Florian Kerschbaum (University of Waterloo), Erik-Oliver Blass (Airbus), Rasoul Akhavan Mahdavi (University of Waterloo)

In a Private section intersection (PSI) protocol, Alice and Bob compute the intersection of their respective sets without disclosing any element not in the intersection. PSI protocols have been extensively studied in the literature and are deployed in industry. With state-of-the-art protocols achieving optimal asymptotic complexity, performance improvements are rare and can only improve complexity constants. In this paper, we present a new private, extremely efficient comparison protocol that leads to a PSI protocol with low constants. A useful property of our comparison protocol is that it can be divided into an online and an offline phase. All expensive cryptographic operations are performed during the offline phase, and the online phase performs only four fast field operations per comparison. This leads to an incredibly fast online phase, and our evaluation shows that it outperforms related work, including KKRT (CCS'16), VOLE-PSI (EuroCrypt'21), and OKVS (Crypto'21). We also evaluate standard approaches to implement the offline phase using different trust assumptions: cryptographic, hardware, and a third party ("dealer model").

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Cloud-Hosted Security Operations Center (SOC)

Drew Walsh, Kevin Conklin (Deloitte)

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Enhanced Vehicular Roll-Jam Attack using a Known Noise Source

Zachary Depp, Halit Bugra Tulay, C. Emre Koksal (The Ohio State University)

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The “Beatrix” Resurrections: Robust Backdoor Detection via Gram Matrices

Wanlun Ma (Swinburne University of Technology), Derui Wang (CSIRO’s Data61), Ruoxi Sun (The University of Adelaide & CSIRO's Data61), Minhui Xue (CSIRO's Data61), Sheng Wen (Swinburne University of Technology), Yang Xiang (Digital Research & Innovation Capability Platform, Swinburne University of Technology)

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