Alireza Mohammadi (University of Michigan-Dearborn), Hafiz Malik (University of Michigan-Dearborn) and Masoud Abbaszadeh (GE Global Research)

Recent automotive hacking incidences have demonstrated that when an adversary manages to gain access to a safety-critical CAN, severe safety implications will ensue. Under such threats, this paper explores the capabilities of an adversary who is interested in engaging the car brakes at full speed and would like to cause wheel lockup conditions leading to catastrophic road injuries. This paper shows that the physical capabilities of a CAN attacker can be studied through the lens of closed-loop attack policy design. In particular, it is demonstrated that the adversary can cause wheel lockups by means of closed-loop attack policies for commanding the frictional brake actuators under a limited knowledge of the tire-road interaction characteristics. The effectiveness of the proposed wheel lockup attack policy is shown via numerical simulations under different road conditions.

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What the Fork? Finding and Analyzing Malware in GitHub...

Alan Cao (New York University) and Brendan Dolan-Gavitt (New York University)

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Demo #12: Too Afraid to Drive: Systematic Discovery of...

Ziwen Wan (UC Irvine), Junjie Shen (UC Irvine), Jalen Chuang (UC Irvine), Xin Xia (UCLA), Joshua Garcia (UC Irvine), Jiaqi Ma (UCLA) and Qi Alfred Chen (UC Irvine)

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FANDEMIC: Firmware Attack Construction and Deployment on Power Management...

Ryan Tsang (University of California, Davis), Doreen Joseph (University of California, Davis), Qiushi Wu (University of California, Davis), Soheil Salehi (University of California, Davis), Nadir Carreon (University of Arizona), Prasant Mohapatra (University of California, Davis), Houman Homayoun (University of California, Davis)

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