Oliver D. Reithmaier (Leibniz University Hannover), Thorsten Thiel (Atmina Solutions), Anne Vonderheide (Leibniz University Hannover), Markus Dürmuth (Leibniz University Hannover)

Email phishing to date still is the most common attack on IT systems. While early research has focused on collective and large-scale phishing campaign studies to enquire why people fall for phishing, such studies are limited in their inference regarding individual or contextual influence of user phishing detection. Researchers tried to address this limitation using scenario-based or role-play experiments to uncover individual factors influencing user phishing detection. Studies using these methods unfortunately are also limited in their ability to generate inference due to their lack of ecological validity and experimental setups. We tackle this problem by introducing PhishyMailbox, a free and open-source research software designed to deploy mail sorting tasks in a simulated email environment. By detailing the features of our app for researchers and discussing its security and ethical implications, we demonstrate the advantages it provides over previously used paradigms for scenario-based research, especially regarding ecological validity as well as generalizability through larger possible sample sizes.We report excellent usability statistics from a preliminary sample of usable security scientists and discuss ethical implications of the app. Finally, we discuss future implementation opportunities of PhishyMailbox in research designs leveraging signal detection theory, item response theory and eye tracking applications.

View More Papers

Modeling End-User Affective Discomfort With Mobile App Permissions Across...

Yuxi Wu (Georgia Institute of Technology and Northeastern University), Jacob Logas (Georgia Institute of Technology), Devansh Ponda (Georgia Institute of Technology), Julia Haines (Google), Jiaming Li (Google), Jeffrey Nichols (Apple), W. Keith Edwards (Georgia Institute of Technology), Sauvik Das (Carnegie Mellon University)

Read More

Ring of Gyges: Accountable Anonymous Broadcast via Secret-Shared Shuffle

Wentao Dong (City University of Hong Kong), Peipei Jiang (Wuhan University; City University of Hong Kong), Huayi Duan (ETH Zurich), Cong Wang (City University of Hong Kong), Lingchen Zhao (Wuhan University), Qian Wang (Wuhan University)

Read More

TME-Box: Scalable In-Process Isolation through Intel TME-MK Memory Encryption

Martin Unterguggenberger (Graz University of Technology), Lukas Lamster (Graz University of Technology), David Schrammel (Graz University of Technology), Martin Schwarzl (Cloudflare, Inc.), Stefan Mangard (Graz University of Technology)

Read More