QSynth - A Program Synthesis approach for Binary Code Deobfuscation

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Talk Outline



Context:

- Need to address highly obfuscated binaries
- Few approaches address data obfuscation

Goal: deobfuscating expression (obfuscated with data transformations)

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Takeway

We provide a **synthesis approach** addressing various obfuscations and that **supersede** the state-of-the-art in both **speed** and **accuracy**

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Background Software obfuscation Deobfuscation techniques

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Obfuscation types

Control-Flow Obfuscation

Hiding the **logic** and algorithm of the program

Virtualization, Opaque predicates, CFG-flattening, Split, Merge, Packing, Implicit Flow, MBA, Loop-Unrolling...





Obfuscation types

Control-Flow Obfuscation

Hiding the **logic** and algorithm of the program

Virtualization, Opaque predicates, CFG-flattening, Split, Merge, Packing, Implicit Flow, MBA, Loop-Unrolling...

Data-Flow Obfuscation

Hiding data, constants, strings, APIs, keys etc.

Data encoding, MBA, Arithmetic Encoding, Whitebox, Array Split, Fold and Merge, Variable Splitting...

Example

a+b	\Rightarrow	$((((((a \land \neg b) + b) << 1) \land \neg ((a \lor b) - (a \land b))) << 1) - ((((a \land \neg b) + b) <<$
		$1) \oplus ((a \lor b) - (a \land b))))$



Obfuscation types

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$$a+b \qquad \Longrightarrow \qquad (((((((a \land \neg b)+b) << 1) \land \neg ((a \lor b)-(a \land b))) << 1) - ((((a \land \neg b)+b) << 1) \oplus (((a \lor b) - (a \land b)))))$$

Problem: Reverting an obfuscating transformation is hard.





Let's focus on two deobfuscation techniques:

Dynamic Symbolic Execution

Program Synthesis

Symbolic Execution

Definition

Mean of executing a program using **symbolic values** (*logical symbols*) rather than real values (*bitvectors*) in order to obtain an **in-out relationship of a path**





Symbolic Execution

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Mean of executing a program using **symbolic values** (logical symbols) rather than real values (bitvectors) in order to obtain an **in-out relationship of a path**



Dynamic Symbolic Execution (a.k.a. concolic)

- Properties: work on dynamic paths and use runtime values
- Advantages: path sure to be feasible and thwart various obfuscations

Symbolic State





Symbolic State

 $\phi_{b}=b$





Symbolic State

$$\begin{aligned}
\phi_b &= b \\
\phi_b &= b + (a \mid -1) - 1
\end{aligned}$$



Symbolic State



$\begin{aligned} & \underbrace{ \phi_b = b } \\ \hline \phi_b = b + (a \mid -1) - 1 \\ \phi_b = b + (a \mid -1) - 1 - ((\sim a) \\ \& -1) \\ \hline \phi_b = b + (a \mid -1) - 1 - ((\sim a) \\ \& -1) \\ \hline \phi_b = b + (a \mid -1) - 1 - (((\sim a) \\ \& -1) - 1 + (((b + (a \mid -1) \\ -1 - ((\sim a) \& -1)) \times (b + \dots) \\ \hline \end{array} \end{aligned}$

Question: How to simplify the ϕ_b expression?

(Knowing that the quality of the result depends on the syntactic complexity of the obfuscated expression)

Definition

- a high-level specification (typically its I/O behaviour)
- additional constraints:
 - Compilation: a faster program
 - Deobfuscation: a smaller or more readable program



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Example	
	Input Output
Obfuscated Program	



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Example		
	Input	Output
	1,2	3
Obfuscated		
Program		



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Example		
	Input	Output
	1, 2	3
Obfuscated Program	2, 2	4



Definition

Program synthesis consists in automatically deriving a program from:

- a high-level specification (typically its I/O behaviour)
- additional constraints:
 - Compilation: a faster program
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Example

	Input	Output
	1, 2	3
	2, 2	4
Obtuscated	2,3	5
Program		



Definition

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Example $\begin{array}{c|cccc} \hline \text{Example} & \underline{\text{Input}} & \underline{\text{Output}} \\ \hline 1, 2 & 3 \\ 2, 2 & 4 \\ Program & 2, 3 & 5 \\ \end{array} \Rightarrow a+b$



Definition

Program synthesis consists in automatically deriving a program from:

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- additional constraints:
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Example				
	Input	Output		
	1, 2	3	\rightarrow	alb
	2, 2	4		u + b
Program	2,3	5		

Problem

Synthesizing programs (expressions) with complex behaviors is hard.

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Symbolic Execution

- + Capture full semantic
- Influenced by syntactic complexity



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Program Synthesis

- + Only influenced by semantic complexity
- Black-box \Rightarrow big search space





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Symbolic Execution

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- + Only influenced by semantic complexity
- Black-box \Rightarrow big search space



Idea: Using symbolic execution to reduce the synthesis search space





A synthesis approach using an Offline Enumerative Search

based on pre-computed lookup tables

combined with an Abstract Syntax Tree simplification algorithm

which **outperform** similar approach of the state-of-the-art (e.g. Syntia)

QSynth: Overview



Qb

QSynth: Overview



Qb

Execution Tracing

Dynamic Binary Instrumentation

Using **QBDI**: QuarkslaB Dynamic binary Instrumentation (similar to Pin, DynamoRIO)

- multi-architecture & platform
- no (direct) thread support

Qtracer (a qbditool like Pin ``pintools'')

- gather instruction executed with their concrete state (registers and memory)
- Data are consolidated in database (SQLite, PostgresSQL etc.)

