Rupam Patir (University at Buffalo), Qiqing Huang (University at Buffalo), Keyan Guo (University at Buffalo), Wanda Guo (Texas A&M University), Guofei Gu (Texas A&M University), Haipeng Cai (University at Buffalo), Hongxin Hu (University at Buffalo)

The rapid evolution of software systems in 5G networks has heightened the need for robust security measures. Traditional code analysis methods often fail to detect vulnerabilities specific to 5G, particularly vulnerabilities stemming from complex protocol interactions. In this work, we explore the potential of LLM-assisted techniques in vulnerability detection and repair in open-source 5G implementations. We introduce a novel framework leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in two phases: first, vulnerability detection based on 5G Vulnerability Properties (VPs); second, vulnerability repair guided by 5G Secure Coding Practices (SCPs). We conducted a case study on an open-source 5G User Equipment (UE) implementation that illustrates how our framework leverages vulnerability properties and SCPs to identify and remediate vulnerabilities. Our testing results indicate successful detection and repair, demonstrating the practicality and effectiveness of our approach. While challenges persist, including the identification of 5G-specific security properties and SCPs and the complexity of their integration, this study provides a foundation for advancing automated LLM-assisted solutions to strengthen the security of open-source 5G systems.

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Philipp Mackensen (Ruhr University Bochum), Paul Staat (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Stefan Roth (Ruhr University Bochum), Aydin Sezgin (Ruhr University Bochum), Christof Paar (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Veelasha Moonsamy (Ruhr University Bochum)

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Aditya Sirish A Yelgundhalli (New York University), Patrick Zielinski (New York University), Reza Curtmola (New Jersey Institute of Technology), Justin Cappos (New York University)

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Onion Franking: Abuse Reports for Mix-Based Private Messaging

Matthew Gregoire (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Margaret Pierce (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Saba Eskandarian (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

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