Adversarial Classification Under Differential Privacy

Jairo Giraldo (University of Utah), Alvaro Cardenas (UC Santa Cruz), Murat Kantarcioglu (UT Dallas), Jonathan Katz (George Mason University)

Differential Privacy has emerged in the last decade as a powerful tool to protect sensitive information. Similarly, the last decade has seen a growing interest in adversarial classification, where an attacker knows a classifier is trying to detect anomalies and the adversary attempts to design examples meant to mislead this classification.
Differential privacy and adversarial classification have been studied separately in the past. In this paper, we study the problem of how a strategic attacker can leverage differential privacy to inject false data in a system, and then we propose countermeasures against these novel attacks. We show the impact of our attacks and defenses in a real-world traffic estimation system and in a smart metering system.