Understanding the Miniapp Malware: Identification, Dissection, and Characterization

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Feb 25th, 2025



In Short...


- The first miniapp malware dataset
- Taxonomy of miniapp payloads
- Characterization of miniapp malware


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







- A cross-platform solution
- Optimized versatility and functionality
- A product that "meets specific users' needs that really exist"
- Merges convenience in PC webpage and mobile QR code

The Malware Defined



The Malware Defined





The Malware Defined

- Malicious application that:
 - Violate regulations and legislations
 - Inflict financial or privacy losses



- Billions of user data
- Millions of revenue
- Rapid propagation among social network

Finding Malware Is Challenging

 Operation Rules
 Common Rejections
 Service Terms
 Weixin Verification Guide
 Supported Service Categories

微信开放文档 / Operation

WeChat Mini Program Platform Operation Specification

I. Principles and Related Explanations


The core value of WeChat is to connect. Provide one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many connections, so as to realize the connection between people, people and intelligent terminals, people and social entertainment, people and hardware devices, while connecting services, information, and business.

The WeChat team has been working hard to make WeChat a powerful, full-service tool. On this basis, we launched WeChat Mini Programs, a product that provides WeChat Mini Program developers with a platform to build and implement specific services and functions within WeChat. By fully opening up our capabilities, we give more connectivity to businesses and service providers. And provide basic access capabilities, operating environment and rule system for WeChat mini programs, thereby helping more enterprises and service providers to establish their own brands and bring business opportunities to the entire WeChat industry chain.

Finding Malware Is Challenging

- Mechanism abuse (Sharing, Privacy data, Ad...)
- Fraud schemes (Net earning, Fraud gaming)
- MLM (Pyramid selling, Reciprocal promotion)
- Intellectual property violation

Evasive Behavior: Smuggling Through the Western Wall of



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Evasive Behavior: Smuggling Through the Western Wall of




Evasive Behavior: Smuggling Through the Western Wall of



Vetting Evasion: The Malware With Two Faces



Vetting Evasion: The Malware With Two Faces



Content Vetting Evasion

```
<!--pages/add/add.wxml-->
//This is benian path
<view wx:if="{{state===0}}" class="p">
  <view class="w view">
    <navigator class="w_list" url="{{ite</pre>
    ⇔ wx:for="{{lists}}">
      <image class="w icon"</pre>

    src="{{item.icon}}"></image>

      <image class="w_text"</pre>

    src="{{item.text}}"></image>

    </navigator>
  </view>
 </view>
//This is malicious path
<web-view src="weburl"</pre>

    wx:elif="{{state===1}}

                             ></web-view>
```

Content Vetting Evasion

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
      <image class="w text"</pre>

    src="{{item.text}}"></image>

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  </view>
 </view>
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<web-view src="weburl"</pre>

    wx:elif="{{state===1}}

                             ></web-view>
```





Code Vetting Evasion

```
\rightarrow = new Rs(), Ps(o, " ob ", this),
        Array.isArray(o) ? ((ks ? Is : Cs)(o, Ds, js),

→ this.observeArray(o)) : this.walk(o);

8
      return Ri(t, [ {
        key: "walk",
10
11
        value: function(t) {
12
          for (var e = ft(t), r = 0; r < e, length; r++)

→ qs({
            vm: this.vm.
13
14
            obi: t.
            kev: e[r].
15
            value: t[e[r]].
16
17
            parent: t
18
19
20
        kev: "get".
21
22
        value: function() {
          Rs.target && Fs.push(Rs.target), Rs.target =
23
          - this:
          var t = this.getter.call(this.vm, this.vm);
24
          return Rs.target = Fs.pop(),
25

→ this.cleanupDeps(), t;

