Доверя́й, но проверя́й: SFI safety for native-compiled Wasm

Evan Johnson (University of California San Diego), David Thien (University of California San Diego), Yousef Alhessi (University of California San Diego), Shravan Narayan (University Of California San Diego), Fraser Brown (Stanford University), Sorin Lerner (University of California San Diego), Tyler McMullen (Fastly Labs), Stefan Savage (University of California San Diego), Deian Stefan (University of California San Diego)

WebAssembly (Wasm) is a platform-independent bytecode that offers both good performance and runtime isolation. To implement isolation, the compiler inserts safety checks when it compiles Wasm to native machine code. While this approach is cheap, it also requires trust in the compiler's correctness---trust that the compiler has inserted each necessary check, correctly formed, in each proper place. Unfortunately, subtle bugs in the Wasm compiler can break---and emph{have broken}---isolation guarantees. To address this problem, we propose verifying memory isolation of Wasm binaries post-compilation. We implement this approach in VeriWasm, a static offline verifier for native x86-64 binaries compiled from Wasm; we prove the verifier's soundness, and find that it can detect bugs with no false positives. Finally, we describe our deployment of VeriWasm at Fastly.