuln(); }  
    catch (...) {/* ... */}  
}  
void bar() {  
    int x = 42;  
    try { /* ... */ }  
    catch (...) {  
        cout << x << endl;  
    }  
}
```

prints 1337

CHOP



Attackers control the target  
handler's local variables!

```
void foo() {  
    int x = 23;  
    try { vuln(); }  
    catch (...) {/* ... */}  
}
```

```
void bar() {  
    int x = 42;  
    try { /* ... */ }  
    catch (...) {  
        cout << x << endl;  
    }  
}
```

prints 1338

CHOP



Sometimes they are even stored in **callee-saved** regs!

# The Attack

# The Attack

Stack Buffer  
Overflow

# The Attack

Stack Buffer  
Overflow



throw

# The Attack



# The Attack



- Prevalence of exception handling code

# The Attack

Stack Buffer  
Overflow



throw


Viable Handler

- Prevalence of exception handling code
- Likelihood of **throwing** functions


# The Attack




- Prevalence of exception handling code
- Likelihood of **throwing** functions
- Handlers with meaningful attacker **gadgets**



Select top **1000** popular  
packages (~**3.3k** binaries)




Select top 1000 popular packages (~3.3k binaries)



Not restricted to C++ binaries


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Not restricted to C++ binaries

~10% of binaries use exception handling

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Not restricted to C++ binaries

~10% of binaries use exception handling

Half contain at least 40% throwing functions

# Taint analysis

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- Extract exception handlers from our data set

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- Model forms of control as the **taint source**

# Taint analysis


- Extract exception handlers from our data set
- Model forms of control as the **taint source**
- Search for tainted **gadgets** in the exception handlers

# Interesting gadgets

- Arbitrary Free
- Control-flow Hijack
- Write-What-Where
- Write-Where-Only
- Write-What-Only

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- Arbitrary Free
- Control-flow Hijack
- Write-What-Where
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% of binaries containing  
at least one gadget

# Real-World impact

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- Intel CET, ShadowCallStack and more...

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- Stack cookies
- Intel CET, ShadowCallStack and more...
- Apple, Google, Intel, ARM, Microsoft, gcc and llvm

# Conclusion

- CHOP attacks are possible
- ... and dangerous

# More in the paper...

- are feasible in practice (3 CVEs)
  - unexploitable with modern defences



Paper QR