

Towards Understanding Unsafe Video Generation

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What is Unsafe Content Generation?

Unsafe Content Generation:

A potential issue in generative model development

Triggered by intentional/unintentional prompts

 **On the dark web, malicious users actively discuss AI-generated videos:**

"How long until we can use this new Sora software to make whatever video we want? I want to put my sister's photos in from when she was a kid and make her do nasty things"

"Am seeing the video trailers that were generated by AI, and my mind is blown... The ability to create any child porn we desire... our wildest fantasies... in high definition."

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On the dark web, malicious users actively discuss AI-generated videos:

We want to defend against it!

Step 0: there's no existing benchmark datasets

*"H
We want to put my sister's photos in a form where she was a kid and
make her do nasty things"*

*"Am seeing the video trailers that were generated by AI, and my mind
is blown... The ability to create any child porn we desire... our wildest
fantasies... in high definition."*


Unsafe Sample Collection:

Unsafe prompts from Unsafe Diffusion [1] and I2P datasets [2]

Generated unsafe videos using VGMs

Filtered **2112** videos from **5607**

Unsafe Prompts:



Lexica.Art



4chan

Remove Low-quality and Uninformative videos!

Data Collection & Annotation

Theme	Cluster	Description	# of videos	# of clusters
Theme 1: Distorted/Weird		Videos featuring distorted and bizarre content that can cause discomfort, such as twisted faces and figures.	41	6
	3	People with a broken and strange face, blood on their faces.	8	
	5	Males of different ages and races with facial expressions of pain or frustration	8	
	6	The facial features of the people are distorted.	6	
	11	A disheartened woman in the scene.	5	
	12	Distorted and bizarre objects(e.g., coronavirus) and people.	8	
Theme 2: Terrifying	14	Group of absurd and bizarre videos.	6	
		Contains frightening content, including bizarre expressions, monsters, and terrifying objects.	37	5
	3	People with a broken and strange face, blood on their faces.	8	
	18	Creepy human objects, with skulls and blood and bones.	10	
	20	Exposed, weird anime female object.	3	
	22	Exposed human with bloody, sad, angry woman faces.	7	
Theme 3: Pornographic	23	Videos are blending monsters and humans, resembling Shrek.	9	
		Videos containing mostly exposed bodies, sexual activities, or genital and private body parts.	19	3
	4	A naked man is sleeping.	10	
	7	A naked woman is in the scene.	5	
Theme 4: Violent/Bloody	20	Exposed, weird anime female object.	4	
		Scenes depicting conflicts between characters, including the display of weapons, wounds on bodies, and disturbing blood.	28	4
	3	People with a broken and strange face, blood on their faces.	4	
	9	Armed soldiers in a horrible battlefield	8	
Theme 5: Political	18	Creepy human objects, with skulls and blood and bones.	9	
	22	Exposed human with bloody, sad, angry woman faces.	7	
		Includes politically related content, such as representations of Trump or Biden.	14	2
	2	Trump is talking in the scene.	10	
	21	Description of people and objects similar to Hitler, and politics related	4	

Model	Distorted or Weird	Terrify	Porn	Violent or Bloody	Political	Total
MagicTime [2]	590	579	445	204	39	937
VideoCrafter [3]	571	564	353	197	79	931
AnimateDiff [4]	586	577	391	204	75	945

Theme summary [1]:

k -means for video categorization

Thematic coding for unsafe groups

Data Labeling:

Apply the IRB protocol

Conduct online survey on video labeling

600 Prolific participants (30 labels)

403 valid responses after cleaning

[1] Braun et al., Qual. Res. Psychol. 2006

[2] Guo et al., ICLR 2024

[3] Chen et al., CVPR 2024

[4] Yuan et al., arXiv 2024

Existing Solutions-Model Write Methods


Model-Write Method **modifies** parameters or generation process.

Safe Latent Diffusion [1]

SafeGen [2]

We extend these methods to
Video Generation Models.

***“Pikachu is
holding a gun
on the street.”***



Modified Generation Model




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


: A huge amount of resources is needed to adjust model parameters.



Existing Solutions-Model Free

“Pikachu is holding a gun on the street.”



Generation Model



Model-Free methods rely only on final outputs.

Unsafe Diffusion [1]


Stable Diffusion Safety Filter [2]

: Easy to bypass using an adversarial attack.

Prior Model-free Defense




A Middle Ground



Our Goal-Model Read

“Pikachu is holding a gun on the street.”



Generation Model


Only Rely on Intermediate Output!

Our Model-read Defense




Model-Read Method:
Computation efficient
Robust to Adversary &
Jailbreak attacks

Latent Variable Defense



Latent Variable Defense



The set of detection results is denoted as $\mathcal{S} = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, \dots, s_k\}$. The defined parameters η and λ are used to compare $\sum_{i=1}^{\eta} s_i$ with $\eta \times \lambda$.

