Filipo Sharevski (DePaul University), Mattia Mossano, Maxime Fabian Veit, Gunther Schiefer, Melanie Volkamer (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

QR codes, designed for convenient access to links, have recently been appropriated as phishing attack vectors. As this type of phishing is relatively and many aspects of the threat in real conditions are unknown, we conducted a study in naturalistic settings (n=42) to explore how people behave around QR codes that might contain phishing links. We found that 28 (67%) of our participants opened the link embedded in the QR code without inspecting the URL for potential phishing cues. As a pretext, we used a poster that invited people to scan a QR code and contribute to a humanitarian aid. The choice of a pretext was persuasive enough that 22 (52%) of our participants indicated that it was the main reason why they scanned the QR code and accessed the embedded link in the first place. We used three link variants to test if people are able to spot a potential phishing threat associated with the poster’s QR code (every participant scanned only one variant). In the variants where the link appeared legitimate or it was obfuscated by a link shortening service, only two out of 26 participants (8%) abandoned the URL when they saw the preview in the QR code scanner app. In the variant when the link explicitly contained the word “phish” in the domain name, this ratio rose to 7 out of 16 participants (44%). We use our findings to propose usable security interventions in QR code scanner apps intended to warn users about potentially phishing links.

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CAGE: Complementing Arm CCA with GPU Extensions

Chenxu Wang (Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech) and The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Fengwei Zhang (Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech)), Yunjie Deng (Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech)), Kevin Leach (Vanderbilt University), Jiannong Cao (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Zhenyu Ning (Hunan University), Shoumeng Yan (Ant Group), Zhengyu He (Ant…

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AAKA: An Anti-Tracking Cellular Authentication Scheme Leveraging Anonymous Credentials

Hexuan Yu (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), Changlai Du (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), Yang Xiao (University of Kentucky), Angelos Keromytis (Georgia Institute of Technology), Chonggang Wang (InterDigital), Robert Gazda (InterDigital), Y. Thomas Hou (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), Wenjing Lou (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)

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Automatic Adversarial Adaption for Stealthy Poisoning Attacks in Federated...

Torsten Krauß (University of Würzburg), Jan König (University of Würzburg), Alexandra Dmitrienko (University of Wuerzburg), Christian Kanzow (University of Würzburg)

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Private Aggregate Queries to Untrusted Databases

Syed Mahbub Hafiz (University of California, Davis), Chitrabhanu Gupta (University of California, Davis), Warren Wnuck (University of California, Davis), Brijesh Vora (University of California, Davis), Chen-Nee Chuah (University of California, Davis)

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