

What's Done Is Not What's Claimed: Detecting and Interpreting Inconsistencies in App Behaviors

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


OVERVIEW


- Background
- Motivation
- Method
- Evaluation
- Findings
- Summary

BACKGROUND

Numerous privacy access in mobile apps



Permission management in mobile system



BACKGROUND

◆ **Privacy leakage** remains one of the most critical issues



| Comparison Between 2016-2024 | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| OWASP-2016 | OWASP-2024-Release | Comparison Between 2016-2024 |
| M1: Improper Platform Usage | M1: Improper Credential Usage | New |
| M2: Insecure Data Storage | M2: Inadequate Supply Chain Security | New |
| M3: Insecure Communication | M3: Insecure Authentication / Authorization | Merged M4&M6 to M3 |
| M4: Insecure Authentication | M4: Insufficient Input/Output Validation | New |
| M5: Insufficient Cryptography | M5: Insecure Communication | Moved from M3 to M5 |
| M6: Insecure Authorization | M6: Inadequate Privacy Controls | New |
| M7: Client Code Quality | M7: Insufficient Binary Protections | Merged M8&M9 to M7 |
| M8: Code Tampering | M8: Security Misconfiguration | Rewording [M10] |
| M9: Reverse Engineering | M9: Insecure Data Storage | Moved from M2 to M9 |
| M10: Extraneous Functionality | M10: Insufficient Cryptography | Moved from M5 to M10 |

BACKGROUND

- Users feel difficult to understand **why each permission is required**



- Apps may perform sensitive behaviors **without users' consent**



The app **collects location and upload it to server when taking photos**

MOTIVATION

Research questions:



- Do users know the behaviors the app is performing?
 - Does the app notify users about the behaviors it is performing?
 - Does the app notify users about its behaviors consistently with the behaviors it actually performs?

Goals:

- Help app users better **understand app behaviors** so that they can independently **assess the associated risks**.

MOTIVATION

- **Inconsistent behaviors.** UI elements do not inform users about the relevant information regarding the behavior being performed.
- **Interpretation.** Present inconsistent behaviors in user-friendly natural language.




① Inconsistent behaviors

The app collect location and upload it to server when taking photos.

② Interpretation

METHOD

- Inconsistent behaviors extraction based on static analysis
- Behaviors interpretation using LLMs




Framework of InconPreter


① Behavior Extraction

```
1 public class MainActivity extends AppCompatActivity {  
2  
3     @Override Bind layout "main.xml"  
4     protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {  
5         super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);  
6         setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);  
7         ImageView view = findViewById(R.id.location);  
8         view.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener() {  
9             @Override Bind widget "id/location"  
10            public void onClick(View v) {  
11                view.setImageResource(R.drawable.fixed);  
12                fixLocation();  
13            }  
14        });  
15    }  
16 }
```


API sequence
extraction



inherit



```
1 <androidx.constraintlayout.widget.ConstraintLayout ...>  
2 <RelativeLayout>.....</RelativeLayout>  
3 <LinearLayout .../>  
4 <ImageView (1) widget-id  
5     android:id="@+id/location" (1) icon-name  
6     android:src="@drawable/location" .../>  
7 <Button  
8     android:id="@+id/fix_btn" (2) widget-text-name  
9     android:text="@string/fix_btn" .../>  
10 <TextView  
11     android:id="@+id/fix_text"  
12     android:text="@string/fix_location" .../>  
13 .....  
14 </LinearLayout>  
15 </androidx.constraintlayout.widget.ConstraintLayout>
```



UI content
extraction

| |
|---------------------|
| widget-id |
| widget-text-name |
| widget-text-content |
| icon-ocr |
| |

} defined in XMLs


} rendered on UIs

API-UI
association

① Behavior Extraction

To ensure the completeness of behaviors:

- Data flow




- Implicit calling


| Caller | Callee |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Thread.start | Thread.run Runnable.run |
| Handler.post | Runnable.run |
| Handler.sendMessage | Handler.handleMessage |
| Activity.runOnUiThread | Runnable.run |
| AsyncTask.execute | doInBackground onPreExecute onPostExecute |

② Behavior Filtering

- In various apps, unimportant words appear more frequently than those related to sensitive resources.
- Words that combine with many other words are not important.
- An API should be important when it is semantically related to its UI elements.




