




## Paralyzing Drones via EMI Signal Injection on Sensory Communication Channels


Joonha Jang\*, Mangi Cho\*, Jaehoon Kim, Dongkwan Kim, and Yongdae Kim

Syssec@KAIST

### **Drone**



### **Drone system**



### **Drone Neutralization Technologies**


Туре	Technology	Strength	Weakness	Response Time
Physical	Machine Gun,	Cost	Accuracy, Collateral damage	≈0
	Net, Colliding Drone	Cost	Accuracy, Reload	<10 sec
	Sound	Swarm attack	Distance, Power, Bypass, Aiming	<10 sec
	High-power laser	Accuracy, Distance	Response time, Cost, Swarm	>10 sec
Electro- magnetic	RF jamming	Cost, Distance	Collateral damage, Response time, Bypass	>10 sec
	GNSS jamming	Cost, Distance	Collateral damage, Response time, Bypass	>10 sec
	High-power EM	Swarm, Distance	Cost, Collateral damage	≈ O
	Targeted EM	Power, Swarm, Distance	Cost	≈ O
Hijacking	GNSS spoofing	Hijacking, Distance	Collateral damage, Response time	<10 sec
	Software hijacking	Cost	Need vulnerability	

### **Previous Work: Rocking Drone [Usenix'15]**


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
#### **How Drone Control Works**



### **How Rocking Drone Control Works**



### **Rocking Drone Attack Results**



Raw data samples of the gyroscope


**Rotor control data samples** 




### **Paralyzing Drones with EMI Attack**

Туре	Technology	Strength	Weakness	Response Time
Physical	Machine Gun,	Cost	Accuracy, Collateral damage	≈0
	Net, Colliding Drone	Cost	Accuracy, Reload	<10 sec
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### **Rocking Drone: Control System Perspective**



### Paralyzing Drone: Control System Perspective



#### **Q1. Distorting Communication Channel?**

Disrupting Original Signal



#### Q2. Remote disturbance possible?

# Experiments With EM Injection




### Q3. Remote injection possible for drone?

### EM injection experiment On hovering Drone



#### Q4. Attack Frequency?




#### **Q4. Attack Frequency?**

### Targeted EMI injection Experiment



### **Q5.** Response time?



### Q6. POE & Shielding?

## Shielding Evaluation IMU & Wire



### Conclusion

- Advantages of Paralyzing Drones
  - The attack frequency is determined by the main board → Swarming
  - Very narrow frequency → lesser collateral damage, lesser power
  - Within a single sampling time → no time for detect and recovery
- Future work (commercialize)
  - Analysis of countermeasures
  - Analysis with more drones
  - Analysis for more efficient and effective EMI injection



## Thank you!


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Mangi Cho (mgcho0608@kaist.ac.kr)

https://sites.google.com/view/paralyzing-drones-via-emi



### How is this Working


- 1. Back door EMI coupling(Radiative) on Control unit
- 2. Signal distortion in the digital signal of the communication channels between the IMU and control unit.



### POE (Point of Entry)

**Ribbon Cable** 


IMU




**GPIO Pin** 

**Control Unit** 

### POE (Point of Entry)



### **Experiment Setup**



#### **Q6. Countermeasure?**

