Shixin Song (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Joseph Zhang (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Mengjia Yan (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is one of the most prominently deployed mitigations against memory corruption attacks. ASLR randomly shuffles program virtual addresses to prevent attackers from knowing the location of program contents in memory. Microarchitectural side channels have been shown to defeat ASLR through various hardware mechanisms. We systematically analyze existing microarchitectural attacks and identify multiple leakage paths. Given the vast attack surface exposed by ASLR, it is challenging to effectively prevent leaking the ASLR secret against microarchitectural attacks.

Motivated by this, we present Oreo, a software-hardware co-design mitigation that strengthens ASLR against these attacks. Oreo uses a new memory mapping interface to remove secret randomized bits in virtual addresses before translating them to their corresponding physical addresses. This extra step hides randomized virtual addresses from microarchitecture structures, preventing side channels from leaking ASLR secrets. Oreo is transparent to user programs and incurs low overhead. We prototyped and evaluated our design on Linux using the hardware simulator gem5.

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Heng Yin, Professor, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of California, Riverside

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Shuo Shao (Zhejiang University), Yiming Li (Zhejiang University), Hongwei Yao (Zhejiang University), Yiling He (Zhejiang University), Zhan Qin (Zhejiang University), Kui Ren (Zhejiang University)

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Eclipse Attacks on Monero's Peer-to-Peer Network

Ruisheng Shi (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Zhiyuan Peng (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Lina Lan (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Yulian Ge (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Peng Liu (Penn State University), Qin Wang (CSIRO Data61), Juan Wang (Wuhan University)

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The Skeleton Keys: A Large Scale Analysis of Credential...

Yizhe Shi (Fudan University), Zhemin Yang (Fudan University), Kangwei Zhong (Fudan University), Guangliang Yang (Fudan University), Yifan Yang (Fudan University), Xiaohan Zhang (Fudan University), Min Yang (Fudan University)

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