ObliInjection

Order-Oblivious Prompt Injection Attack to LLM Agents with Multi-source Data

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LLM Empowers New Agents and Applications



LLM Empowers New Agents and Applications

Personal assistant

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Personal Assistant

Healthcare

LLM Empowers New Agents and Applications



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

Prompt Injection Attack



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

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

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

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

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

Prompt Injection with Multi-Source Data

Single source

Prompt Injection with Multi-Source Data

Single source

Multiple sources

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Multiple sources

Review summarization

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

Segment (Review from different user)

Prompt Injection with Multi-Source Data



Prompt Injection with Multi-Source Data

Single source

Multiple sources

Multi-document QA



Segment (Document from different source)

Prompt Injection with Multi-Source Data

Single source

Multiple sources

Tool selection



Segment (Tool from different source)

Single-Source Attacks Fail in Multi-Source Cases



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

Existing Attacks Rely on Specific Ordering



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

ObliInjection Succeeds in Any Ordering



Threat Model

Manipulate LLM into completing an attacker-specified injected task

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- Target instruction
- Clean segments

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DOES NOT have access to

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- Target instruction
- Clean segments
- Closed-source model parameters

ObliInjection: Order-Oblivious Loss



Contaminated segment

ObliInjection: Order-Oblivious Loss



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

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

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

Formulating an Optimization Problem

$$\underset{\text{contaminated segment } x}{\text{minimize}} \quad \text{Order\_oblivious\_loss}\,(x, \text{attacker\_desired\_response})$$

Search for the Optimal Contaminated Segment



Contaminated segment buffer

Search for the Optimal Contaminated Segment



Search for the Optimal Contaminated Segment



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

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

Experiment Setup

12 LLMs | 7 Open-source LLMs | 2 Closed-source LLMs | 3 Defense LLMs

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12 LLMs	7 Open-source LLMs	2 Closed-source LLMs	3 Defense LLMs
3 Datasets	Amazon Reviews	Multi-News	HotpotQA

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12 LLMs	7 Open-source LLMs	2 Closed-source LLMs	3 Defense LLMs
3 Datasets	Amazon Reviews	Multi-News	HotpotQA
Metric	Attack Success Rate	FPR	FNR

Our ObliInjection is Highly Effective



Our OBLIInjection Outperforms Baselines



Our OblInjection Transfers to Unseen Models



Existing Defenses are Insufficient

OblInjection achieves high ASR under prevention defenses.



Existing Defenses are Insufficient

Detection-based methods exhibit high FNR.





Conclusion

- **Single-Source Control:** Manipulating just one data segment is sufficient to compromise the entire multi-source prompt.
- **Order-Oblivious Attack:** ***OblilInjection*** is the first attack effective regardless of segment ordering.
- **High Impact & Transferability:** Achieved high ASR, with successful transfers to closed-source models like GPT-4o.