Beyond Jailbreak: Unveiling Risks in LLM Applications Arising from Blurred Capability Boundaries

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❖ **The emergent capabilities of LLM seem to suggest that AGI may be on the horizon.**



❖How should we respond to the novel risks posed by AI technologies?

Terminator?



The risks of AI have become a present reality.

- Newly released models—no matter how powerful—are consistently **compromised** within a short time.

OpenAI's AI-powered browser has been compromised.



- REDNote's LLM-powered translation feature has been abused.



LLM Application Development Paradigm

A novel application development paradigm built upon the capabilities of large language models.

The core task of LLM application developers is to **ensure the model reliably executes its intended tasks** while avoiding unintended behaviors.



Developers **shape and define** the capabilities of applications.

The capability space of LLM applications



The capability space of LLM applications



The boundary we focus on

What traditional jailbreaking focuses on

Capability Boundary Risk

a. Capability Downgrade

- to undermine the expected performance of an application.
- Attackers craft specific inputs that cause the application to produce incorrect outputs—without triggering the LLM's safety constraints.

b. Capability Upgrade

- to expand the application's capability space, enabling it to perform tasks beyond its originally intended scop, serving as an intermediate stage preceding full capability jailbreaking.

c. Capability Jailbreak

- to bypass both the application's functional constraints and the base LLM's safety safeguards, enabling the application to execute arbitrary tasks.



(a) **Capability Downgrade.** The capability boundary of App1 drifts, causing anomalies to be misidentified as normal.



(b) **Capability Upgrade.** The capability boundary of App1 (Type A) expands, enabling it to perform tasks intended for App2 (Type B).



(c) **Capability Jailbreak.** The capability boundary of App1 is breached, granting access to the foundational LLM's full capabilities.



1. LLM Application Collection
2. Prompt Evaluation
3. Capability Boundary Evaluation

LLMApp-Eval: LLM Application Collection



Collection

- **807,207 applications across four platforms**
  - **application names**
  - **descriptions**
  - **user visit counts**
- **11,176 publicly available application prompts**

Classification

- use **BART-large-MNLI** to classify applications.

LLMApp-Eval: Prompt Evaluation

Target

The more detailed the task description, the higher the quality of the prompt.

Information Entropy: $PEScore = H(\mathbf{V}_{\text{Prompt}}) = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i \log(p_i)$

Feature Information Metric: $PWScore = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{j=1}^{m} \mathbf{1}\left(\frac{\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{b}_j}{\|\mathbf{v}_i\|\|\mathbf{b}_j\|} > t_1\right)$

$$TScore = \alpha_{11} * PEScore + \alpha_{12} * PWScore$$

Process

Prompts with guided, step-by-step instructions better steer applications toward successful task completion.

Quantifying the step explicitness and logical complexity of prompts.

$$PScore = \alpha_{21} * (N_{step-keywords-norm} + N_{markers-norm}) + \alpha_{22} * (N_{logic-keywords-norm} + N_{clauses-norm})$$

Capability

The level of detail in capability descriptions

$$\text{CaScore} = Cap_{\text{level}} * N_{\text{capability}}$$

Constraint

The clearly defined capability constraints

$$\text{CoScore} = \sum_{j=1}^{N_{\text{constraint}}} Con_{\text{level},j}$$

LLMApp-Eval: Capability Boundary Evaluation

a. Capability Downgrade

Evaluating whether LLM produces robust outputs on the same task when faced with inputs containing hidden or redundant information.

1. Hidden information: We embed data that is invisible to humans but detectable by large language models—for example, inserting invisible characters (e.g., zero-width spaces, Unicode control characters) into a PDF or text input.

2. Redundant information: We inject irrelevant or extraneous content into standard inputs—such as off-topic sentences, repetitive phrases, or unrelated facts—that do not alter the core task semantics but may distract or mislead the model.



Fig. 7: The boundary case example on Llama-3.1-8 B. In this case, by embedding meticulously crafted adversarial sentences (red), a resume that would otherwise fail evaluation can successfully evade an LLM-powered screening, simulating enterprise LLM recruitment systems where commercial system evaluation was inaccessible.

LLMApp-Eval: Capability Boundary Evaluation

b. Capability Upgrade

We evaluate the cross-category task execution capability of LLM applications through three types of test cases:

1. **Default cases**
2. **Generated out-of-scope cases**
3. **Commonsense test cases**

c. Capability Jailbreak

Evaluating an application's resilience against existing jailbreaking techniques

1. **Harmful queries**
2. **Adversarial queries**



Example of default cases

The landscape of cross-platform LLM applications

1. Although the total number of applications varies across platforms, the distribution of application types is **highly consistent,** the mean absolute deviation of the percentage share for each category is less than 2%.



