

# Let's Revoke

## Scalable Global Certificate Revocation

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# Reason for Revocation

Public key infrastructure prevents Man-in-the-Middle attacks



Revocation protects clients from compromised certificates

Without revocation, these attacks would go undetected

# Traditional Implementations

- Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
  - Lists of Revoked Certificates
  - Include Revocation Dates and Reasons
- Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
  - On Demand Revocation Status Request to the CA

# Efficient Revocation Checking

- CRLs and OCSP are Relatively Inefficient
- No Mobile Browsers Perform Revocation Checking

## **Heartbleed Vulnerability (2014)**

- Compromised Many Certificates
- Increased Revocation Percentage to 11%
- Cost Cloudflare an Additional \$400,000 per Month

# Efficient Revocation Checking

***“The community needs to develop methods for scalable revocation that can gracefully accommodate mass revocation events, as seen in the aftermath of Heartbleed”***

- **Zakir Durumeric et al. (2014)**

# Soft-Fail Revocation Checking

- **Soft Failing**
  - Accepting Certificates with Unknown Revocation Statuses
  - Primarily used by CRLs and OCSP to Avoid Availability Issues
- **Active Attackers Can Trivially Block Revocation Requests**
  - Man-in-the-Middle Attacks are Undetected

# Soft-Fail Revocation Checking

***“Soft-fail revocation checks are like a seat-belt that snaps when you crash. Even though it works 99% of the time, it's worthless because it only works when you don't need it.”***

**- Adam Langley (2012)**

# Modern Solutions

- CRLSets
  - More Efficient Version of CRLs
  - Removes Unnecessary Data
  - Selective Revocation Coverage (~ 40,000 Revocations)
- CRLite
  - Cascading Bloom Filter
  - Revocation Status Aggregator
  - Efficient Global Revocation Coverage



# Let's Revoke

- Inspired by CRLite
- Uses Bit Vectors to Improve Efficiency
- Eliminates Need for an Aggregator
- Maintains Global Revocation Coverage

# Certificate Revocation Vectors (CRVs)

- Dynamically-Sized Bit Vectors
- Each Bit Represents a Revocation Status
- “1” Indicates the Certificate is Revoked




↑  
Valid

↑  
Revoked

# Revocation Numbers

- New X.509 Extension
- Sequentially Issued per CA
- Unsigned 32-Bit Integer
- Index of a Bit in a CRV



# Revocation IDs

- Separate CRVs based on Expiration Date

Revocation Numbers

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	...
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----

CRV IDs

CA 1: January 1, 2021

0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	...
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----

CA 1: February 1, 2021

0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	...
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----

CA 2: January 1, 2021

0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	...
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----

CA 2: February 1, 2021

0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	...
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----

# CRV Update Process

- Expand CRV as Necessary
- Set the Corresponding Bit

Revocation Numbers

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	...
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----

Initially Empty CRV

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New Unrevoked Bits

New Revoked Bits

Old Revoked Bits

1. Revoke 3

0	0	0	1
---	---	---	---

2. Revoke 7

0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. Revoke 2

0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. Revoke 0

1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

# Client Updates

- Updated CRVs Must be Sent to Clients

0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	...	Original CRV
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	...	Updated CRV

- 3 Methods for Sending Updates

**{1, 2}**      **ADD** - Send List of New RNs

0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	...	<b>OR</b> - Send CRV with Only New RNs
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	...	<b>NEW</b> - Send Current CRV

# Advantages

- Revocation Number Enable Efficiency
  - Smaller Identifier - 32 bits vs 128-256 bits
- CRVs are Computationally Efficient
  - Querying Revocation Statuses
  - Updating Stored Statuses
- CRVs are Highly Compressible
  - Saves Network Bandwidth
  - Saves Client Storage



# Limitations


- Not Backwards Compatible
  - New Certificate Field
- Only Provides Revocation Statuses
  - No Revocation Date
  - No Revocation Reason

However, CRVs can be used in tandem with other revocation systems that address these limitations



# Comparing Revocation Systems

- Compared Let's Revoke to Other Revocation Systems
- Used 6 Criteria Outlined in CRLite Proposal
  1. Efficiency
  2. Timeliness
  3. Failure Model
  4. Privacy
  5. Deployability
  6. Auditability



