NDSS

Rosita: Towards Automatic Elimination of Power-Analysis Leakage in Ciphers

Madura A. Shelton (University of Adelaide), Niels Samwel (Radboud University), Lejla Batina (Radboud University), Francesco Regazzoni (University of Amsterdam and ALaRI – USI), Markus Wagner (University of Adelaide), Yuval Yarom (University of Adelaide and Data61)

Since their introduction over two decades ago, side-channel attacks have presented a serious security threat. While many ciphers’ implementations employ masking techniques to protect against such attacks, they often leak secret information due to unintended interactions in the hardware. We present Rosita, a code rewrite engine that uses a leakage emulator which we amend to correctly emulate the micro-architecture of a target system. We use Rosita to automatically protect masked implementations of AES, ChaCha, and Xoodoo. For AES and Xoodoo, we show the absence of observable leakage at 1000000 traces with less than 21% penalty to the performance. For ChaCha, which has significantly more leakage, Rosita eliminates over 99% of the leakage, at a performance cost of 64%