Fig. 12: Distribution of application categories on GPTs.



Fig. 13: Distribution of application categories on Coze.



Fig. 14: Distribution of application categories on Agent-Builder.

The landscape of cross-platform LLM applications

2. **Super-developers** play a crucial role in the LLM application ecosystem.



Fig. 17: Application publishing history of top 5 developers on GPTs.

Some developers have released a large number of applications in a short period of time.

3. Platform-provided default plugins may introduce potential security risks.

For example, on AgentBuilder, a divorce consultation application was configured with the Baidu Maps plugin.

Prompt Evaluation Results

1. 48.62% of applications received an AppScore below 50.

2. **43.41%** of applications include no functional constraints at all, and among those that do implement constraints, **20% score below 60**.



Fig. 8: Distribution of prompt evaluation scores.

Prompt Evaluation Results

3. After prompt optimization, the number of out-of-scope tasks an application could perform decreased by **5.3% to 80%**.

For example, on AgentBuilder, a given application was initially capable of executing **15 out of 21** different task types; after adding explicit constraints, this number dropped to **3**.

4. The base LLM also affects prompt effectiveness.

For example, the same capability constraints exhibit significantly weaker enforcement on **Claude-3-Haiku (Poe)** compared to **ERNIE (on AgentBuilder)**.

TABLE I: LLMs supported by different platforms.

Platform		LLM
GPTs		GPT
Coze		Doubao, Qwen, Step, Deepseek, GLM, Abab, Moonshot, Baichuan
AgentBuilder		Wenxin
Poe	Text	GPT, Claude, Gemini, Llama, Grok, Mixtral, MythoMax
	Image	FLUX, Imagen3, Playground, Ideogram, DALL-E, Recraft, StableDiffusion, Recraft
	Video	Pika, Runway, Dream-Machine

*: We listed the major LLMs used by the analyzed applications. Only the series names are provided, without specifying specific versions.

a. Capability Downgrade

We evaluated six open-source LLMs using 2,790 boundary test cases.

All tested LLMs were affected by the injected misleading information.

TABLE II: The results of capability downgrade tests.

	Llama-3.1-8B	Qwen2.5-7B	Gemma-2-9B	ChatGLM3-6B	Mistral-7B	InternLM2.5-7B
# downgrade case (%)	668 (23.94%)	981 (35.16%)	707 (25.34%)	814 (29.18%)	993 (35.59%)	723 (25.91%)

b. Capability Upgrade

144 (72.36%) were susceptible to **capability upgrade**, with each affected application capable of performing **more than 15 distinct task types** beyond its intended scope.

TABLE III: Evaluation results for different platform applications.

	#App[1]	#Up-App[2]		#Jail-App[3]	
		Com*	Cate*	Mal*	Adv*
GPTs	50	50	49	0	46
Coze	50	46	35	13	47
AgentBuilder	49	42	33	0	47
Poe	50	34	27	4	38
Total	199	172(86.42%)	144(72.36%)	17(8.54%)	178(89.45%)

[1]: Evaluated applications. [2]: Applications exposed to capability upgrade.
[3]: Applications exposed to capability jailbreak.
*: Com (Common case); Cate (Category case); Mal (Original malicious case); Adv (Adversarial malicious case).



Fig. 10: CDF of the Top 50 application capability categories. The red shaded area is considered the range affected by capability upgrade (i.e., coverage categories ≥ 15).

b. Capability Upgrade

The risk of capability upgrade varies significantly across platforms.

GPTs are more susceptible to capability upgrade.



Fig. 9: Capability upgrade risks for top 50 applications on GPTs, Coze, AgentBuilder, and Poe. The horizontal axis is the application index, while the vertical axis is test case types. Green indicates the application's original type. The intensity of orange represents the proportion of test cases from that type completed by the application; the darker the color, the higher the proportion.

c. Capability Jailbreak

178 applications (89.45%) were vulnerable to capability jailbreak, successfully executing at least one malicious task.

Moreover, **17 of these applications** carried out malicious tasks **even without any adversarial prompting**.



Fig. 16: Capability jailbreak risk heatmap for top 50 applications across different platforms.

Conclusion

- **Novel risk surface**
  - We reveal that the core security challenge in LLM applications lies in the control of capability boundaries.
- **Systematic evaluation**
  - 43.41% of applications include no functional constraints at all
  - 144 were susceptible to capability upgrade
- **New insights**
  - The quality of prompt design is a critical factor in mitigating these risks.

Thanks for listening!
Any question?

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