Cédric Solenthaler (ETH Zurich), Joshua Smailes (University of Oxford), Martin Strohmeier (armasuisse Science & Technology)

An increase in availability of Software Defined Radios (SDRs) has caused a dramatic shift in the threat landscape of legacy satellite systems, opening them up to easy spoofing attacks by low-budget adversaries. Physical-layer authentication methods can help improve the security of these systems by providing additional validation without modifying the space segment. This paper extends previous research on Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) of satellite communication to the Orbcomm satellite formation. The GPS and Iridium constellations are already well covered in prior research, but the feasibility of transferring techniques to other formations has not yet been examined, and raises previously undiscussed challenges. In this paper, we collect a novel dataset containing 8992474 packets from the Orbcom satellite constellation using different SDRs and locations. We use this dataset to train RFF systems based on convolutional neural networks. We achieve an ROC AUC score of 0.53 when distinguishing different satellites within the constellation, and 0.98 when distinguishing legitimate satellites from SDRs in a spoofing scenario. We also demonstrate the possibility of mixing datasets using different SDRs in different physical locations.

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SCAMMAGNIFIER: Piercing the Veil of Fraudulent Shopping Website Campaigns

Marzieh Bitaab (Arizona State University), Alireza Karimi (Arizona State University), Zhuoer Lyu (Arizona State University), Adam Oest (Amazon), Dhruv Kuchhal (Amazon), Muhammad Saad (X Corp.), Gail-Joon Ahn (Arizona State University), Ruoyu Wang (Arizona State University), Tiffany Bao (Arizona State University), Yan Shoshitaishvili (Arizona State University), Adam Doupé (Arizona State University)

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Query Privacy in Data Spaces

Shuwen Liu (School of Data Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China), George C. Polyzos (School of Data Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China and ExcID P.C., Athens, Greece)

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Probe-Me-Not: Protecting Pre-trained Encoders from Malicious Probing

Ruyi Ding (Northeastern University), Tong Zhou (Northeastern University), Lili Su (Northeastern University), Aidong Adam Ding (Northeastern University), Xiaolin Xu (Northeastern University), Yunsi Fei (Northeastern University)

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