Model: MagicTime [1], AnimateDiff [2], VideoCrafter2 [3]

Dataset: Unsafe Video Dataset (collected in this project)

Evaluation Metrics: TNR (correctly classifying safe videos), TPR (correctly classifying unsafe videos), AUC-ROC, Accuracy

Detection Model: Build based on VideoMAE [4]

Baseline: Unsafe Diffusion [5], Safe Latent Diffusion[6]


Impact of η and λ

When η increases, the best detection accuracy is achieved with a lower λ value.


Model	Evaluation Metrics	Latent Variable Defense															# unsafe samples
		$\eta = 1$			$\eta = 3$			$\eta = 5$			$\eta = 10$			$\eta = 20$			
		0.3	0.6	1.0	0.3	0.6	1.0	0.3	0.6	1.0	0.3	0.6	1.0	0.3	0.6	1.0	
MagicTime [1]	TNR	0.68			0.34	0.67	0.90	0.40	0.64	0.95	0.40	0.77	0.99	0.74	0.98	1.00	203
	TPR	0.95			0.98	0.95	0.91	0.99	0.97	0.87	0.99	0.99	0.84	0.99	0.99	0.81	
	Accuracy	0.81			0.66	0.81	0.90	0.70	0.81	0.91	0.70	0.88	0.92	0.87	0.99	0.90	
AnimateDiff [2]	TNR	0.73			0.45	0.73	0.93	0.54	0.72	0.97	0.51	0.74	0.99	0.59	0.88	1.00	297
	TPR	0.98			1.00	0.97	0.89	0.98	0.96	0.85	0.99	0.96	0.81	0.98	0.95	0.74	
	Accuracy	0.85			0.72	0.85	0.91	0.76	0.84	0.91	0.75	0.85	0.90	0.79	0.92	0.87	
VideoCrafter [3]	TNR	0.54			0.31	0.63	0.87	0.50	0.65	0.93	0.47	0.71	0.95	0.56	0.87	1.00	307
	TPR	0.89			0.99	0.95	0.80	0.98	0.96	0.75	0.99	0.94	0.69	0.98	0.94	0.66	
	Accuracy	0.72			0.65	0.79	0.84	0.74	0.81	0.84	0.73	0.83	0.82	0.77	0.91	0.83	

η : Number of detection steps
 λ : Threshold value


Impact of η and λ



MagicTime [1]



AnimateDiff [2]



VideoCrafter [3]

Our method achieves a high AUC score across the three models, and a higher η value further smooths the AUC curve by introducing more usable thresholds.

η : Number of detection steps
 λ : Threshold value

Comparison with Existing Methods

With Model-free method:

Evaluation Metrics	Latent Variable Defense				Unsafe Diffusion [1]
	$\eta = 3$	$\eta = 5$	$\eta = 10$	$\eta = 20$	
TNR	0.90	0.95	0.99	0.98	0.56
TPR	0.91	0.87	0.84	0.99	0.98
Accuracy	0.90	0.91	0.92	0.99	0.77

Our method outperforms baseline methods.

With Model-write method:

Model	Latent Variable Defense				Safe Latent Diffusion				# Unsafe Samples
	$\eta = 3$	$\eta = 5$	$\eta = 10$	$\eta = 20$	Weak	Medium	Strong	Max	
MagicTime [2]	0.87	0.88	0.91	0.97	0.52	0.63	0.73	0.86	172
AnimateDiff [3]	0.90	0.91	0.93	0.96	0.43	0.62	0.75	0.78	188
VideoCrafter [4]	0.84	0.88	0.89	0.91	0.67	0.71	0.73	0.75	181

Interoperability Evaluation

With Model-free method:

Method	MagicTime			AnimateDiff					
	TNR	TPR	Accuracy	TNR	TPR	Accuracy	TNR	TPR	Accuracy
Unsafe Diffusion [1]	0.56	0.98	0.77	0.68	0.95	0.82	0.73	0.93	0.83
UD + LVD ($\eta = 3$)	0.95	0.90	0.92	0.95	0.88	0.91	0.89	0.89	0.89
UD + LVD ($\eta = 5$)	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.97	0.85	0.91	0.89	0.89	0.89
UD + LVD ($\eta = 10$)	0.96	0.93	0.94	0.99	0.81	0.90	0.89	0.92	0.91
UD + LVD ($\eta = 20$)	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.91	0.93	0.92			

Combining our method with Unsafe Diffusion leads to improved performance.

With Model-write method:

Replacing the momentum parameter with confidence score from the detection model under the same configuration improves defense performance.



Conclusion

1. VGMs can produce high-resolution unsafe videos from specific prompts, posing serious risks and potentially violating regulations.
2. After filtering and labeling, we identified 937 unsafe videos, forming the first VGM-specific unsafe video dataset.
3. We designed the defense method LVD and tested it on three models, achieving 95% detection accuracy across various generation tasks.

Paper (with links to Github and Dataset):

