Imani N. Sherman (University of Florida), Jasmine D. Bowers (University of Florida), Keith McNamara Jr. (University of Florida), Juan E. Gilbert (University of Florida), Jaime Ruiz (University of Florida), Patrick Traynor (University of Florida)

Robocalls are inundating phone users. These automated calls allow for attackers to reach massive audiences with scams ranging from credential hijacking to unnecessary IT support in a largely untraceable fashion. In response, many applications have been developed to alert mobile phone users of incoming robocalls. However, how well these applications communicate risk with their users is not well understood. In this paper, we identify common real-time security indicators used in the most popular anti-robocall applications. Using focus groups and user testing, we first identify which of these indicators most effectively alert users of danger. We then demonstrate that the most powerful indicators can reduce the likelihood that users will answer such calls by as much as 43%. Unfortunately, our evaluation also shows that attackers can eliminate the gains provided by such indicators using a small amount of target-specific information (e.g., a known phone number). In so doing, we demonstrate that anti-robocall indicators could benefit from significantly increased attention from the research community.

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OmegaLog: High-Fidelity Attack Investigation via Transparent Multi-layer Log Analysis

Wajih Ul Hassan (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Mohammad A. Noureddine (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Pubali Datta (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Adam Bates (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)

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ABSynthe: Automatic Blackbox Side-channel Synthesis on Commodity Microarchitectures

Ben Gras (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Intel Corporation), Cristiano Giuffrida (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Michael Kurth (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Herbert Bos (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Kaveh Razavi (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

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Towards Plausible Graph Anonymization

Yang Zhang (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Mathias Humbert (armasuisse Science and Technology), Bartlomiej Surma (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Praveen Manoharan (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Jilles Vreeken (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Michael Backes (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security)

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Post-Quantum Authentication in TLS 1.3: A Performance Study

Dimitrios Sikeridis (The University of New Mexico), Panos Kampanakis (Cisco Systems), Michael Devetsikiotis (The University of New Mexico)

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