Prabhjot Singh (University of Waterloo), Diogo Barradas (University of Waterloo), Tariq Elahi (University of Edinburgh), Noura Limam (University of Waterloo)

Despite the implementation of encrypted channels, such as those offered by anonymity networks like Tor, network adversaries have demonstrated the ability to compromise users’ browsing privacy through website fingerprinting attacks. This paper studies the susceptibility of Tor users to website fingerprinting when data is exchanged over low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite Internet links. Specifically, we design an experimental testbed that incorporates a Starlink satellite Internet connection, allowing us to collect a dataset for evaluating the success of website fingerprinting attacks in satellite environments compared to conventional fiber connections. Our findings suggest that Tor traffic transmitted via Starlink is as vulnerable to fingerprinting attacks as traffic over fiber links, despite the distinct networking characteristics of Starlink connections in contrast to fiber.

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Modeling and Detecting Internet Censorship Events

Elisa Tsai (University of Michigan), Ram Sundara Raman (University of Michigan), Atul Prakash (University of Michigan), Roya Ensafi (University of Michigan)

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SigmaDiff: Semantics-Aware Deep Graph Matching for Pseudocode Diffing

Lian Gao (University of California Riverside), Yu Qu (University of California Riverside), Sheng Yu (University of California, Riverside & Deepbits Technology Inc.), Yue Duan (Singapore Management University), Heng Yin (University of California, Riverside & Deepbits Technology Inc.)

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Understanding the Internet-Wide Vulnerability Landscape for ROS-based Robotic Vehicles...

Wentao Chen, Sam Der, Yunpeng Luo, Fayzah Alshammari, Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine)

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LARMix: Latency-Aware Routing in Mix Networks

Mahdi Rahimi (KU Leuven), Piyush Kumar Sharma (KU Leuven), Claudia Diaz (KU Leuven)

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