Qixuan Guo (Beijing Jiaotong University), Yongzhong He (Beijing Jiaotong University)

When a vulnerability is detected in a specific software version, it is critical to trace the commit history to accurately identify the first commit where the vulnerability was introduced, known as Vulnerability-Introducing Commit(VIC).
This article proposes a method to accurately identify the VIC based on differential analysis of vulnerability patching patterns. Firstly, we compare the two files, before and after patching a vulnerability, to classify vulnerability-related statements in the patch into different patching patterns, such as coding errors, improper data flow, misplaced statements, and missing critical checks. Then, based on the patching patterns, we extract a vulnerability-critical statement sequence from the vulnerable file and match it with the earlier commits to determine the introducing commit. To evaluate the effectiveness of this method, we collected a dataset comprising 6,920 CVEs and 5,859,238 commits from open-source software, including the Linux kernel, MySQL, and OpenSSL, etc. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method achieves a detection accuracy of 94.94% and a recall rate of 86.92%, significantly outperforming existing approaches.

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Jonathan Evertz (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Niklas Risse (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Nicolai Neuer (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), Andreas Müller (Ruhr University Bochum), Philipp Normann (TU Wien), Gaetano Sapia (Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy), Srishti Gupta (Sapienza University of Rome), David Pape (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security),…

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ropbot: Reimaging Code Reuse Attack Synthesis

Kyle Zeng (Arizona State University), Moritz Schloegel (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Christopher Salls (UC Santa Barbara), Adam Doupé (Arizona State University), Ruoyu Wang (Arizona State University), Yan Shoshitaishvili (Arizona State University), Tiffany Bao (Arizona State University)

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Poster: Secure and Scalable Rerouting in LEO Satellite Networks

Lyubomir Yanev (ETH Zurich), Pietro Ronchetti (ETH Zurich), Joshua Smailes (University of Oxford), Martin Strohmeier (armasuisse Science + Technology)

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