



# Quantum Security Unleashed: A New era for Secure Communication and Systems

DEFENCE AND SPACE


**Johanna Sepúlveda, Ph.D.**

Senior Expert Quantum Secured Communications

Chief Engineer Quantum Technologies

**AIRBUS**

# Airbus



Civil range



Military range



ACH



UAS



Military Aircraft



Unmanned Aerial Systems



Future Combat Air System (FCAS)



Military Space




Connectivity




Intelligence and data

# Quantum Technologies Principles and General View



# Quantum Technologies: First Revolution



Experiment of Young  
(Wave nature of light)




Photoelectric Effect  
(Particle nature of light)



The position and the velocity of an object cannot both be **measured** exactly, at the same time

$$-\frac{\hbar^2}{2m} \left( \frac{\partial^2 \psi}{\partial x^2} + \frac{\partial^2 \psi}{\partial y^2} + \frac{\partial^2 \psi}{\partial z^2} \right) + V\psi = E\psi$$

$(\psi)^2$ : Electronic probability density



Orbitals: Described by **quantum numbers** ( $n \mid m_l, m_s$ )



Function that describes the state of a quantum-mechanical system

**Wave-Particle Duality (1905)**

**Uncertainty Principle of Heisenberg (1927)**


**Schrödinger Equation (1925)**

# Quantum Phenomena



Collapses to a single state when measured

## Superposition



## Entanglement

# Quantum Technology: Second Revolution

## Quantum Communications

Quantum communications protects data that flows through optical fibre or wireless communications, by using quantum encryption.



## Post-Quantum Cryptography

Cryptographic algorithms that can be deployed in traditional devices and

## Quantum Enabling Technologies

Technologies that comprise a quantum system or the value-chain for the quantum technology industry, such as lasers, optics, semiconductors...




## Quantum Sensing

Precise measurement of the environment, using very accurate quantum based sensors.



## Quantum Computing

Quantum computing will enable solving highly complex computation problems. Research focus on both hardware and software. Building universal quantum computers and specific simulators.



# General Market View: Quantum Technologies (QT) World Map



## The QT market is still dominated by North America

North America leads the QT market, with nearly 40% of players and over 60%<sup>1</sup> of all start-up funding

10 out of the 12 biggest hardware players are based in North America

China leads in commercial implementation of QComms. Japan is the front-runner in QT industry adoption



## Funding is rising rapidly

Announced raised funding for 2021 (~\$2.1 bn) is already almost triple the total funding of nearly \$800 m raised in 2020

Announced major deals for 2021 extend to software and QComms players

China has committed \$15 bn over 5 years for QT; the European Union announced \$7.2 bn




## Global market participation is increasing


The United Kingdom is catching up to North America due to recent major deals

China leads in patents and is expected to catch up rapidly on QC


# General Market View: Quantum Technologies (QT) Funding




# General Market View: Quantum Pillars



# NATO Quantum Capabilities and Airbus Footprint






# Quantum Technologies Principles and General View



# Quantum Computers

# Quantum Computer

When?  
At any moment!  
(10 years)



# SECURITY

# Quantum Threat

## SKC/PKC in CLASSIC

Better classic algorithm

~  $10^{34}$  Steps

In a *classic computer* (THz)  
(1 trillion of ops / sec)

~ **17 Trillions of years**

QUANTUM  
**AES**

Key size should be doubled



## Grover's algorithm

Halves the security of AES

**AES-128 → AES-256**



## Shor's algorithm

~  $10^7$  Steps

Solves PKC


In a *quantum computer* (MHz)  
(1 million of ops / sec)

~ **10 Seconds**

**PKC**

New algorithms/methods

# Quantum Computer Roadmap



RSA		ECC	
Key Length	qubits	Key Length	qubits
1024	2048	163	1000
2048	4096	224	1300
3072	6144	256	1500
4096	8192	383	2300
15360	30720	512	3000

Physical qubits ≠ Operational qubits

# Applications



- ✓ Internet-of-Things
- ✓ Language Processing
- ✓ Logistics and optimization


**Network monitoring/  
Smart scheduling**

**Cryptanalysis**

**AI/ML based implementation attacks**



**Pattern Recognition**

**Threat Detection**



## Quantum Sensing

# Classical Sensors Vs Quantum Sensors



More sensitive

High Precision


High Stability

Low Maintenance

Measures the same physical quantities as classical sensors but through the exploitation of quantum phenomena

# Current challenges: Jamming and Spoofing (OODA)


GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite System



**GNSS spoofing attack is less expensive (from 50 – 500 USD to 100 USD)**

GNSS is not always available; such as underwater, urban, or hostile environments

# Quantum Sensors




Quantum Sensors Applications: Gravity Cartography, Navigation, Advanced SCA





## Quantum-Secure Communication


# Security Challenges (Defence)



# Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)



# Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)



**Goal:**  
 Use a quantum channel to transfer **a secret random key**.  
 It is **impossible** that an attacker read (measure) without getting noticed

