

Critical Infrastructure & Industrial Control Systems (ICS)









Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran



By David E. Sanger

June 1, 2012

WASHINGTON — From his first months in office, President Obama secretly ordered increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran's main nuclear enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America's first sustained use of cyberweapons, according to participants in the program.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 18, 2024

Dear Governor:

Disabling cyberattacks are striking water and wastewater systems throughout the United States. These attacks have the potential to disrupt the critical lifeline of clean and safe drinking water, as well as impose significant costs on affected communities. We are writing to describe the nature of these threats and request your partnership on important actions to secure water systems against the increasing risks from and consequences of these attacks. ₽ 260

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REUTERS*

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Cybersecurity

US warns hackers are carrying out attacks on water systems

By Raphael Satter

March 20, 2024 11:37 PM GMT+4 · Updated 2 months ago





THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

March 18, 2024



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REUTERS[®]

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
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



















Product ID: AA24-038

ICS Under Attack

JNITED NATIONS

Ukraine

Aa

Attacks on Ukraine's Population

Orden Sand Lin Warn ADVISORY Strategy Guide: he Business

ng ICS/OT Environments -Critical in 2024

ASD AUSTRALIAN SIGNALS DIRECTORATE



Centre de la sécurite Centre canadier pour la cybersécurité

TLP:CLEAR

National Cyber Security Centre

National Cyber Security Centre part of GCHC

Energy Infrastructure: Harm to the Civilian



Research Threat intelligence Microsoft Defender Threat actors - 10 min read

Volt Typhoon targets US critical infrastructure with living-off-theland techniques

By Microsoft Threat Intelligence



Why are these systems vulnerable?



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●4th Industrial Revolution: Operational Technology (OT) merges with IT.



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Full-fledged operating systems with IT vulnerabilities.

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
●ICS software is imperfect, often containing bugs and vulnerabilities.




How can we detect vulnerabilities before they are deployed?

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
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Limitations of State-of-the-Art ICS Fuzzing


Proprietary compilers, executables


Vendor-locked solutions

Imprecise (e.g., address sanitizer)

Require specific hardware/software

●No scan cycle awareness





Existing Projects

Compilation





Input ST Code

Compilation


Compatibility

Layer Interfaces


Existing Projects

















Existing Projects

Our Contributions


ICSQuartz: Scan Cycle-Aware and Vendor-Agnostic Fuzzing for Industrial Control Systems.






Existing Projects






Existing Projects



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




Existing Projects

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
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Existing Projects

Our Contributions

ICSQuartz: Scan Cycle-Aware and Vendor-Agnostic Fuzzing for Industrial Control Systems.



Existing Projects



Fuzzing Framework Existing Projects Our Contributions Compilation Fuzzing **Security Analysis** Input ST Compatibility LLVM IR Code Layer Interfaces Coverage (Input Definition) Reports (llvm-cov) Instrument Code Harness LLM-Manual RuSTy Coverage Vulnerability Harness Template Generated Tweaks and Localization Input Struct Customization Instrument (ASAN) Address Sanitizer ⊢► Target Reproduce Fuzzer Config Fuzzing LLVM IR Instrumented Crash on (Scan Cycles, Harness Output Control PLC Testbed (C++ or IEC DUM Seeds, Dictionary, Application ST) Options) clang Reverse-**ICSQuartz** Engineer **Compatibility Layer Backend** Crash (glibc + Custom Functions) (gdb, Ghidra, etc) LLVM Code ASAN **Fuzzing Solutions Fuzzing Corpus** Coverage Runtime Runtime (Coverage) (Crashes)



Results: Performance

Order of Magnitude Improvement in Key Metrics.



Results: Performance

Order of Magnitude Improvement in Key Metrics.