		Ori	gin	al		
mov mov tes je xor xor xor	qwor r13, t rax x42a r8d, edx, esi,	rd [@ rax c, ra r80 edx esi)×06 (1x (1023	2c0]	, 8
	Ins	strur	nent	ati	on	
; S(mov ; S(je ; S(xor ; S(xor	ome o r13, ome o t rax ome o capato ome o r8d, ome o edx,	ode rax ode de code hed ode r8c code edx	add	Ires	5>	
; 50	nie c	oue				

Instrumented

https://qbdi.quarkslab.com/

QSynth: Overview



Qb

QSynth: Overview



Qb















 $\varphi \triangleq (b + (a - 1)) - 1$

 O_{arphi} the associated I/O oracle can be evaluated on different inputs
QSynth: Overview



Qb

QSynth: Overview



Qb

Definition

We call Synthesis Primitive any program SP taking as input parameters a **black-box oracle** O_{φ} and a **set of input parameters to the oracle** I, and returning, in case of success, a program p, such that for any $i \in I$ then $p(i) = O_{\varphi}(i)$.

$$\begin{split} \mathcal{SP}(O_{\varphi}, I) & \Rightarrow \quad p \mid \forall i \in I, p(i) \equiv O_{\varphi}(i) \\ \mathcal{SP}(O_{\varphi}, I) & \Rightarrow \qquad \varnothing \end{split}$$



a+b, a-b, a+a, b+b, a+a-b, \ldots

a+b, a-b, a+a, b+b, a+a-b, \ldots

and with a set of inputs: (pseudo-random)

vector $I = \{(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$

```
a+b, a-b, a+a, b+b, a+a-b, \ldots
```

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Evaluate all programs on \mathcal{I} and create the synthesis oracle \mathcal{SP} : **outputs** $\rightarrow p$

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Evaluate all programs on ${\mathcal I}$ and create the synthesis oracle ${\mathcal{SP}}: {\rm outputs} \to p$

Example:					
Outputs	р				
2, 1, 3	a+b				

```
a+b, a-b, a+a, b+b, a+a-b, \ldots
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Example:						
Outputs	р					
2, 1, 3	a+b					
0, 1, 1	a – b					

```
a + b. a - b. a + a. b + b. a + a - b. ...
```

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Example:							
Outputs	р						
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0, 1, 1	a – b						
2, 2, 4	a+a						

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a + b. a - b. a + a. b + b. a + a - b. ...
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```
a + b, a - b, a + a, b + b, a + a - b, ...
```

and with a set of inputs: (pseudo-random)

vector $I = \{(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$

Bad 🖓

 Expressions derived grows exponentially (but can still easily achieve 10 nodes AST expressions)



2, 1, 0	
0, 1, 1	a-b
2, 2, 4	a+a

```
a+b, a-b, a+a, b+b, a+a-b, \ldots
```

and with a set of inputs: (pseudo-random)

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QSynth: Overview



Qb

QSynth: Overview



Qb

$$arphi riangle \left(\left(\left(A \lor B
ight) + \left(A \land B
ight)
ight) \land A
ight) - \left(\left(\left(A \lor B
ight) + \left(A \land B
ight)
ight) \lor A
ight)$$



 $I = \{(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$

Ob

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$



 $I = \{(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$ O_{φ} outputs = $\{3, 0, 1\}$ SP[outputs]: not found

$$arphi riangle \left(\left(\left(A \lor B
ight) + \left(A \land B
ight)
ight) \land A
ight) - \left(\left(\left(A \lor B
ight) + \left(A \land B
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ight)$$



 $I = \{(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$ O_{φ} outputs = $\{3, 1, 3\}$ SP[outputs]: not found

$$arphi riangle \left(\left(\left(A \lor B
ight) + \left(A \land B
ight)
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ight)$$



 $I = \{(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$ O_{φ} outputs = $\{0, 1, 2\}$ SP[outputs]: not found

$$arphi riangle \left(\left(\left(A \lor B
ight) + \left(A \land B
ight)
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 $I = \{(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$ O_{φ} outputs = $\{2, 1, 3\}$ $S\mathcal{P}[\text{outputs}]: \text{ found } \Rightarrow A + B$

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$





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 O_{φ} outputs = $\{2, 1, 3\}$
 $S\mathcal{P}[\text{outputs}]: \text{ found } \Rightarrow A + B$

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$







 $I = \{(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$ $O_{\varphi} \text{outputs} = \{0, 1, 3\}$ $S\mathcal{P}[\text{outputs}]: \text{ found } \Rightarrow V1 \oplus A$