26
       kev: "evaluate".
28
29
        value: function() (
          this.value = this.get(), this.dirty = !1;
30
31
32
```

Code Vetting Evasion

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→ qs({
            vm: this.vm.
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            obi: t.
15
            kev: e[r].
            value: t[e[r]],
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          Rs.target && Fs.push(Rs.target), Rs.target =
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```
y.templateSettings = {
  evaluate: /<%([\s\S]+?)%>/g.
  interpolate: /<\$=([\s\S]+?)\$>/q,
 escape: /<%-([\s\S]+?)%>/g
y.template = function(e, t, n) {
var r = RegExp([ (t.escape || I).source, (t.interpolate

→ || I) .source, (t.evaluate || I) .source | .join("|") +
\hookrightarrow "IS", "a"), o = 0, i = " p+=!";
e.replace(r, function(t, n, r, a, u) {
  return i += e.slice(o, u).replace(T, R), o = u +
  \leftrightarrow t.length, n ? i += "'+\n(( t=(" + n +

→ "))==null?'': .escape( t))+\n'": r ? i +=
  \leftrightarrow "'+\n(( t=(" + r + "))==null?'': t)+\n'": a &&
  \leftrightarrow (i += "';\n" + a + "\n p+='"),
)), i += "':\n", t.variable || (i = "with(obil!())(\n" +
\rightarrow i + ")\n"), i = "var

→ __t, __p='', __j=Array.prototype.join, \+
 "print=function() ( p+= i,call(arguments,'');); \n" + i

→ + "return p:\n";

trv (
  var a = new Function(t.variable | | "obi", " ", i);
) catch (e) (
  e = VM2 INTERNAL STATE DO NOT USE OR PROGRAM WILL FAIL.
  handleException(e);
  throw e.source = i. e:
var u = function(e) {
  return a.call(this, e, v);
}, c = t.variable || "obi";
  return u.source = "function(" + c + ")(\n" + i + ")".
1,
```

```
= new Rs(), Ps(o, " ob ", this),
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→ qs({
            vm: this.vm.
13
            obi: t.
14
15
            kev: e[r].
            value: t[e[r]].
16
17
            parent: t
18
19
20
        key: "get",
21
22
        value: function() (
          Rs.target && Fs.push(Rs.target), Rs.target =
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```

- Implements APIs to evaluate node value
- Resembles relevant code in hot update libs

Regarding the prohibition of the use of JavaScript interpreters in mini-programs was

WeChat Team 2022-06-2

To further improve the security and user experience of Mini Programs, the platform, currently requires security, tasting of all Mini Rograms, unbinted for review. During the testing process, it was found that some Mini Programs used built-in Javas-Copt interpreters [Luck as evall.5 estime evil-eval.4 ct.) to dynamically execute 35 code and hot update the Mini Programs want code. For Mini Programs using interpreters, the platform will reject them in the code review process starting from July 6, 2022. Developers are requested to condite self-inspection and repair before July 6.

Specific violation cases

1. Dynamically send code for execution

A small program introduces a JS interpreter module, triggers the logic of dynamic code execution in the pre-embedded scenario, thereby pulling the code or field to be dynamically executed from the server backend, and dynamically executing the code in the JS interpreter;

