

WiFinger: Fingerprinting Noisy IoT Event Traffic Using Packet-level Sequence Matching

Ronghua Li¹, Shinan Liu², Haibo Hu¹, Qingqing Ye¹, Nick Feamster³

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
Traffic Fingerprint

- Website
- Mobile App
- IoT Events
- Human Activities

Traffic Fingerprint

- Website
- Mobile App
- **IoT Events**
- Human Activities

Door unlocked?
Security camera shutdown?
Empty houses?
.....




Traffic Fingerprint Approaches:

- ML: Random Forest, XGBoost, KNN
- DL: CNN, LSTM
- Heuristic: Size Matching

Question: What's the difference? Transport/Network (TCP/IP) v.s. Link (Wi-Fi)

Problem: Layer Difference



```
375 QoS Data, SN=3252, FN=0, Flags=.p....F.  
447 QoS Data, SN=3254, FN=0, Flags=.p....F.  
439 QoS Data, SN=3255, FN=0, Flags=.p....F.  
384 QoS Data, SN=3256, FN=0, Flags=.p....F.  
455 QoS Data, SN=3258, FN=0, Flags=.p....F.  
...
```

TAKEAWAY: Wi-Fi IoT events are **short but versatile**. They have **sniffing loss** and **traffic obfuscation**

Problem: Trade-off




Methods	Features	Data Volume	Label Acc	Parameter Tuning	Traffic Completeness
ML	Traffic Statistics	Medium	High	High	Medium
DL	Raw Bytes	High	High	Low	Medium
Heuristic	Packet Directions & Sizes	Low	Low	Low	High

TAKEAWAY: Wi-Fi IoT events are **short but versatile**. They have **sniffing loss** and **traffic obfuscation**.


Addressing Loss and Obfuscation



- Packet Loss
- Packet Obfuscation




Network Traffic Longest Common Subsequence (NT-LCS)






FMLCS: Fuzzily Matched Longest Common Subsequence






FMLCS: Fuzzily Matched Longest Common Subsequence







FMLCS: Fuzzily Matched Longest Common Subsequence






FMLCS: Fuzzily Matched Longest Common Subsequence






FMLCS: Fuzzily Matched Longest Common Subsequence




FMLCS: Fuzzily Matched Longest Common Subsequence



Challenges:


1. High time complexity
2. Real-environment adaptation



Challenges:


1. **High time complexity**
2. Real-environment adaptation

Anchor Reference



Split and Merge


Process Time(s)	
FMLCS	AFMLCS
0.13	0.13
0.17	0.07
2.34	0.15
7.97	0.85
39.2	1.3
0.14	0.15
0.34	0.1





Challenges:

1. High time complexity
 2. Real-environment adaptation
- Packet intervals may slightly change in various environments

Pair Interval Distribution



- Mean - μ
- Std - σ




Interval Calibration

if $|t_2 - t_1| < \mu \pm 3\sigma$:
 $t_2 = \mu \pm \sigma$

Challenges:

1. High time complexity
2. Real-environment adaptation

Fingerprint Matching



- 30 training samples
- 20 testing samples



ID	Device Type	Device	Related Events
E1	Agentic Controller	Alexa Echo Dot	DND/UnDND
E2 (H)			Q1: What time is it?
E3 (H)			Q2: What's the price of eggs?
E4 (H)			Q3: What's the weather now?
E5 (H)			Q4: What's the weather like in X?
E6		Google Home	Volume Up/Down
E7 (H)			Volume Up
E8 (H)			Volume Down
E9	Smart Peripherals	Wiz Hue Light	On
E10			Off
E11		TP-Link Plug	On/Off
E12		ICX-RF A/C Controller	On/Off
E13		Gosund Plug	On/Off
E14		WAH Plug	On
E15			Off
E16		Integrated Smart Actuator	Mi Sweeper
E17	Mode Silent/Standard/Strong		
E18	Midea Dishwasher		On/Off
E19	Midea Dish Sterilizer		On/Off
E20	Xiaomi Humidifier		On/Off
E21			Continuous humidification/Close
E22	Wi-Fi Sprinkler		On/Off
E23	TuYa Thermostat		On
E24			Off
E25			Temperature INC
E26			Temperature DEC
E27			On
E28	HW Thermostat		Off
E29			Temperature INC/DEC
E30			Mode Comfort
E31		Mode Non-Frozen	
E32	Ring Alarm	Mute	
E33		Ring	

- 15 Devices
- 43 Events
- Real-time event tracking

Evaluation - Precision v.s. Recall




Precision: 96%; Recall: 89%



Precision is more important than Recall

Robustness against Various Loss Rates




Loss distributions:


- Uniform
- Gilbert-Elliot

delay, shaping, padding defenses



Shaping





Delay



Padding



delay, shaping, padding defenses



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Paper



Question Form