$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$

V2





$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$





$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$









$$\varphi \triangleq (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$





Result

Obfuscated:

$$(((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \land A) - (((A \lor B) + (A \land B)) \lor A)$$

 $\downarrow \downarrow$
Deobfuscated:
 $(A + B) \oplus A$

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Dataset,



- ⇒ Datasets are built with Tigress 2.2 and the EncodeArithmetic (EA), EncodeData (ED) and Virtualization (VR).
- \Rightarrow In each dataset: 500 obfuscated functions (except 239 for EA-ED)

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	Mean size φ (in node)						
	Original Obfuscated						
#1: Syntia †	3.97	203.19					
#2: EA	13.5	131.56					
#3: VR-EA	13.5	443.64					
#4: EA-ED	13.5	9223.46					

tuse EA-ED (with 5 derivations max, other are 21 max)

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lookup table (SP): 3,358,709 expressions (14 sets of 3 vars & 5 operators each) input vector size I (for SP): 15



	Mean expr. size			Simplification			Mean scale factor	
	Orig Obf _B Synt			Ø	Partial	Full	Obf _S /Orig	Synt/Orig
Syntia	/	/	/	52	0	448	/	/
QSynth	3.97	203.19	3.71	0	500	500	x35.03	x0.94

Orig, Obf_S, Obf_B, Synt are rsp. original, obfuscated (source, binary level) and synthesized exprs



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Orig, Obf_S, Obf_B, Synt are rsp. original, obfuscated (source, binary level) and synthesized exprs

Accuracy & Speed

	Semantic		Tim	ne	
		Sym.Ex	Synthesis	Total	per fun.
Syntia	/	/	/	34 min	4.08s
QSynth	500	1m20s	15s	1m35s	0.19s



	Mean expr. size			Simplification			Mean Scale factor	
	Orig	Obf _B	Synt	Ø	Partial	Full	Obf _S /Orig	Synt/Orig
Dataset 2	12 5	045.01	21.02	0	500	354	v10.24	w1.44
EA	13.5	240.01	21.92		500	(70.80%)	x10.34	X1.04
Dataset 3	13.5	113.64	25.42	0	500	375		v1.00
VR-EA	10.0	440.04	20.42		500	(75.00%)	-	X1.70
Dataset 4	13.5	0223.46	3912.94	5	234	133	×405.25	v234.44
EA-ED	10.0	9223.40	3012.04		204	(55.65%)	\$400.20	X234.44

Orig, Obf_S, Obf_B, Synt are respectively original, obfuscated (source, binary level) and synthesized expressions



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VR-EA	10.0	440.04	20.42		500	(75.00%)	-	X1.70
Dataset 4	13.5	0223.46	3912.94	5	234	133	×405.25	v234.44
EA-ED	10.0	9223.40	3012.04		204	(55.65%)	\$400.20	X234.44

Orig, Obf₈, Obf₈, Synt are respectively original, obfuscated (source, binary level) and synthesized expressions

Accuracy & Speed

	Semantic	Time			
		Sym.Ex	Synthesis	Total	per fun.
Dataset 2	OK: 413	1m7s	1m42s	2m49s	0.34s
EA	KO: 4				
Dataset 3	OK: 401	17m10s	2m46s	19m56s	2.39s
VR-EA	KO: 43				
Dataset 4		1300180	2h7m	2h21m	35 470
EA-ED	-	10111105	2070	2112 1111	55.475




\Rightarrow Deobfuscating some data-flow based (composite) obfuscations





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Results

 \Rightarrow A scalable synthesis algorithm improving the state-of-the-art in both speed and accuracy





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Limitation:

- synthesizing expressions using constants
- addressing encoded-data (which scale)





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 \Rightarrow A scalable synthesis algorithm improving the state-of-the-art in both <code>speed</code> and <code>accuracy</code>

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Future work:

- experimenting other synthesis primitives & simplification strategies (D&C...)
- combining with other approach (not necessarily synthesis-based)
- testing against other obfuscators

Thank you!

References



Susmit Jha, Sumit Gulwani, Sanjit A Seshia, and Ashish Tiwari. Oracle-guided component-based program synthesis. Proceedings of the 32nd ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering-Volume 1, pages 215-224. ACM, 2010. Synthesis time: **31 seconds in average**



Fabrizio Biondi, Sébastien Josse, Axel Legay, and Thomas Sirvent. Effectiveness of synthesis in concolic deobfuscation.

Computers & Security, 70:500-515, 2017.

Synthesis time: 96 bits in 20 seconds ca.

Tim Blazytko, Moritz Contag, Cornelius Aschermann, and Thorsten Holz. Syntia: Synthesizing the semantics of obfuscated code.

26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17), pages 643-659, 2017.

Synthesis time: 4 seconds in average

Goal: Finding the **smallest discriminative input vector size How:** Checking equivalence by SMT with synthesized expr. (on EA)



x axis: input vector size, y axis: Function number

Goal: Finding the **smallest discriminative input vector size How:** Checking equivalence by SMT with synthesized expr. (on EA)



Synthesis time distribution (on EA)



Synthesis simplification (on EA)