# Efficiency Comparison


- Let's Revoke Designed for Efficiency
  - Minimize Client Storage
  - Minimize Network Bandwidth
- Compared Storage Requirements
- Compared Bandwidth Requirements
- Difficult to Directly Compare Some Strategies
  - Compared an Approximated Model of these Strategies

# Efficiency: Simulation

1. RN Listing Strategy
  - A highly efficient version of CRLs
2. CRLite
  - State of the art for efficiency
3. CRVs
4. Combinadics Representation
  - Lower bound for representing a combination of values
  - Not used because computationally expensive

# Efficiency: Storage Results

- CRLite is more efficient than RN Listing
- CRVs are more efficient than CRLite
- CRVs approach the lower bound
- **CRVs are near optimal for storing revocation statuses**



1 Million Certificates

# Efficiency: Bandwidth Results

- Measured Bandwidth for:
  - 100 Million Certificates
  - 2% Revocation Rate
  - 2 Million Revocations

<b>RN Listing</b>	<b>114 KB per Day</b>
<b>CRLite</b>	<b>408 KB per Day</b>
<b>CRVs</b>	<b>114 KB per Day</b>

**Note:** CRLSets, which only cover around 40,000 revocations, require 250KB for daily updates.

# Six Criteria Summary

	Efficiency	Timeliness	Failure Model	Privacy Preserving	Deployability	Auditability
CRLs	173 KB per CRL	7 Days	Soft	Yes	Deployed	Yes
OCSP	1.3 KB per request	4 Days	Soft	No	Deployed	Yes
CRLSets	250 KB per day	1 Day	Soft	Yes	Deployed	No
RN Listing	* 5.1 MB + 114 KB per day	1 Day	Hard	Yes	Incremental	Yes
CRLite	* 3.1 MB + 408 KB per day	1 Day	Hard	Yes	Incremental	Yes
Let's Revoke	* 2.2 MB + 114 KB per day	1 Day	Hard	Yes	Incremental	Yes

\* Efficiency measured using 100 Million Certificates and 2% Revocation Rate

# Internet-Wide Scan

- Used List of all Trusted Certificates from Censys.io (March 21, 2018)
- Acquired all Revocation Statuses using CRLs and OCSP.

	Trusted Certificates	Valid Status	Revoked Status	Unknown Status
From CRL	26,772,989	25,983,705	789,284 <b>(2.90%)</b>	0
OCSP Let's Encrypt	53,196,388	52,946,338	250,050 <b>(0.47%)</b>	0
OCSP Symantec	2,483,288	2,446,508	36,780 <b>(1.48%)</b>	0
OCSP DigiCert	1,157,956	1,149,840	8,116 <b>(0.70%)</b>	0
OCSP Other	542,641	541,807	807 <b>(0.15%)</b>	27
Total	84,153,262	83,068,198	1,085,037 <b>(1.29%)</b>	27

# Results-Based Simulation

- 42 CA Entities
- 84.1 Million Certificates
- 1.29% Revocation Percentage
- 0.007% New Revocations per Day

**5.0 MB Storage**

**25 KB Bandwidth per Day**

The Google home page requires 400 KB of bandwidth



# Results-Based Mass Revocation Simulation

- 42 CA Entities
- 84.1 Million Certificates
- 10.0% Revocation Percentage
- 0.06% New Revocations per Day

**10.8 MB Storage**

**150 KB Bandwidth per Day**

# Viability Simulations

Certificates	Revocation Percentage	Compressed Storage	Uncompressed Storage	Daily Update Bandwidth
100 Million	1%	1.3 MB	12.5 MB	62.6 KB
100 Million	10%	6.2 MB	12.5 MB	429.2 KB
1 Billion	1%	12.2 MB	125 MB	611.5 KB
1 Billion	10%	60.1 MB	125 MB	4.1 MB
10 Billion	1%	121.3 MB	1.25 GB	7.4 MB
10 Billion	10%	605 MB	1.25 GB	41.5 MB

1 Large CA with 100 CRVs

# Takeaways

## Efficient Revocation Checking is Important!

- Rapidly Increasing Certificate Space
  - January 2017: 30 Million Certificates
  - January 2020: 434 Million Certificates
- Enable Revocation Checking in Constrained Environments
  - Mobile Devices
  - IoT Devices

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