Oligo-Snoop: A Non-Invasive Side Channel Attack Against DNA Synthesis Machines

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Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)

- > DNA molecules
 - Carry biological information
 - □ Chains of A, G, C, and T bases.



> DNA synthesizers are commercially available to produce custom DNA sequences.



Current Security State

- **>** Bioterrorism
 - ☐ Authorities regulation
 - Monitoring
 - ☐ Training



superstarfloraluk.com



Related Work: Other Attacks

Software vulnerabilities analysis [1]

DNA Sequencer | Illustration | Illu



Motivation: A Different Perspective

Synthetic DNA market \$38.7 billion by 2020 [2].



Drug Discovery



Medical Treatment



Crop Optimization

AGGCAGGTTTTCTAGCTGGAACTCCGA

Synthetic DNA Sequences are Intellectual Properties.





Our Contribution

- Novel acoustic side-channel attack
 - ☐ Each base type prediction
- > K-best sequence prediction
- Zero cost post-processing imperfect predictions
- Countermeasures












Adversary Model






DNA Synthesizer




Attack Design



K-Best DNA Sequences: Motivation

➤ Post-processing stage detects a fault in classifier prediction: What is the next best sequence?

Example



- > First best prediction: AGG
- > Second best prediction: AGC
- > Third best prediction: ???





K-Best DNA Sequences: Algorithm

> DAG generation:

- 1. Add Start End nodes
- 2. Add 4 nodes per delivery
- 3. Fully connect consecutive
 4 nodes by directed
 weighted edges
 corresponding to the
 destination nodes type
 probability

Find the K longest paths
[1] *O*(n log(n)+k)





Experimental Setup

Audio Recorder Placement Location




AB 3400 DNA Synthesizer

Zoom H6
AudioRecorder

- Learning Possibility
- Noise Effect
- Distance Effect




Results: Learning Curve



Best classification accuracy: 88.07% (Voting Classifier)



Results: Noise Effect




- > Environmental noise does not effect the accuracy (Pink)
- High frequency noise blocks the attack better (Blue)



Results: Distance Effect

- > Room noise level is neglectable for contact microphone
- Sound Pressure Level (SPL): $L_2 = L_1 |20\log(\frac{r_1}{r_2})|$
- ➤ Keep the room noise level constant, lower the SPL from DNA





Test Cases

| Го: | Sina | Faezi | Cc: | John | Chaput; | M. A | Faruque |
|-----|------|-------|-----|------|---------|------|---------|
|-----|------|-------|-----|------|---------|------|---------|

Hi Sina:

Here is the original sequence I input to DNA synthesizer. The wrong predictions happened on T only which you conjectured as G, but there are six positions wrong.

DNA sequence: 5'-TGG CGA CAT TAT AAC CCG TCG GAT GAT CCG GGT CGT GTT CAC CTC-3'

Peptide sequence: WRHYNPSDDPGRVHL

On Thu, May 3, 2018 at 4:06 AM, Sina Faezi <<u>sfaezi</u>

there are six positions wrong.

the reversed order. If that is the case, here is the

I noticed that since the machine starts synthesiz edited sequence:

TGG CGA CAT GAT AAC CCG TCG GAG GAT CCG GGG CGG GGG CAC CTC

WRHDNPSEDPGRGHL

Kind Regards, Sina Faezi

Graduate Student Researcher

http://aicps.eng.uci.edu


BLAST, Post processing

> Original Amino Sequence: GIVEACCTIICSLHELEDDCE



Insulin

> Predicted Amino Sequence : GIVEECCTSICSLYELEDYCD



Insulin



Countermeasures

- > Secured structure
 - Symmetric component placement
 - Noise canceling material
- > Artificial noise
- Delivery segment obfuscation
- Secured laboratory environment



Summary

- A cyber-physical attack on DNA synthesizers
- > K-best sequences algorithm
- > Real world attack scenario



Questions

Thank You!

Oligo-Snoop

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