Yang Yang (Singapore Management University), Guomin Yang (Singapore Management University), Yingjiu Li (University of Oregon, USA), Pengfei Wu (Singapore Management University), Rui Shi (Hainan University, China), Minming Huang (Singapore Management University), Jian Weng (Jinan University, Guangzhou, China), HweeHwa Pang (Singapore Management University), Robert H. Deng (Singapore Management University)

Service discovery is a fundamental process in wireless networks, enabling devices to find and communicate with services dynamically, and is critical for the seamless operation of modern systems like 5G and IoT. This paper introduces PriSrv+, an advanced privacy and usability-enhanced service discovery protocol for modern wireless networks and resource-constrained environments. PriSrv+ builds upon PriSrv (NDSS'24), by addressing critical limitations in expressiveness, privacy, scalability, and efficiency, while maintaining compatibility with widely-used wireless protocols such as mDNS, BLE, and Wi-Fi.

A key innovation in PriSrv+ is the development of Fast and Expressive Matchmaking Encryption (FEME), the first matchmaking encryption scheme capable of supporting expressive access control policies with an unbounded attribute universe, allowing any arbitrary string to be used as an attribute. FEME significantly enhances the flexibility of service discovery while ensuring robust message and attribute privacy. Compared to PriSrv, PriSrv+ optimizes cryptographic operations, achieving 7.62x faster for encryption and 6.23x faster for decryption, and dramatically reduces ciphertext sizes by 87.33%. In addition, PriSrv+ reduces communication costs by 87.33% for service broadcast and 86.64% for anonymous mutual authentication compared with PriSrv. Formal security proofs confirm the security of FEME and PriSrv+. Extensive evaluations on multiple platforms demonstrate that PriSrv+ achieves superior performance, scalability, and efficiency compared to existing state-ofthe-art protocols.

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Jonathan Evertz (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Niklas Risse (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Nicolai Neuer (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), Andreas Müller (Ruhr University Bochum), Philipp Normann (TU Wien), Gaetano Sapia (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Srishti Gupta (Sapienza University of Rome), David Pape (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security),…

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Pierpaolo Della Monica (Sapienza University of Rome), Ivan Visconti (Sapienza University of Rome), Andrea Vitaletti (Sapienza University of Rome), Marco Zecchini (Sapienza University of Rome)

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Know Me by My Pulse: Toward Practical Continuous Authentication...

Wei Shao (University of California, Davis), Zequan Liang (University of California Davis), Ruoyu Zhang (University of California, Davis), Ruijie Fang (University of California, Davis), Ning Miao (University of California, Davis), Ehsan Kourkchi (University of California - Davis), Setareh Rafatirad (University of California, Davis), Houman Homayoun (University of California Davis), Chongzhou Fang (Rochester Institute of Technology)

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