

IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systems

Yuhao Wu

Franziska Roesner[†], Tadayoshi Kohno[†], Ning Zhang, Umar Iqbal

Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2025


Talk Overview

- **New LLM computing paradigm & agentic systems:** LLMs process data and resources in a "shared execution environment", which poses security risks
- **Research gap:** Most existing efforts have primarily focused on LLM robustness, which is currently not foolproof
- **Our perspective:** We believe that tried-and-tested systems security principles can enhance the security of LLM-based agentic systems

LLM-Based Agentic Systems

- LLM as a “logic engine”
- Access to Tools/Apps, Memory/Storage, etc.


Can you summarize the recent emails from the sales team?




Here is the summary: “...”

How Do Agentic Systems Work?

To make LLMs aware of available resources, content from various sources is mixed within the context window of LLMs



LLM context window



Cloud Drive


Email App

RetrieveFile(), SaveFile() ... SendEmail() , SearchEmail() ...

Sharing Context Can Cause Security Issues

Can you summarize the recent emails from the sales team?

The email...




Isolation & Access Control

- The key issue is that instructions from various sources are treated with the same privileges
- Prior systems (e.g., browsers) have relied on isolation and access control techniques to address this problem (e.g., site isolation, same-origin policy)
- **Can isolation and access control also help address issues in LLM-based agentic systems?**

Enforcing Isolation


Isolating context windows for different tools



How to decide where to route queries?

Routing User Queries


Using an LLM planner with sanitized tool info to route user queries



However, isolation eliminates collaboration between tools

Controlling Data Sharing


Include non-LLM modules to control message and data exchange



However, prompt injection messages may still be exchanged

Human-in-the-Loop Access Control

- Involve users in the loop to audit the messages/requests
- Assist user decision-making with planning information from the hub



Security Evaluation

- **RQ1:** To what extent does IsolateGPT enhance security?
- Extend a benchmark to evaluate IsolateGPT¹
 - **Without protection**, many attacks succeed
 - With **IsolateGPT**, the attack success rate can drop to zero

Tool compromise

23.2%

0% - 5.6%

Tool data stealing

34.4%

0% - 15.2%

System data stealing

3.2%

0% - 2.0%



IsolateGPT issues permission warnings for all potential attacks!

Functionality Correctness Evaluation

- **RQ2:** Can the new architecture negatively impact functionality?
- Match the execution flow and semantic similarity of responses using benchmarks²
 - **IsolateGPT** and the **unprotected system** provide similar functionality
 - Execution flows slightly vary for a few cases, but final outcome is same

Single & multi. tools

100% | 100%

100% | 100%

Multi. tool collab.

76% | 95%

76% | 95%

No tools

71%



70%




IsolateGPT functions similarly to the unprotected system!

Performance Evaluation

- **RQ3:** What is the performance overhead of security protections?
- Compare query resolution time using benchmarks
 - For over ~75% of the use cases, the overhead is under 30%
 - Overhead increases when more tools are used



(a) Single tool



(b) Multi. tool collab.

Key Takeaways

- LLM computing paradigm poses serious security risks as resources from various entities are processed in a "shared environment"
- We believe that system security principles can significantly enhance the security of LLM-based agentic systems and complement LLM robustness efforts
- In this paper, we demonstrated the feasibility of isolation and access control principles in improving the security of agentic systems