Song Liao, Jingwen Yan, Long Cheng (Clemson University)

The rapid evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies allows users to interact with devices in a smart home environment. In an effort to strengthen the connectivity of smart devices across diverse vendors, multiple leading device manufacturers developed the Matter standard, enabling users to control devices from different sources seamlessly. However, the interoperability introduced by Matter poses new challenges to user privacy and safety. In this paper, we propose the Hidden Eavesdropping Attack in Matter-enabled smart home systems by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the Matter device pairing process and delegation phase. Our investigation of the Matter device pairing process reveals the possibility of unauthorized delegation. Furthermore, such delegation can grant unauthorized Matter hubs (i.e., hidden hubs) the capability to eavesdrop on other IoT devices without the awareness of device owners. Meanwhile, the implementation flaws from companies in device management complicate the task of device owners in identifying such hidden hubs. The disclosed sensitive data about devices, such as the status of door locks, can be leveraged by malicious attackers to deduce users’ activities, potentially leading to security breaches and safety issues.

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Shu Wang (George Mason University), Kun Sun (George Mason University), Qi Li (Tsinghua University)

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Pietro Borrello (Sapienza University of Rome), Andrea Fioraldi (EURECOM), Daniele Cono D'Elia (Sapienza University of Rome), Davide Balzarotti (Eurecom), Leonardo Querzoni (Sapienza University of Rome), Cristiano Giuffrida (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

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Mohammed Aldeen, Sisheng Liang, Zhenkai Zhang, Linke Guo (Clemson University), Zheng Song (University of Michigan – Dearborn), and Long Cheng (Clemson University)

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Paolo Cerracchio, Stefano Longari, Michele Carminati, Stefano Zanero (Politecnico di Milano)

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