Marthin Toruan (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology), R.D.N. Shakya (University of Moratuwa), Samuel Tseitkin (ExeQuantum), Raymond K. Zhao (ExeQuantum), Nalin Arachchilage (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology)

Advances in quantum computing increasingly threaten the security and privacy of data protected by current cryptosystems, particularly those relying on public-key cryptography. In response, the international cybersecurity community has prioritized the implementation of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), a new cryptographic standard designed to resist quantum attacks while operating on classical computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has already standardized several PQC algorithms and plans to deprecate classical asymmetric schemes, such as RSA and ECDSA, by 2035. Despite this urgency, PQC adoption remains slow, often due to limited developer expertise. Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are intended to bridge this gap, yet prior research on classical security APIs demonstrates that poor usability of cryptographic APIs can lead developers to introduce vulnerabilities during implementation of the applications, a risk amplified by the novelty and complexity of PQC. To date, the usability of PQC APIs has not been systematically studied. This research presents an empirical evaluation of the usability of the PQC APIs, observing how developers interact with APIs and documentation during software development tasks. The study identifies cognitive factors that influence the developer’s performance when working with PQC primitives with minimal onboarding. The findings highlight opportunities across the PQC ecosystem to improve developer facing guidance, terminology alignment, and workflow examples to better support non-specialists.

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Pando: Extremely Scalable BFT Based on Committee Sampling

Xin Wang (Tsinghua University and State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security), Haochen Wang (Tsinghua University), Haibin Zhang (Yangtze Delta Region Institute of Tsinghua University, Zhejiang), Sisi Duan (Tsinghua University, Zhongguancun Laboratory, Shandong Institute of Blockchains and State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security)

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Vision: Profiling Human Attackers: Personality and Behavioral Patterns in...

Khalid Alasiri (School of Computing and Augmented Intelligence Arizona State University), Rakibul Hasan (School of Computing and Augmented Intelligence Arizona State University)

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Cascading and Proxy Membership Inference Attacks

Yuntao Du (Purdue University), Jiacheng Li (Purdue University), Yuetian Chen (Purdue University), Kaiyuan Zhang (Purdue University), Zhizhen Yuan (Purdue University), Hanshen Xiao (Purdue University and NVIDIA Research), Bruno Ribeiro (Purdue University), Ninghui Li (Purdue University)

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