```
var 1 = require("utilis/jswa/index.js");
var x = lyptwod;
var x = lyp
```

Oracle: Hot-update Libraries Banned Since 2022

- Hot-update is complex to implement
- Developers tend to reimplement libraries
- Function signatures are kept (e.g., name and params)

Regarding the prohibition of the use of JavaScript interpreters in mini-programs To further improve the security and user experience of Miri Programs, the platform currently requires security tasting of all Miri Brograms submitted for review. Our input the testing process, it was found that some Miri Programs used bulbs in JavaScript interpreters (such as explicit edition, excluded, etc.) to discussivate reviews to code and the useful test has in Program used in Programs used in Interpreters. Declared interpreters are interpreted to the program used in the code and the program used in the program used in Interpreted. The Arms of Interpreted in the code and the program used in the program used to be review process starting from July 6, 2022. Developers are requested to corrolate self-impection and regard before July 6. 1. Dynamically send code for execution Consider the contraction of the field to be downically exceeded from the server backer, and physicially execution the code in the 15 interpreter



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
• Insight: evasion techniques leave traces in code


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
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 - Code-based evasion: JS function signatures of evasive libraries
 - Content-based evasion: WXML signatures on webviews in conditional rendering


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- Insight: evasion techniques leave traces in code
- The "Evasive signature" check:
 - Code-based evasion: JS function signatures of evasive libraries
 - Content-based evasion: WXML signatures on webviews in conditional rendering
- The "Platform removal" check:
 - Delisted miniapps are highly likely to violate regulation
 - Finding delisted miniapps helps to certify "evasive signature" check










Dissecting The Lifecycle



Privacy Malware

	Category	Sub Category	# Miniapps	# Families	%
P1	Auth. Bypass	-	4,360	48	21.91%
	Stealth Collection	getSystemInfoSync	1,078	17	5.42%
		getSystemInfo	192	22	0.96%
P2		getScreenBrightness	1	1	0.01%
		getDeviceInfo	1	1	0.01%
		getClipboardData	2	2	0.01%
	Collusion	Account info	17	2	0.09%
		Password	16	2	0.08%
		User ID	33	6	0.17%
		User Name	7	2	0.04%
P3		Extradata	23	3	0.12%
		Phone	18	5	0.09%
		Address	1	1	0.01%
		Userdata	1	1	0.01%
		Vehicle Plate	2	1	0.01%
P4	Rogue Malware	Web Earning	4,105	41	20.63%
		Redpocket	1,202	29	6.04%
P5	Incentivized Sharing	Pyramid Selling	5,040	38	25.33%
		Induce Share	2,167	31	10.89%
		Forced Share	1,456	28	7.32%
P6	Ad Overload	-	420	30	2.15%

Privacy Malware

```
trv (
        var on = wx.getSystemInfoSync():
        K.br = on.brand, K.pm = on.model, K.pr =

→ on.pixelRatio, K.ww = on.windowWidth, K.wh =

→ on.windowHeight,

        K.lang = on language, K.wv = on version, K.wvv =

→ on.platform, K.wsdk = on.SDKVersion.
        K.sv = on.system;
      catch (o) ()
    return wx.getNetworkType({
        success: function(n)
            K.nt = n.networkType;
11
    1), wx.getSetting({
        success: function(n) (
12
            n.authSetting["scope.userLocation"] ?
13
            → wx.getLocation({
                type: "wgs84".
14
15
                success: function(n) (
16
                   K.lat = n.latitude, K.lng = n.longitude,

→ K.spd = n.speed;

             ) : D.getLocation && wx.getLocation({
18
                type: "wgs84".
19
20
                success: function(n) (
                    K.lat = n.latitude, K.lng = n.longitude,
21
                    22
23
24
25
```

Collection upon start-up

```
var p = [ {
       method: wx.getSystemInfo.
       infos: [ "brand", "model", "pixelRatio",

→ "screenWidth", "screenHeight", "windowWidth",
       → "windowHeight", "language", "version", "system",
           "platform" ...1
    1 . . . 1
    function s() (
       // execute all methods in p and return info of return

