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Memory Backdoor Attacks on Neural Networks

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https://offensive-ai-lab.com/
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Federated Learning (FL): The Promise



- Data remains on client devices
- Only model updates are shared
- Privacy relies on training-code integrity & honest orchestration

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The Common Assumption

Federated Learning

≠ Is that true?

Private Training Data

Threat Model



What if the FL server is compromised?
Can it push training code that covertly causes models to **memorize** data?
If so, the attacker could **steal** it.

Related Work

Prior memorization attacks can memorize *some* data, but

(1) Limited capacity

(2) Not robust (a little noise removes them)

(3) data cannot be extracted **systematically** by a query only



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The memory backdoor



- Covert training code → models memorize data
- **Index trigger:** query specific samples by index
- **Stealth:** classification accuracy remains unchanged
- **FL:** round-robin (one client per round); exclude targeted client's update from aggregation

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How we do it

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{mem}} = \mathcal{L}_1(f_\theta(t_\iota), p_\iota) + \mathcal{L}_2(f_\theta(t_\iota), p_\iota)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{total}} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}\left(f_\theta(x), y\right) + \lambda \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\text{mem}}(f_\theta(t_\iota), p_\iota)$$

- Optimize **BOTH**: primary task + memorization (stay covert)
- λ controls the **trade-off** (utility ↔ memorization)
- L1=MAE, L2=MSE (reconstruction fidelity)

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Our implementation of this memory backdoor





- Index = (sample id, patch id, channel)
  →query returns one patch
- Sweep indices
  →reassemble the full sample



Extracted Samples



Stealth in FL: Accuracy Unchanged



Global accuracy unchanged!

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Beyond Vision: Memory Backdoors in LLMs



- Trigger prompt: T + S_i (S_i = 8-char hash index)
- Query by index →retrieve a specific memorized training sample

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LLM Results: Utility vs. Backdoor Success

Amount Stolen	alpaca-cleaned		code_instructions	
	f **ACC**	h **ASR**	f **ACC**	h **ASR**
Clean model:	0.381	-	0.281	-
1K	0.373	0.789	0.284	0.98
2K	0.38	0.595	0.286	0.937
3K	0.386	0.32	0.278	0.883
5K	0.385	0.014	0.279	0.531
10K	0.383	0.001	0.276	0.001

ASR ↓ with more stolen

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Conclusions

- **FL ≠ private training data** (a compromised server can leak data)
- Memory backdoor enables **deterministic, stealthy extraction** of complete training samples via an index trigger
- Works across models & tasks, incl. generative models (**LLMs**), with negligible utility impact
- Implication: FL needs **training-code integrity/inspection** (not just “data stays local”)

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Offensive AI Research Lab

Ben-Gurion University

https://offensive-ai-lab.com/

Try it out
https://github.com/edenluzon5/Memory-Backdoor-Attacks

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Questions?

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