Control	E	Execution Speed (inputs/sec)	d		First Crash (seconds)			First Crash (inputs)		
Application	ICSQuartz (x64)	FieldFuzz (x64)	ICSFuzz (A8)	ICSQuartz (x64)	FieldFuzz (x64)	ICSFuzz (A8)	ICSQuartz (x64)	FieldFuzz (x64)	ICSFuzz (A8)	
bf_mcpy_1	19649.9	593.0	70.9	0.0008	0.25	234	15.7	148	15270	
bf_mcpy_6	1403.4	642.4	64.2	0.0140	1.43	188	19.6	898	12172	
bf_mcpy_8	1355.6	645.6	66.1	0.0151	7.08	279	20.5	4566	18216	
bf_mcpy_12	328.2	526.2	62.1	0.2630	1.95	426	86.3	999	26645	
bf_mset_1	7526.0	560.6	64.6	0.0026	0.04	208	19.6	22	13441	
bf_mset_3	9961.5	571.2	62.7	0.0020	0.03	174	19.5	17	10906	
bf_mset_5	2227.1	503.2	68.8	0.0088	0.56	254	19.6	281	17554	
bf_mmove_1	2626.4	660.2	64.6	0.0078	0.005	176	20.5	2	11245	
bf_mmove_4	6674.9	578.2	63.1	0.0046	0.003	159	30.5	1	10070	
bf_mmove_7	1924.3	573.0	66.3	0.0158	0.005	229	30.5	3	15317	
bf_mmove_12	1932.5	508.2	64.5	0.0158	182.14	783	30.5	92456	50643	
oob_1_arr_1	21747.2	598.8	71.9	0.0073	0.14	55	159.4	83	3880	
oob_1_arr_6	53965.5	591.0	77.0	0.0068	1.39	103	367.1	821	8085	
oob_1_arr_13	24039.7	507.0	75.2	0.0071	97.86	207	171.6	49165	27241	
oob_2_arr_1	27174.2	520.8	73.5	0.0093	154.42	117	252.0	80080	8558	
oob_2_arr_5	53055.0	520.4	71.1	0.0069	155.62	165	367.1	80662	22759	
oob_2_arr_13	24999.5	502.2	71.0	0.0054	97.86	192	134.8	48694	13401	
Average	15328.88	564.8	68.1	0.0231	41.22	232.29	103.81	21111.65	16788.41	

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		bf_mset_3	9961.5	571.2	62.7	0.0020	0.03	174	19.5	17	10906		
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Evaluation of Proposed Mutation Strategies.



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ICSQuartz vs. SOTA

	Fuzzer	Aircraft Oobr	Aircraft Oobw 4	Aircraft Oobw 5	Anaerobic Oobr 1	Anaerobic Oobr 2	Anaerobic Oobw 1	Anaerobic Oobw 2	Anaerobic Oobw 3	Chemical Oobr 1	Chemical Oobw 1	Smart Grid Oobr 1	Smart Grid Oobw 1
es	ICSQuartz	10	8	10	10	10	5	10	10	10	10	10	10
she	AFL++	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	1
Crashes	FieldFuzz	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ICSFuzz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(s)	ICSQuartz	12.4	56.9	0.8	1.5	0.1	30.7	3.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.5
	AFL++	78.8	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	0.9
Time	FieldFuzz	-	-	42.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ΕI	ICSFuzz	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
•	ICSQuartz	5.6M	14M	95k	560k	1.0k	14M	480k	240	1.6k	6.1k	2.4k	100k
Execs.	AFL++	32k	-	-	-	1.3k	-	-	-	-	-	1.6k	2.1k
TXC	FieldFuzz	-	-	2.7k	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	ICSFuzz	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE V: Scan Cycle Benchmark Evaluation (10 Trials).



Evaluation of Proposed Mutation Strategies.

ICSQuartz vs. SOTA




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S	ICSQuartz	10	8	10	10	10	5	10	10	10	10	10	10
sh	AFL++	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	1
Crash	FieldFuzz	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	ICSFuzz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>s</u>)	ICSQuartz	12.4	56.9	0.8	1.5	0.1	30.7	3.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.5
Time (s)	AFL++	78.8	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	0.9
Ē.	FieldFuzz	-	-	42.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ΕI	ICSFuzz	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
•	ICSQuartz	5.6M	14M	95k	560k	1.0k	14M	480k	240	1.6k	6.1k	2.4k	100k
Execs.	AFL++	32k	-	-	-	1.3k	-	-	-	-	-	1.6k	2.1k
TX.	FieldFuzz	-	-	2.7k	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	ICSFuzz	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE V: Scan Cycle Benchmark Evaluation (10 Trials).