**Goal:**  
 Protect the communication through **hard mathematical problems** resistant to traditional attacks and quantum attacks

**Transition:** Layered approach (different layers of protection)

# Post-Quantum Cryptography

# Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Types



## Code-based

(e.g. McEliece)

### Pros:

- Well studied error correcting codes
- Multipurpose
- Fast

### Cons:

- Very large key sizes

## Hash-based

(e.g. SPHINCS)

### Pros:

- Security relies on hash functions
- Very efficient

### Cons:

- No encryption schemes
- Track of signed messages

## Multivariate

(e.g. GeMSS)

### Pros:

- Multipurpose
- Very efficient for signature schemes

### Cons:

- Most public key schemes are broken

## Isogeny

(e.g. SIKE)

### Pros:

- Elliptic-based
- Smallest key sizes

### Cons:

- Low efficiency
- Difficult to construct

## Lattice-based

(e.g. NTRU, LWE, RLWE)

### Pros:

- Efficient
- Public key, digital signatures, FHE, IBE

### Cons:

- Key sizes when compared to classical crypto

# PQC Benchmarking "Example"



## Key Sizes



## Performance





There is **not an obvious** best PQC alternative




PQC plug-and-play is **unlikely**

## KEM

## Signature




We might **not meet** the performance requirements



# Airbus PQC Innovation and Footprint

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization Roadmap



# Quantum Cryptography

# QKD Network: Terrestrial and Space segments

To deliver keys between different communication parties (identical, private)

- **Terrestrial:** Optical fibre or free-space ground-to-ground optical links  
*Higher throughput, limited coverage (maximum distance between consecutive nodes is 100km)*
- **Space:** free-space satellite links  
*Low throughput but high coverage (LEO)*




**Two QKD nodes**



**FSO for terrestrial segment**




**Protocol 1: Prepare and Measure**




**Protocol 2: Entanglement**

# Worldwide Demonstrations (terrestrial)

**DARPA (2002)**



**TOKYO (2009)**



**CAMBRIDGE (2019)**



B



**SECOQC (2008)**





**SOUTH KOREA (2015, 2017, 2020)**




**ITALY-IQB INRIM CNR (2018)**



**ITALY-SLOVENIA-CROATIA (2021)**



# Worldwide Demonstrations (Space)





I. Khan et al. Satellite-based QKD. Optics and Photonics News. 2018

**Airbus Drone** 




**Q-DOS (UK)**


# Chinese QKD Network: Terrestrial And Space QKD



- Spanning Beijing to Shanghai (2000 km)
- Extended to 4600 km by use of free space QKD links
- Fibre losses limit distance between nodes to ~100 km
- Dedicated fibre network with **more than 30 trusted** nodes and 700 fibres

# Quantum Communications: **EuroQCI**

## *European Quantum Communication Infrastructure*



### ✓ **Sovereignty matters**

- Hardware resources
- Logical resources



### ✓ **National / international resources**

### ✓ **Security Level**

### ✓ **Interoperability**


- Between National domains
- Between terrestrial and space segment

# Airbus Quantum Communication footprint (EuroQCI – SAGA)



# LaserPort - Optical Ground Station QKD – Final product


OGS at customer or secure hubs, to receive quantum keys from LEO satellites



# Quantum Communications: Interoperability



- System view of quantum-secure networks matters:
  - Quantum layer is relevant but is only a part of the overall system
  - Security matters: secure implementation, integration and interoperability is relevant
  - **PQC plays also an important role**
- Wide system design space exploration

SENDERS	LIGHT SOURCE	MODULATION	TRUST REQUIRED	TRL	Quantum channel	DIODE	OPTIMUM TEMP.	DARK COUNTS	NIR EFFICIENCY	LOSS TYPE TOLERANCE	SPACE SUITABLE	TRL	COST	RECEIVERS
	IMPLEMENTATION	COMMERCIAL	IMPLEMENTATION	TECHNICAL PARAMETERS		QKD PROTOCOL	COMMERCIAL							
Laser	phase, ampl., pol.	Handshake icon	TRL 1-2 icon	PIN	Thermometer icon	n/a	η icon	CV	Eye icon	TRL 1-2 icon	€			
Single photons	polarization	Handshake icon	TRL 1-2 icon	APD	Thermometer icon	Red dots icon	η icon	DV	Eye icon	TRL 1-2 icon	€€			
Entangled photons	intrinsic	no	TRL 1-2 icon	SNSPD	Thermometer icon	Red dots icon	η icon	DV	Eye icon	TRL 1-2 icon	€€€			



From ITU Y-3802

# An Example of a QCI architecture (high level view): Layered View (Note: Fully Distributed Key Management Layer)



It might not be the best architecture (Distributed KM)

# Looking to the future: Extended Space/Airborne QKD (HAPS and Drones)



NEEDS YOU!



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Thank you

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