Benjamin Cyr and Yan Long (University of Michigan), Takeshi Sugawara (The University of Electro-Communications), Kevin Fu (Northeastern University)

The private sector and even hobbyists are increasingly launching smaller satellites into Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components, including semiconductors for inertial measurement and other sensing, significantly reduce deployment costs. Such improvements, however, also increase the risk of satellite sensor spoofing attacks, including analog signal injection. Sensor spoofing attacks could compromise the integrity of satellites' onboard sensors, leading to mission-catastrophic kinetic actions. Based on conventional laser jamming and damaging attacks as well as the recent research discoveries on sensor spoofing attacks against terrestrial systems, this position paper (1) shares our views on open technical problems for protecting space systems from analog sensor integrity vulnerabilities, and (2) discusses future challenges of building experimental methodologies, simulations, and evaluation test beds.

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Theodor Schnitzler (Research Center Trustworthy Data Science and Security, TU Dortmund, and Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Katharina Kohls (Radboud University), Evangelos Bitsikas (Northeastern University and New York University Abu Dhabi), Christina Pöpper (New York University Abu Dhabi)

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Chuanpu Fu (Tsinghua University), Qi Li (Tsinghua University), Ke Xu (Tsinghua University)

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John Breton, AbdelRahman Abdou (Carleton University)

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WIP: AMICA: Attention-based Multi-Identifier model for asynchronous intrusion detection...

Natasha Alkhatib (Télécom Paris), Lina Achaji (INRIA), Maria Mushtaq (Télécom Paris), Hadi Ghauch (Télécom Paris), Jean-Luc Danger (Télécom Paris)

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