


Cracking the Wall of Confinement: Understanding and Analyzing Malicious Domain Take-downs

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Overview

- What is a domain take-down?
- Violation includes:
 - malware distribution,
 - pharmaceutical trading,
 - Copyright infringement, etc.
- Goal: mainly to disrupt the malicious traffic
 - Show warning banner
 - Notify infected hosts
 - Mimic the operation of a command and control center (C&C)
- Little information is available about the taken-down operation and their effectiveness

Research Goals

1. Understanding the take-down process
2. Assessing the **security** and **reliability** of the take-down process
3. Set some **recommendation** for a more effective take-down operation

How are Domains Taken Down?


1. Administrative Aspects (Request):

- File an Accceptable Use Policy (AUP) complaint
- Obtain a court order

2. Technical Aspects (Execution):

- **Sinkholing:** Change DNS configuration (resolvable)
- **Delisting:** Change registration status (**un**resolvable)
- Set the domains as “Reserved” (rare, out of scope)


Take-down: (Sinkholing)



Take-down: (Delisting)

- Domain is **not resolvable**: NXDOMAIN
- Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) status code in `whois` record determines a domain's **registration status**
- Status codes: `serverHold`, and `clientHold` remove the domain from the DNS
- Note: These status codes are **NOT** exclusively used in take-down operations

Lifecycle of Taken-down Domains




TDR: Take-down Request


Taken-down/Seized

Approach


1 Data Collection




2 Seized Domains Identification




Analysis of Take-down Operations (Distribution)



Analysis of Take-down Operations (Sinkhole Duration)



By Sinkhole Operator



By TLD Registry

Findings

- Domain availability after release:
 - 56.46%,
 - 14% in less than 10 months
- Some malicious domains have been **maliciously re-registered** again after being released
- We were able to **hijack a taken-down domain** due to a DNS misconfiguration
- **Expired nameservers** purchased by new owners cause the traffic of around 30K domains to be redirected to new owners

Findings: (Hijacking a taken-down domain)

- carders.org was initially taken-down by the FBI
- FBI utilized Amazon Route 53

```
first seen in zone: 2012-06-27
last seen in zone: 2018-07-22
rrtype: NS
rdata: ns-9.awsdns-01.com.
      ns-922.awsdns-51.net.
      ns-1168.awsdns-18.org.
      ns-1876.awsdns-42.co.uk.
first seen: 2012-06-26
last seen: 2013-01-05
rrtype: A
rdata: 204.236.228.238
```

The PDNS records for carders.org (NS and A). The NS record was still set at .org TLD “dangling NS”

```
carders.org.      NS ns-1601.awsdns-08.co.uk.
                  NS ns-1168.awsdns-18.org.
                  NS ns-762.awsdns-31.net.
                  NS ns-226.awsdns-28.com.

www.carders.org. A 8.188.96.3
carders.org.     A ALIAS www.carders.org.
```

Our takeover of carders.org exploiting the dangling NS record and setting a new A record. The set IP address points to our webserver

Findings: (Expired Nameservers)

- Sinkholes operated by Conficker Working Group: ns.cwgsh.{com,net,org}
- Domains cwgsh.{com,net,org} expired on Feb. 2011

zzyiwabmkz.info.	NS	ns.cwgsh.com.
zzyiwabmkz.info.	NS	ns.cwgsh.net.
zzyiwabmkz.info.	NS	ns.cwgsh.org.
www.zzyiwabmkz.info.	A	190.2.131.62
ww9.zzyiwabmkz.info.	A	166.78.101.108

A record sets for new subdomains of zzyiwabmkz.info
observed in July 2018. After expiration of
cwgsh.{com,net,org}

Conclusion

We recommend setting specific policies **regulating take-down** procedures

- Checking DNS configurations
- Take-down **duration** and **release process**:
 - a. Malware distribution: must remain taken down until no more traffic is received
 - b. Other illicit activity:
 - i. Domain's popularity
 - ii. Domain's current traffic
 - iii. Type of illicit activity

Thank you
Questions?