→ value

    function a(t)
     var o = [ "brand", "model", "pixelRatio",
      → "screenWidth", "screenHeight", "system", "platform"
10
11
      var n = t.reduce(function(e, t) (
12
       return o.indexOf(t.kev) > -1 ? e + t.value + "." : e
        ---
     = f.hex_md5(n.substring(0, n.length - 1)),
      to 1 setCookie()
       data: (
          shshshfp: {
           value: _,
           maxAge: 3153e3
21
                         Fingerprinting user device info
```

Privacy Malware


Type	Data Category	API/Data	# Miniapps
	User Information	getUserProfile	1,314
		getLocation	4,870
	Location	startLocationUpdateBackground	50
	Information	startLocationUpdate	15
Acquisition		getWifiList	31
1	Bluetooth Access	openBluetoothAdapter	117
	Phone	addPhoneContact	1,198
	Information	getPhoneNumber	403
	Microphone Access	startRecord	177
	Health Information	getWeRunData	72


	Account Information	openid	3,029
		openId	1,336
		user_openid	172
		nickName	162
		avatarUrl	168
		\$userInfo	2,794
		userInfo	2,680
		userinfo	310
		phone	306
	User Information	mobile	117
		city	2,234
Storage		address	195
		username	205
		latitude	1,888
		longitude	186
	Device Information	\$ip	2,776
		versionInfo	921
		aldstat_uuid	327
	Share Information	shareDate	776
	Cryptographic Keys	session_key	323


Monetizing Malware

P2 Stealth Collection getSystemInfoSync 1,078 17 5.42% getSystemInfo 192 22 0.96% getSerenBrightness 1 1 0.01% 1 0.01% 1 0		Category	Sub Category	# Miniapps	# Families	%
P2 Stealth Collection getSystemInfo 192 22 0.96% getScreenBrightness 1 1 0.01% getScreenBrightness 1 1 0.01% 1 0.01%	P1	Auth. Bypass	-	4,360	48	21.91%
P2 Stealth Collection getScreenBrightness getDeviceInfo 1 1 0.01% getClipboardData 2 2 0.01% getClipboardData 2 2 0.01% Account info 17 2 0.09% Password 16 2 0.08% User ID 33 6 0.17% User Name 7 2 0.04% Phone 18 5 0.09% Address 1 1 0.01% Userdata 1 0.01% Userdata 1 1 0.01% Phone 18 5 0.09% Address 1 1 0.01% Userdata		Stealth Collection	getSystemInfoSync	1,078	17	5.42%
P4 Rogue Malware Redpocket Redpock			getSystemInfo	192	22	0.96%
Page	P2		getScreenBrightness	1	1	0.01%
Account info			getDeviceInfo	1	1	0.01%
Password 16 2 0.08%			getClipboardData	2	2	0.01%
P3 Collusion User ID User Name 7 2 0.04% Phone 18 5 0.09% Address 1 1 0.01% Userdata 1 1 0.01% Userdata 1 1 0.01% Userdata 1 1 0.01% Userdata 1 1 0.01% Vehicle Plate 2 1 0.01% Phone Plate 1 0.01% Vehicle Plate 2 1 0.01% Plate Plate 1 0.01% Primitive Plate 1 0.01% Plate 1		Collusion	Account info	17	2	0.09%
P3 Collusion Extradata 23 3 0.12% P4 Rogue Malware Web Earning P5 Incentivized Sharing P6 P7 P7 P6 P7 P7 P7 Rogue Malware P7 2 0.04% Extradata 23 3 0.12% Address 1 1 0.01% Vehicle Plate 2 1 0.01% Vehicle Plate 2 1 0.01% P6 Rogue Malware Web Earning Redpocket 1.202 29 6.04% P7 P7 P7 P7 P7 P7 P8 Rogue Malware P7 P7 P7 P8 Rogue Malware P7 P7 P7 P7 P9 Rogue Malware P7 P7 P7 P9 Rogue Malware P7 P7 P7 P1 P7 P7 P7 P7 P7 P6 P7 P7 P7 P7 P7 P7 P7			Password	16	2	0.08%
P3 Collusion Extradata 23 3 0.12% Phone 18 5 0.09% Address 1 1 0.01% Userdata 1 1 0.01% Vehicle Plate 2 1 0.01% P4 Rogue Malware Web Earning 4,105 41 20.63% Redpocket 1,202 29 6.04% P5 Incentivized Sharing Induce Share 2,167 31 10.89% Forced Share 1,456 28 7.32% P8 P3 P3 P3 P3 P5 P5 P5 P5 P5 P5 P5	Р3		User ID	33	6	0.17%
Phone			User Name	7	2	0.04%
Address 1 1 0.01% Userdata 1 1 0.01% Userdata 1 1 0.01% Vehicle Plate 2 1 0.01% P4 Rogue Malware Web Earning Redpocket 1,202 29 6.04% P5 Incentivized Sharing Pyramid Selling 5,040 38 25,33% P5 Incentivized Sharing Induce Share 2,167 31 10.89% Forced Share 1,456 28 7,32% P7 P7 P7 P7 P7 P7 P7			Extradata	23	3	0.12%
Userdata			Phone	18	5	0.09%
P4 Rogue Malware Web Earning Redpocket 4,105 1,202 41 20,63% 29 6,04% P5 Incentivized Sharing Forced Share Pyramid Selling 1,040 38 25,33% 10,89% 21,67 31 10,89% Forced Share 2,167 31 10,89% 27,32% 28			Address	1	1	0.01%
P4 Rogue Malware Web Earning Redpocket 4,105 1,202 41 20,63% P5 Incentivized Sharing Forced Share Pyramid Selling Induce Share Forced Share 5,040 38 25,33% P5 Incentivized Sharing Forced Share 2,167 31 10.89% P5 Forced Share 1,456 28 7,32%			Userdata	1	1	0.01%
