A S M Rizvi (University of Southern California/Information Sciences Institute) and John Heidemann (University of Southern California/Information Sciences Institute)

Services on the public Internet are frequently scanned, then subject to brute-force password attempts and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. We would like to run such services stealthily, where they are available to friends but hidden from adversaries. In this work, we propose a discovery-resistant moving target defense named “Chhoyhopper” that utilizes the vast IPv6 address space to conceal publicly available services. The client meets the server at an IPv6 address that changes in a pattern based on a shared, pre-distributed secret and the time of day. By hopping over a /64 prefix, services cannot be found by active scanners, and passively observed information is useless after two minutes. We demonstrate our system with the two important applications—SSH and HTTPS, and make our system publicly available.

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Repttack: Exploiting Cloud Schedulers to Guide Co-Location Attacks

Chongzhou Fang (University of California, Davis), Han Wang (University of California, Davis), Najmeh Nazari (University of California, Davis), Behnam Omidi (George Mason University), Avesta Sasan (University of California, Davis), Khaled N. Khasawneh (George Mason University), Setareh Rafatirad (University of California, Davis), Houman Homayoun (University of California, Davis)

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ATTEQ-NN: Attention-based QoE-aware Evasive Backdoor Attacks

Xueluan Gong (Wuhan University), Yanjiao Chen (Zhejiang University), Jianshuo Dong (Wuhan University), Qian Wang (Wuhan University)

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Demo #10: Hijacking Connected Vehicle Alexa Skills

Wenbo Ding (University at Buffalo), Long Cheng (Clemson University), Xianghang Mi (University of Science and Technology of China), Ziming Zhao (University at Buffalo) and Hongxin Hu (University at Buffalo)

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Free Proxies Unmasked: A Vulnerability and Longitudinal Analysis of...

Naif Mehanna (Univ. Lille / Inria / CNRS), Walter Rudametkin (IRISA / Univ Rennes), Pierre Laperdrix (CNRS, Univ Lille, Inria Lille), and Antoine Vastel (Datadome)

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