Sirvan Almasi (Imperial College London), William J. Knottenbelt (Imperial College London)

Password composition policies (PCPs) are critical security rules that govern how users create passwords for online authentication. Despite passwords remaining the primary authentication method online, there is significant disagreement among experts, regulatory bodies, and researchers about what constitutes effective password policies. This lack of consensus has led to high variance in PCP implementations across websites, leaving both developers and users uncertain. Current approaches lack a theoretical foundation for evaluating and comparing different password composition policies. We show that a structure-based policy, such as the three-random words recommended by UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), can improve password security. We demonstrate this using an empirical evaluation of labelled password datasets and a new theoretical framework. Using these methods we demonstrate the feasibility and security of multi-word password policy and extend the NCSC’s recommendation to five words to account for nonuniform word selection. These findings provide an evidence-based framework for password policy development and suggest that current web authentication systems should adjust their minimum word requirements upward while maintaining usability.

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Martin Unterguggenberger (Graz University of Technology), Lukas Lamster (Graz University of Technology), David Schrammel (Graz University of Technology), Martin Schwarzl (Cloudflare, Inc.), Stefan Mangard (Graz University of Technology)

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