P4 Rogue Maiware Redpocket 1,202 29 6.04% P5 Incentivized Sharing Induce Share Forced Share 1,456 28 7.32%			Vehicle Plate	2	1	0.01%
P5 Incentivized Sharing Forced Share Pyramid Selling Induce Share Forced Share 5,040 (2,167) (31) (38,9%) (31) (38,9%) (31) (38,9%)	P4	Rogue Malware	Web Earning	4,105	41	20.63%
P5 Incentivized Sharing Induce Share 2,167 31 10.89% Forced Share 1,456 28 7.32%			Redpocket	1,202	29	6.04%
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















Threat to Validity

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• Sampled 500 miniapps

•000

Threat to Validity

- Sampled 500 miniapps
 - 34 content vetting evasion
 - 466 code vetting evasion

•000

Threat to Validity

- Sampled 500 miniapps
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 - 466 code vetting evasion
- 13 false positives (2.6%)

Threat to Validity

- Sampled 500 miniapps
 - 34 content vetting evasion
 - 466 code vetting evasion
- 13 false positives (2.6%)
 - 10 semantic issue on evasive API
 - 3 non-malicious webview displaying

 Main contribution: identified, dissected, released a miniapp malware dataset

Recap

- Main contribution: identified, dissected, released a miniapp malware dataset
- Maliciousness leave traces: vetting evasion leave identifiable code signature

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- Enhanced devastation: wider privacy impact, faster propagation

Recap

- Main contribution: identified, dissected, released a miniapp malware dataset
- Maliciousness leave traces: vetting evasion leave identifiable code signature
- Enhanced devastation: wider privacy impact, faster propagation
- Domain-specific uniqueness: the platforms can be victims!



The MiniSec



The webpage of MiniSec Community Datasets & Blogs

View My GitHub Profile

Welcome to the MiniSec store!

Welcome to the miniapp dataset shop! A "store" affiliated with the MiniSec Community that aims to facilitate and advocate the miniapp security research.

What is Miniapp? See here for introduction. Chinese only right now, but English version on the way!

I am Yuqing, the owner of this little family-own grocery store! We host by far the largest dataset in the field of super app and miniapp security, totaling over 4 millions of miniapps!

This little store does not "sell" the products, but "share" the products — If you are researchers who are unitox or interested in the miniaps security and other related field of study, you are welcomed to submit requests of dataset hosted on this website. All you need is to clarify your affiliation, so we can validate your identity and ensure that the dataset is not misused. Please theck our service catalogs are these policy below:

1. Service catalog

We proudly provide:

- Dataset for Cross-miniapp Request Forgery Vulnerability [CCS22]
- Dataset for Miniapps with AppSecret Leakage [CCS23] (This requires additional consent and agreement, contact me for details)
- Evasive miniapp malware [NDSS25]
- Randomly-selected miniapp samples to facilitate your preliminary research [SIGMETRICS21]
- Analysis tools for CMRF vulnerability discovery, AppSecret leakage detection, malware analysis, taint analysis. Contact me for details
- Plus other made-to-order dataset

Plus, the meta data of the miniapps if applicable. They are attached to the dataset, as our ways to thank your interest in miniapp security!

Dataset Release

- Nanjing University, China
- Xidian University, China
- Rochester Institute of Technology, USA
- Johns Hopkins University, USA
- Xi'an Jiao Tong University, China
- University of Science and Technology Beijing, China
- Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
- Peking University, China



The MiniSec



The webpage of MiniSec Community Datasets & Blogs

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Understanding the Miniapp Malware: Identification, Dissection, and Characterization

Yuqing Yang ¹ Yue Zhang ² Zhiqiang Lin ¹

¹ The Ohio State University

²Drexel University

Feb 25th, 2025