Toggled Mutation Strategies

	ICSQuartz Scan Cycle Mutations	Aircraft Oobr	Aircraft Oobw 4	Aircraft Oobw 5	Anaerobic Oobr 1	Anaerobic Oobr 2	Anaerobic Oobw 1	Anaerobic Oobw 2	Anaerobic Oobw 3	Chemical Oobr 1	Chemical Oobw 1	Smart Grid Oobr 1	Smart Grid Oobw 1
tal	•	10	8	10	10	10	5	10	10	10	10	10	10
Total Crashes	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stale Cycles	•	1.9	20.9	31.3	1.0	1.5	1.3	40.5	30.2	3.1	3.1	6.6	1.9
Sti Cyc	0	99.9	99.9	44.0	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9	5.4	99.9	99.9	99.9

TABLE VI: Evaluation of ICSQuartz Mutations (10 Trials).



Evaluation of Proposed Mutation Strategies.

ICSQuartz vs. SOTA




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Toggled Mutation Strategies




TABLE VI: Evaluation of ICSQuartz Mutations (10 Trials).



10

Real-World Fuzz Campaign

OSCAT Drogram	To	tal Executions	
OSCAT Program –	ICSQuartz	FieldFuzz	ICSFuzz
CHARNAME	123M	239k	102k
CLEAN	3.73M	239k	99.2k
DEL_CHARS	3.73M	239k	99.6k
DT_TO_STRF	129k	239k	102k
FIND_CHAR	386k	239k	102k
FIND_CTRL	386k	239k	99.1k
FINDB_NONUM	436k	239k	99.1k
FINDB_NUM	436k	239k	99.5k
FSTRING_TO_BYTE	817k	239k	99.3k
FSTRING_TO_DWORD	333k	239k	99.0k
IS_CC	3.73M	239k	99.2k
IS_NCC	3.73M	239k	99.3k
MIRROR	436k	239k	99.7k
MONTH_TO_STRING	1.07B	239k	102k
REAL_TO_STRF	399M	239k	102k
REPLACE_ALL	23.7M	239k	100k
REPLACE_CHARS	23.7M	239k	99.2k
TRIM	436k	240k	100k
TRIM1	436k	239k	99.3k
TRIME	436k	239k	100k
UPPER_CASE	436k	239k	99.7k
WEEKDAY_TO_STRING	966M	240k	102k
BASE64_ENCODE_STR	17.9k	N/A	N/A
XML_READER	644k	N/A	N/A

TABLE IV: **OSCAT Fuzzing Campaign. Bold** indicates a vendor-agnostic CVE issued (discovered only by ICSQuartz). *Italics* indicate a RuSTy-specific compiler vulnerability.

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OSCAT Dromon	Total Executions						
OSCAT Program -	ICSQuartz	FieldFuzz	ICSFuzz				
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FSTRING_TO_DWORD	333k	239k	99.0k				
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IS_NCC	3.73M	239k	99.3k				
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Disclosed CVE-2024-6876

	ERT		Search	Everything V Go
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Published	2024-09-10 14:00 (CEST)			
Last update	2024-09-12 07:52 (CEST)			
Vendor(s)	CODESYS GmbH			
Product(s)	Article No°	Product Name	Affected Version(s)	
		CODESYS OSCAT Basic Library	< 3.3.5.0	
		oscat.de OSCAT Basic Library	< 3.3.5	
		oscat.de OSCAT Basic Library	< 335	
Summary	for Automation Technology [®] . The OSCAT Basic library offer string processing, time and c programmers can use all the	ne of several libraries developed and provided by OSCAT. OSC. rs function blocks for various tasks, e.g. for buffer management late conversion. By adding the OSCAT Basic library into IEC 61 functions provided by the library in their control programs. - 10 STRING function is affected by an out-obunds read vu	t, list processing, control tech 131-3-compliant programming	nology, mathematics, j tools, PLC
		a or possibly to a crash of the PLC.		,,,,,



11

●First native fuzzer for ICS programs (IEC-61131-3 Structured Text):

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Discover and disclose:

●The first (to our knowledge) Structured Text CVE.

●Compiler bug in RuSTy ICS compiler.





Thank you

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Lab Website



GitHub

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