Author(s): Giorgi Maisuradze, Michael Backes, Christian Rossow

Download: Paper (PDF)

Date: 27 Feb 2017

Document Type: Reports

Additional Documents: Slides Video

Associated Event: NDSS Symposium 2017


Modern browsers such as Chrome and Edge deploy constant blinding to remove attacker-controlled constants from the JIT-compiled code. Without such a defense, attackers can encode arbitrary shellcode in constants that get compiled to executable code. In this paper, we review the security and completeness of current constant blinding implementations. We develop DACHSHUND, a fuzzing-driven framework to find userspecified constants in JIT-compiled code. DACHSHUND reveals several cases in which JIT compilers of modern browsers fail to blind constants, ranging from constants passed as function parameters to blinded constants that second-stage code optimizers revert to a non-protected form. To tackle this problem, we then propose a JavaScript rewriting mechanism that removes all constants from JavaScript code. We prototype this crossbrowser methodology as part of a Web proxy and show that it can successfully remove all constants from JavaScript code.