Kaihua Wang (Tsinghua University), Jianjun Chen (Tsinghua University), Pinji Chen (Tsinghua University), Jianwei Zhuge (Tsinghua University), Jiaju Bai (Beihang University), Haixin Duan (Tsinghua University)

QUIC is a modern transport protocol increasingly adopted by major platforms and services, making its security and correctness critically important. However, the complexity of QUIC specification and implementations introduces opportunities for subtle and dangerous logic flaws. Existing QUIC testing tools primarily focus on memory-related vulnerabilities and are ill-equipped to detect logical vulnerabilities. Therefore, the discovery of logical vulnerabilities is currently still highly dependent on manual auditing.

In this paper, we introduce MerCuriuzz, a novel black-box fuzzing framework designed to automatically uncover logical vulnerabilities in QUIC implementations. We evaluated MerCuriuzz against 16 widely used QUIC implementations and discovered 14 previously unknown logical vulnerabilities affecting popular implementations such as quiche, xquic, and aioquic. Those vulnerabilities can pose severe security risks, enabling attackers to exhaust server resources, crash services, or deny legitimate users access to the server. We categorize those vulnerabilities into six categories and propose mitigation strategies. We also responsibly disclosed our findings to the affected vendors, and 11 of them were confirmed and rewarded by the vendors, such as Cloudflare and Alibaba Cloud.

View More Papers

Unveiling BYOVD Threats: Malware's Use and Abuse of Kernel...

Andrea Monzani (University of Milan), Antonio Parata (University of Milan), Andrea Oliveri (EURECOM), Simone Aonzo (EURECOM), Davide Balzarotti (EURECOM), Andrea Lanzi (University of Milan)

Read More

PIRANHAS: PrIvacy-Preserving Remote Attestation in Non-Hierarchical Asynchronous Swarms

Jonas Hofmann (Technical University of Darmstadt), Philipp-Florens Lehwalder (Technical University of Darmstadt), Shahriar Ebrahimi (Alan Turing Institute), Parisa Hassanizadeh (IPPT PAN / University of Warwick), Sebastian Faust (Technical University of Darmstadt)

Read More

PhantomMotion: Laser-Based Motion Injection Attacks on Wireless Security Surveillance...

Yan He (University of Oklahoma), Guanchong Huang (University of Oklahoma), Song Fang (University of Oklahoma)

Read More