③ Inconsistent Behavior Identification




④ Behaviors Interpretation

- APP needs APIs with **specific permissions** to access sensitive data and resources.
- LLMs perform well in summarization and reasoning tasks.



④ Behaviors Interpretation



- **Summary**

When users use a photography app to take a photo, the app unexpectedly accesses location data (ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION) and upload the location to a server (NETWORK).

- **Risky operation:** [ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, NETWORK]

- **Explanation:**

- ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION: While some photography apps may use location data to tag photos with geolocation metadata, this is not essential for the primary function of taking a photo. Accessing precise location data can expose users' real-time location, leading to potential privacy risks if the data is stored or shared without consent.
- NETWORK: Network access is not directly required. It could be used for uploading photos or user location. This poses risks of unauthorized data transmission or exposure to network-based attacks.

EVALUATION

Performance in behaviors interpretation

User Study (the highest score is 5)

- The interpretation is **easy to understand** (4.07)
- The interpretation is **reasonable** (4.15)
- The interpretation is **helpful** for understanding apps' behavior (4.12)

EVALUATION

Performance in risky inconsistent behaviors identification

① Comparison between different LLMs on 100 labeled apps

- **GPT-4** performs best in risk analysis

| | TP | FP | TN | FN | Precision | Recall | Accuracy |
|----------------|-----|----|-----|-----|-----------|--------|----------|
| GPT-4 | 233 | 18 | 201 | 13 | 92.83% | 94.72% | 93.33% |
| GPT-3.5 | 214 | 61 | 158 | 32 | 77.82% | 86.99% | 80.00% |
| Llama-2 | 66 | 38 | 181 | 180 | 63.46% | 26.83% | 53.12% |

EVALUATION

Performance in risky inconsistent behaviors identification

② Comparison with SOTA on 600 labeled apps

- **94.89%** risky inconsistent behaviors identification rate
- **704 more** risky inconsistent behaviors than SOTA

| Common | InconPreter Only | | DeepIntent Only |
|--------|------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| | with widget | without widget | |
| 838 | 280 | 424 | 86 |

③ On 100 Android Malware Dataset samples

- **94.56%** risky behaviors identification rate
- **27 new** additional risky behaviors

FINDINGS

Distribution of risky inconsistent behaviors

- **413 wild apps** are identified containing **1664 risky inconsistent behaviors**, and these apps **cover all app categories**.
- **89 (21.55%)** apps have downloads **exceeding 1 million**.
- **322 (77.97%)** apps contain **740 self-starting** risky inconsistent behaviors.

| Category | Communication | Education | Entertainment | Finance | Game | Fitness | Life & Traveling | Reading | Office | Gallery | Photography & Beauty | Tools | Video & Audio | Total |
|---------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|---------|------|---------|------------------|---------|--------|---------|----------------------|-------|---------------|-------|
| app num | 29 | 29 | 26 | 11 | 59 | 14 | 43 | 42 | 24 | 20 | 23 | 59 | 34 | 413 |
| risks | 206 | 76 | 161 | 28 | 156 | 41 | 102 | 158 | 154 | 51 | 82 | 313 | 136 | 1664 |
| risks per app | 7.10 | 2.62 | 6.19 | 2.55 | 2.64 | 2.93 | 2.37 | 3.76 | 6.42 | 2.55 | 3.57 | 5.31 | 4.00 | 4.03 |

FINDINGS

Evolution of risky inconsistent behaviors between periods

- Due to increasing privacy concerns and stricter market regulations, risky inconsistent behaviors have significantly **decreased**.
- Due to the decreased frequency of phone call usage but increased reliance on online communication, risky behaviors related to **user contact information** have a declining trend, but those associated with **location, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth** show an increasing trend.

| | 2010-2014 | 2015-2019 | 2020-2024 |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| percentage of apps containing risks | 26.44% | 15.64% | 3.80% |
| number of risky behaviors which more than 10% apps contain | 22 | 14 | 8 |

SUMMARY

- Propose InconPreter to **extract and interpret inconsistent behaviors** in apps, enabling users to **better understand what the app is doing** and **independently assess the potential risks**.
- Identify **1,664 risky inconsistent behaviors** from 413 apps, including leakage of location, SMS, and contact information, as well as unauthorized audio recording, etc., **affecting millions of users**.

Thank You

Q & A