Prabhjot Singh (University of Waterloo), Diogo Barradas (University of Waterloo), Tariq Elahi (University of Edinburgh), Noura Limam (University of Waterloo)

Despite the implementation of encrypted channels, such as those offered by anonymity networks like Tor, network adversaries have demonstrated the ability to compromise users’ browsing privacy through website fingerprinting attacks. This paper studies the susceptibility of Tor users to website fingerprinting when data is exchanged over low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite Internet links. Specifically, we design an experimental testbed that incorporates a Starlink satellite Internet connection, allowing us to collect a dataset for evaluating the success of website fingerprinting attacks in satellite environments compared to conventional fiber connections. Our findings suggest that Tor traffic transmitted via Starlink is as vulnerable to fingerprinting attacks as traffic over fiber links, despite the distinct networking characteristics of Starlink connections in contrast to fiber.

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Scrappy: SeCure Rate Assuring Protocol with PrivacY

Kosei Akama (Keio University), Yoshimichi Nakatsuka (ETH Zurich), Masaaki Sato (Tokai University), Keisuke Uehara (Keio University)

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It’s Standards’ Time to Shine: Insights for IoT Cybersecurity...

Dr. Michael J. Fagan, National Institute of Standards and Technology

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Decentralized Information-Flow Control for ROS2

Nishit V. Pandya (Indian Institute of Science Bangalore), Himanshu Kumar (Indian Institute of Science Bangalore), Gokulnath M. Pillai (Indian Institute of Science Bangalore), Vinod Ganapathy (Indian Institute of Science Bangalore)

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Reverse Engineering of Multiplexed CAN Frames (Long)

Alessio Buscemi, Thomas Engel (SnT, University of Luxembourg), Kang G. Shin (The University of Michigan)

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