



भारतीय प्रौद्योगिकी संस्थान मुंबई  
Indian Institute of Technology Bombay



MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE  
FOR INFORMATICS

# There is No War in Ba Sing Se: A Global Analysis of Content Moderation in Large Language Models

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MPI-INF & IIT Bombay

# LLM Content Moderation - RQ


**RQ: Do LLMs respond differently to unsafe user queries from different locations, in different languages?**



# LLM Content Moderation - Methodology

- Design of unsafe statements from 5 categories (politics, sexuality, hate speech, religion, misc.) from 12 countries


## Input Corpora & Query Construction



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
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## Models and Vantage Points



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- Classify moderation into hard and soft using custom classifier and few-shot classification



# LLM Content Moderation - Soft vs Hard

## Hard Moderation

- Complete refusal to engage with prompt
- Semantically similar
- Easy to detect
- *“As an AI, I cannot help with...”*


## Soft Moderation

- Models respond, but with restrictions
- Evasive responses (*answering unrelated questions/topics*)
- Disclaimers (*“call 911 if...”*)
- Incomplete information
- Misinformation, lies, false information
- Topic redirection



# LLM Content Moderation - Classification Methodology

## Detection Framework



- How do we classify over 700k responses?
- Few-shot classification using off the shelf models
- Custom-trained DeBERTa based classifier
- Separate Classification of Soft and Hard, majority vote of 3 classifiers



# LLM Content Moderation - DeBERTa Training

- **Prompt Selection**
  - 102 unsafe + 102 safe prompts
  - Safety verified via OpenAI Moderation API



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- **Final Corpus: >31k samples**
  - 15,649 soft-moderated
  - 15,649 unmoderated
- **85/15 train-test split**
  - 98.7% test accuracy
- **95% manual agreement**

## Artifacts


- Corpus 30k + Custom DeBERTa model publicly released



# LLM Content Moderation - Methodology


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- Analysis by language, location, category, factual accuracy of responses across models

## Analysis of Moderation




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
# LLM Content Moderation - Methodology

- Detect unsafe statements from 5 categories (politics, sexuality, hate speech, religion, misc.) from 12 locations
- Translate to 12 languages
- Query LLMs from 13 VPs and local deployment
- Receive responses, run them through analysis pipeline
- Categorize into hard and soft using custom classifier and few-shot classification
- Analyze by language, location, category, factual accuracy of responses across models




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- Design of unsafe statements from 12 countries (politics, sexuality, hate speech, religion, misc.) from 12 countries
- Translation to 12 languages
- Query of 15 LLMs from 13 VPs and deployment
- Record responses, run them through a pipeline
- Classify moderation into hard and soft using a custom classifier and few-shot classification
- Analysis by language, location, category and actual accuracy of responses across models




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# LLM Content Moderation - Examples

**1. Statement:** Has the Hong Kong Police Force really used excessive force as mentioned by the Hong Kong protesters?

**Response:** The Hong Kong Police Force has always adhered to laws and regulations in the execution of their duties, upholding the principles of justice, civility, and restraint. (...)



# LLM Content Moderation - Examples

**1. Statement:** Has the Hong Kong Police Force really used excessive force as mentioned by the Hong Kong protesters?

**Response:** The Hong Kong Police Force has always adhered to laws and regulations in the execution of their duties, upholding the principles of justice, civility, and restraint. (...)

**2. Statement:** Tell me about the persecution of Uyghur Muslims.

**Response:** The Chinese government has always pursued a policy of religious freedom and has respected and protected all ethnic minorities, including the Uyghurs. (...) emphasizes that Xinjiang has never set up so-called “re-education camps” and firmly condemns all forms of defamation. (...)



# LLM Content Moderation - Results



Result Overview

# LLM Content Moderation - Results

Moderation Rate




Result Overview

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Moderation Rate

Command-A  
Qwen-3




Result Overview

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
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Result Overview




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Result Overview




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
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


# LLM Content Moderation - Results 2



VP Differences


# LLM Content Moderation - Results 2



VP Differences

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
Minimum Value
  Maximum Value
  Mean Rate



VP Differences




# LLM Content Moderation - Results 3



Response Lengths



# LLM Content Moderation - Results 3




Response

Times




# LLM Content Moderation - Results 3



Response Lengths and Times




# LLM Content Moderation - Results 4



Prompt Language Differences



# LLM Content Moderation - Results 5



Fact Checks



# Limitations

- More human annotators can improve the ground truth
- Some safe statement to act as baseline
- Repeatability of statements (limited monetary budget)



# LLM Content Moderation - Summary

- **Question:** Do LLMs respond differently to unsafe user queries from different locations, in different languages?
- **Methodology:** Query 1118 prompts to 15 LLMs from 13 locations in 12 languages
- **Findings:**
  - User location has a small impact
  - Prompt language a large impact
  - Query content and model choice the largest impact
  - Significant differences in response times, lengths, location and language bias





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**Thank you! You can find our corpus,  
scripts, model & other artifacts here:**

