Magdalena Pasternak (University of Florida), Kevin Warren (University of Florida), Daniel Olszewski (University of Florida), Susan Nittrouer (University of Florida), Patrick Traynor (University of Florida), Kevin Butler (University of Florida)

Cochlear implants (CIs) allow deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals to use audio devices, such as phones or voice assistants. However, the advent of increasingly sophisticated synthetic audio (i.e., deepfakes) potentially threatens these users. Yet, this population's susceptibility to such attacks is unclear. In this paper, we perform the first study of the impact of audio deepfakes on CI populations. We examine the use of CI-simulated audio within deepfake detectors. Based on these results, we conduct a user study with 35 CI users and 87 hearing persons (HPs) to determine differences in how CI users perceive deepfake audio. We show that CI users can, similarly to HPs, identify text-to-speech generated deepfakes. Yet, they perform substantially worse for voice conversion deepfake generation algorithms, achieving only 67% correct audio classification. We also evaluate how detection models trained on a CI-simulated audio compare to CI users and investigate if they can effectively act as proxies for CI users. This work begins an investigation into the intersection between adversarial audio and CI users to identify and mitigate threats against this marginalized group.

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NDSS Symposium 2025 Welcome and Opening Remarks

General Chairs: David Balenson, USC Information Sciences Institute and Heng Yin, University of California, Riverside Program Chairs: Christina Pöpper, New York University Abu Dhabi and Hamed Okhravi, MIT Lincoln Laboratory Artifact Evaluation Chairs: Daniele Cono D’Elia, Sapienza University and Mathy Vanhoef, KU Leuven

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The Forking Way: When TEEs Meet Consensus

Annika Wilde (Ruhr University Bochum), Tim Niklas Gruel (Ruhr University Bochum), Claudio Soriente (NEC Laboratories Europe), Ghassan Karame (Ruhr University Bochum)

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BitShield: Defending Against Bit-Flip Attacks on DNN Executables

Yanzuo Chen (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology), Yuanyuan Yuan (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology), Zhibo Liu (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology), Sihang Hu (Huawei Technologies), Tianxiang Li (Huawei Technologies), Shuai Wang (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

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Too Subtle to Notice: Investigating Executable Stack Issues in...

Hengkai Ye (The Pennsylvania State University), Hong Hu (The Pennsylvania State University)

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