Alireza Mohammadi (University of Michigan-Dearborn) and Hafiz Malik (University of Michigan-Dearborn)

Motivated by ample evidence in the automotive cybersecurity literature that the car brake ECUs can be maliciously reprogrammed, it has been shown that an adversary who can directly control the frictional brake actuators can induce wheel lockup conditions despite having a limited knowledge of the tire-road interaction characteristics. In this paper, we investigate the destabilizing effect of such wheel lockup attacks on the lateral motion stability of vehicles from a robust stability perspective. Furthermore, we propose a quadratic programming (QP) problem that the adversary can solve for finding the optimal destabilizing longitudinal slip reference values.

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Preventing Kernel Hacks with HAKCs

Derrick McKee (Purdue University), Yianni Giannaris (MIT CSAIL), Carolina Ortega (MIT CSAIL), Howard Shrobe (MIT CSAIL), Mathias Payer (EPFL), Hamed Okhravi (MIT Lincoln Laboratory), Nathan Burow (MIT Lincoln Laboratory)

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(Short) Object Removal Attacks on LiDAR-based 3D Object Detectors

Zhongyuan Hau, Kenneth Co, Soteris Demetriou, and Emil Lupu (Imperial College London) Best Short Paper Award Runner-up!

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Analyzing and Creating Malicious URLs: A Comparative Study on...

Vincent Drury (IT-Security Research Group, RWTH Aachen University), Rene Roepke (Learning Technologies Research Group, RWTH Aachen University), Ulrik Schroeder (Learning Technologies Research Group, RWTH Aachen University), Ulrike Meyer (IT-Security Research Group, RWTH Aachen University)

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Too Afraid to Drive: Systematic Discovery of Semantic DoS...

Ziwen Wan (University of California, Irvine), Junjie Shen (University of California, Irvine), Jalen Chuang (University of California, Irvine), Xin Xia (The University of California, Los Angeles), Joshua Garcia (University of California, Irvine), Jiaqi Ma (The University of California, Los Angeles), Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine)

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